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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the politics, foreign policies and diplomacy ~d of Australia and New 
Zealand in the Second World War focusing upon relations between ihe two countries. It is 
a study of the decline of the British Empire-Commonwealth and rise of the United States 
and the differing ways in which the Australian and New Zealand governments reacted to 
these dramatic changes. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments were drawn together twice to meet 
two uncomfortable outside influences - one a threatening Japanese invasion, and secondly 
United States intentions in the Pacific, affecting Australian freedom of action. 
The Japanese threat was significant because the Australian and New Zealand 
governments reacted in different ways to the declining power of the Empire-Commonwealth 
in relation to the rising power of the United States in the Pacific. The Australian 
government's relations with the Empire-Commonwealth soured dramatically as Curtin's 
government appeared to move out of the imperial framework and sought close relations 
with the United States. The New Zealand government, in contrast, was more inclined to 
remain within the imperial framework and did not react dramatically to the decline of the 
Empire-Commonwealth. 
These divergent reactions help to explain the differences of opinion between the 
Australian and New Zealand governments over manpower and the location of their armed 
forces - respectively in Pacific and the Mediterranean. 
The second outside uncomfortable influence, the United States increasing interest in 
the Pacific from mid 1943, led to the Australian-New Zealand Agreement which was a 
landmark in trans-Tasman relations. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 
This thesis deals with the politics, foreign policies and diplomacy and of Australia 
and New Zealand in the Second World War focusing upon relations between the two 
countries. It is a study of the decline of the British Empire-Commonwealth and rise of the 
United States and the differing ways in which the Australian and New Zealand governments 
reacted to these dramatic changes. The official policies of the Australian and New Zealand 
governments are considered, focusing upon the politicians and diplomats, and paying special 
attention to trans-Tasman relations. 
Much has been written about the decline of the British Empire-Commonwealth, and 
the rise of the United States during the Second World War. 1 Within this framework there 
have been a considerable number of publications written about Australia's policies in the 
Second World War. Hasluck wrote the comprehensive two volume official history/ 
whereas Robertson has described Australia's war experiences.3 Homer has edited a 
readable collection of essays about the military side of the war. 4 He also has provided a 
credible account of Australia's evolution of an independent foreign policy. 5 Bell has 
discussed Australia's relations with the United States6 while staunch Australian nationalist 
Day described Australia's relations with Britain.7 However, there has been a dearth of 
material written about Australia's relations with New Zealand during this period. 
1 For example see Wm.R Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and Decolonisation of the British 
Empire, 1941-1945, (Oxford, 1977); H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese andAllied Pacific 
strategies to April 1942, (Maryland, 1982); S. Dockrill, (Ed) From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: the Second 
World War in Asia and the Pacific 1941-1945, (New York, 1994); and A Iriye, The Origins of the Second 
World War in Asia and the Pacific, (London & New York, 1989). For a broader survey see P. Calvocoressi, 
G. Wint & 1. Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War, volume II: The 
Greater East Asian and Pacific Conflict, (London, 1989). 
2 P. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941 (volume I); P. Hasluck, The Government and the 
People 1942-1945 (volume II) {both published in Canberra respectively in 1952 & 1970). 
31. Robertson, Australia at War, 1939-1945, (Canberra 1981). 
4 D. Homer, (Ed) The Battles that Shaped Australia, (St Leonards, NSW, 1994). 
5 D. Homer, High Command: Australia's struggle for an independent war strategy. 1939-1945, (St 
Leonards, NSW, 1992). See A Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965, (London, 
1967). See also D. Day, (Ed) Brave New World: Dr H.v. Evatt andAustralian Foreign Policy 1941-1949, 
(St Lucia, 1996). 
6 R Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American relations and the Pacific War, (Melbourne, 1977). 
7 Days' accounts are more controversial but well written. See D. Day, The Great Betrayal: Britain, 
Australia & The Onset of the Pacific War 1939-1943, (New York, 1989); D. Day, Reluctant Nation: 
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New Zealand has received less coverage on the Second World War than Australia, 
apart from the fifty volume official history. In this collection Wood wrote the volume on 
external affairs. 8 There is, however, a distinct lack of debate on New Zealand's experience 
in the war. Lissington's accounts touched on the war but focused upon New Zealand's 
relations with Japan and the United States.9 Trotter discussed New Zealand's relations with 
Japan but focused on the postwar period. 10 
Very little has been written about trans-Tasman relations. Sinclair dealt with 
relations between Australia and New Zealand both before and after the Second World War 
but has omitted the war period. 11 Alan and Robin Burnett's account12 touched on military 
aspects of the war and mentioned the Anzac connection but its primary focus was upon 
Australia and New Zealand after the Second World War, particularly trade, immigration and 
transport. Moore13 referred to the war and mentioned both Australia and New Zealand in 
the context. His focus, however, was Australian-American relations and consequently he 
has not seriously considered Australian-New Zealand relations. Kay edited the 
comprehensive documents volume on the Australian-New Zealand Agreement. 14 Reese15 
provided the closest to a comprehensive survey of trans-Tasman relations in the context of 
the decline of the Empire-Commonwealth and the rise of the United States. What he wrote 
is sound, however he omitted mentioning the war before Pearl Harbor. His account 
continues well into the postwar period concluding with the Vietnam War and is largely 
based on printed sources. Because of his chosen period, Reese's study inevitabil~ focuses X... 
upon Australia's and New Zealand's relations with the United States and trans-Tasman 
relations are a minor theme. 
Australia and the Allied defeat of Japan 1942-1945, (Melbourne, 1992); D. Day, Menzies and Churchill at 
War, (Melbourne, 1993). 
8 F.L.W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War: political and external affairs, (Wellington, 1971). 
9 M.P. Lissington, New Zealand and the United States, 1840-1944, (Wellington, 1972); and M.P. 
Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, 1900-1941, (Wellington, 1972). 
10 A Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 1945-1952: the occupation and the peace treaty, (London, 1990). 
11 K. Sinclair, (Ed) Tasman Relations: New Zealand and Australia, 1788-1988, (Auckland, 1987). 
12 A Burnett & R Burnett, The Australia and New Zealand Nexus, (Canberra, 1978). 
13 lR. Moore (Ed), The American Alliance: Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1940-1970, 
(North Melbourne, 1970). 
14 R Kay, The Australian-New Zealand Agreement 1944, (Wellington, 1972). 
15 T.R Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States: a survey of International Relations 1941-
1968, (Oxford, 1969). 
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This thesis is a modest attempt to break new ground. It goes further than Reese 
because it deals with the Second World War more fully, considers trans-Tasman relations 
prior to Pearl Harbor, and uses some archival sources. Because of my chosen time-frame 
(1938-1944) this thesis not only deals with Australia's and New Zealand's relations with the 
United States but also deals with their relations with the Empire-Commonwealth. It focuses 
on trans-Tasman relations within the context of the declining power of the Empire-
Commonwealth and the rising power of the United States and examines the contrasting 
responses of Australia and New Zealand to this changing world order. It is a study of trans-
Tasman relations in a vital time of transition. 
Chapter two looks at the state of trans-Tasman relations before the Second World 
War. The Australian and New Zealand governments operated within an imperial framework 
based on the British Commonwealth ofNations16 and consequently, while their relations 
with Britain were strong, relations between each other were seen as less important. The 
effect of the outbreak of the Second World War upon trans-Tasman relations is examined in 
chapter three. 
The dramatic entry of Japan in December 1941 marked a turning point in trans-
Tasman relations. Both were concerned with the uncomfortable outside influence of the 
threat of Japanese invasion. Their reactions to this threat are examined in chapter four, as 
are their contrasting reactions to the decline of the Empire-Commonwealth and the rise of 
the United States in this period.· This crucial transitional period had a deep effect upon the 
Australian and New Zealand governments. Chapter five looks at how this helps to explain 
their later differences of opinions about manpower, the locations of their armed forces and 
their approaches to external affairs. 
The second uncomfortable outside influence faced by the Australian and New 
Zealand governments ~ was the United States' intentions in the Pacific from mid 1943. 
This is the focus of chapter six. This concern led to the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement, which was a landmark in trans-Tasman relations. 
16 The British Commonwealth of Nations will hereafter be referred as the Empire-Commonwealth. 
4 
The Second World War saw the first phase of Australian-New Zealand diplomatic 
relations. The Tasman neighbours came together because they were now threatened by new 
outside influences as never before. Japan's bid for hegemony, Britain's admission that its 
power in the Pacific was limited, with the emergence of the United States as a super power 
presented challenges to Australia and New Zealand which required new sources of support 
without abandoning traditional ties. 
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Chapter 2 
Strangers across the Tasman: Australia and New Zealand 1938-1939 
Australia and New Zealand had similar pre-war plans and policies. This was because they 
both adhered to the system of imperial defence that was centred upon London. Both the 
southern dominions were considered to be distant outposts of the Empire-Commonwealth. 
This distance was compensated for by the Royal Navy which maintained the unity of the 
Empire-Commonwealth by attempting to control the seas. From the early 1920s both 
Australia's and New Zealand's defence policies were reliant upon the Main Fleet reaching 
the naval base at Singapore as soon as hostilities began in the Far East. The Singapore base 
became the symbol of the presence of the Empire-Commonwealth in the Indian Ocean, and 
to a lesser degree, in the Pacific. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments held remarkably similar views upon 
defence and foreign policy considering the low level of consultation between the two 
dominions. That they held similar views was determined by their sharing similar 
assumptions that were generally based upon concepts of imperial defence. They had far 
greater contact with Britain than they did with each other. Consequently, they were 
influenced by the information they received from Britain. Consultation across the Tasman 
was minimal and despite this both dominions developed such similar policies in the period 
leading up to the outbreak of the war in Europe. 
Trans-Tasman relations prior to the Second World War can only be understood 
within the imperial framework in which they operated. Both Australia and New Zealand, as 
dominions, organised much of their defence and foreign policy through Britain. Although 
neither country had adopted the 1931 Statue of Westminster, this did not discourage either 
from pursuing independent policies when they so desired. The Australian and New Zealand 
governments communicated with Britain regularly, but communications with each other 
were the exception rather than the rule. This was a choice as the Trans-Tasman cable had 
been installed at Cable Bay, near Nelson, in 1876.1 The system of imperial communication 
1 I. McGibbon, 'Australian-New Zealand Defence Relations to 1939', in Sinclair Tasman Relations: New 
Zealand andAustralia, 1788-1988, (Auckland, 1987) p 164-165. 
was complex. If the New Zealand Prime Minister wanted to cable the British Prime 
Minister he would first give his cable to the Governor-General who would send it to the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs who would pass on the message to the British 
Prime Minister. 2 This system was continued in New Zealand until 1 February 1941 when 
the Governor-General was eliminated from the chain of communication. This was because 
of delays that were caused when the Prime Minister wished to send a cable when the 
Governor General was absent from Wellington. 
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The low level of contact between the Australian and New Zealand governments was 
not surprising considering the low levels of trade that crossed the Tasman Sea in the 1930s. 
However, Australia and New Zealand had not always had poor trading relations. In the 
nineteenth century the Tasman neighbours traded heavily with each other. For a time 
Australia was New Zealand's greatest export market, and its main supplier of imports. In 
1865, 70% of New Zealand's exports went to Australia and even as late as 1871,44 % of 
total exports went to Australia.3 New Zealand's imports were far more diversified in their 
markets than its exports. Despite this, Australia was the greatest source of imports peaking 
at 60% in 1862. Between 1875 and 1914, Britain replaced Australia as New Zealand's 
main export market consuming approximately 80% of total exports in 1915, 1916, and 
1917. Imports from Australia also decreased from the late nineteenth century, falling as low 
as 7% of the total in 1929.4 Britain continued as both Australia's and New Zealand's main 
export market. This trend was encouraged by the Imperial Economic Conference of 1932, 
where it was decided that tariffs were to be adjusted in a way that gave preference to British 
trade and that of countries in the British Empire. Despite this incentive, the quantity of 
trans-Tasman trade remained extremely low. In 1938 and 1939, less than 4 % of New 
Zealand's total exports went to Australia.5 In the same period less than 14 % of New 
Zealand's imports came from Australia. As the Australian market was far larger than the 
New Zealand one, this accounted for an average of only 4.6 % of Australia's exports in 
2 Documents on New Zealand External Relations Volume 1, R. Kay (Ed) The Australia-New Zealand 
Agreement, (Wellington, 1972) p XXV. (Hereafter referred to as DNZER 1) 
3 The New Zealand Official Year Book 1945, (Compiled in the Census & Statistics Department of the 
Dominion of New Zealand, Wellington, 1945), p 694. 
4 Ibid, P 713. 
5 The New Zealand Official Year Book 1940, (Complied in the Census & Statistics Department of the 
Dominion of New Zealand, Wellington, 1940), p 240. The New Zealand Official Year Book 1941, 
(Compiled in the Census & Statistics Department ofthe Dominion of New Zealand, Wellington, 1941), p 
195. 
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1937-38 and 1938-39. Australia's imports from across the Tasman were even smaller than 
its exports in 1938-39, New Zealand supplying only 1.9 % of total imports.6 The level of 
trade between Australia and New Zealand in 1938 to 1939 was at best modest and at worst 
trivial. New Zealand's main exports were meat, wool, butter and cheese, while Australia's 
main exports were meat (7.8% of the total) and wool (34% of the total), minerals and 
metals, some dairy products and fruit, some sugar and hides.7 Australia and New Zealand 
were competing for export markets when they exported the same goods. 
McGibbon notes that while Australian-New Zealand relations were close during war 
time, they swung to the other extreme of indifference during peacetime.8 The term 'Anzac' 
was coined in Egypt in 1915 after the wartime bond that was formed by Australians and 
New Zealanders on the battlefield at Gallipoli. Despite the shared experience of war that 
was exemplified by Gallipoli, any close relations that Australia and New Zealand had 
enjoyed faded after the First World War. Close trans-Tasman relations were not maintained 
without the significant unifying force of war. Subsequently, relations between the 
Australian and New Zealand governments had reached the level of indifference and apathy 
by 1938-1939. 
The Munich crisis in October 1938 stimulated the New Zealand government to 
review its defences. Italy, although a signatory of the Munich Agreement, was now 
considered a potential threat. This was because of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 in 
breech ofthe Covenant of the League of Nations, and its assistance to General Franco in the 
Spanish Civil War.9 As the threat of the Italian Navy to the Royal Navy had not entered 
previous strategic equations, New Zealand's defence needed to be reassessed. 
Consequently, Carl Berendsen, head of the Prime Minister's Department, said that the 
British Fleet would take some time to arrive, and even suggested the possibility that it might 
not arrive at all. It was inevitable that New Zealand would be left in the lurch for some 
time. Berendsen made the following observation to the Council of Defence on 21 
6 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 34 -1941, (Prepared under Instructions from 
The Honourable the Treasurer, Canberra), p 663. 
7 B. Dyster & D. Meredith, Australia in International Economy in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge! 
Melbourne, 1990) p 149. 
8 McGibbon, 'Australian-New Zealand Defence Relations,' p 164-165. 
9 P. Calvocoressi & G. Wint & J. Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War, 
volume 1: The Western Hemisphere, (London, 1989) p 69-73, & 84. 
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December 1938: 'we know with complete certainty that the British ships required to 
adequately support Singapore in the case of a war both in the East and the West are not 
only not built, they are not approved'. 10 Essentially, the fundamental issue was not when 
the fleet would arrive but whether such a fleet even existed, and if not, did the British intend 
to build or buy one? Such concerns were fully shared by Australian defence planners. They 
were best typified by the Australian Chief ofthe General Staff, John Lavarack, whose motto 
. was 'Trust in the Navy [Royal Navy] but keep your powder dry'.11 Generally, Australia 
voiced its defence concerns in a stronger, more forceful way than New Zealand did, partly 
because New Zealand was further from Japan and felt less threatened than Australia. 
That Singapore had become a compelling symbol was evident in the ceremony that 
surrounded the opening of its naval base on 14 February 1938 even though its defences and 
docking facilities were not completed. Although it was said to be an impregnable fortress, 
there may have been some quiet apprehension in New Zealand defence circles at the 
apparent complacency in the Admiralty. New Zealand's defence planners were also 
concerned that Fiji remained undefended, although it was vital to New Zealand's defence. 
If Fiji was to fall into enemy hands, an air attack could be launched upon New Zealand from 
Suva. Trans-Tasman co-ordination of defence to prevent strategically valuable Pacific 
Islands falling into hostile hands was lacking at this stage. 
The United States might have been a potential ally for Australia and New Zealand in 
the Pacific. However, neither country was ever certain of United States military support. 
The United States government does not seem to have had a consistent policy towards the 
Tasman neighbours. Attempts by Australia and New Zealand to foster closer relations with 
the United States met with a variety of responses which, when taken together, seemed to be 
ambiguous. The United States was strongly isolationist in the 1930s. In October 1935 
President Roosevelt told Joseph Aloysius Lyons, the Australian Prime Minister, 'that never 
again would the United States be drawn into a European war, regardless of the 
circumstances'.12 This attitude combined with the various Neutrality Acts, made it seem 
10 1. McGibbon, Blue Water Rationale: the naval defence of New Zealand, 1914-1942, (Wellington, 1981) p 
310. 
II Homer, High Command, p 11. 
12 Bell, Unequal Allies, p 11. 
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very unlikely that the United States would enter a European war. However, the United 
States would be more readily drawn into a Pacific War as this would not involve sending 
expeditionary forces to Europe. However, the Australian and New Zealand governments' 
impressions of the United States government's attitude towards entering a war in the Pacific 
remained ambiguous. Yet, on 14 April 1939, the United States displayed some friendliness 
towards Australia and New Zealand. Joseph Kennedy, the United States Ambassador in 
Britain, commented that, if Japan threatened Australia or New Zealand, 'whether by way of 
a direct descent upon them or indirectly in the fonn of an expedition against Singapore, it 
would be a matter to which the USA could hardly remain for long indifferent,.13 These 
friendly words contrasted dramatically with indications Australia received only the next 
month that the United States was in fact indifferent to the plight of Australia and New 
Zealand. In May, Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, was in 
Washington where he had a conversation with Roosevelt. He raised the possibility of a 
Japanese attack on Australia and received the ambiguous answer, 'Well Australia is a hell of 
a way off'. 14 Sadly for Australia, and also for New Zealand, this comment reflected the 
views ofthe United States' Cabinet. However, this apparent indifference did not last long. 
Three months later New Zealand gained a vastly different impression of the United States 
attitudes towards meeting the threat of Japan in the Pacific. Walter Nash, Minister of 
Finance, was in the United States (returning home from Britain) when he had a meeting 
with Roosevelt on 11 August 1939. Over a cup of tea, Roosevelt chatted about the recent 
visit of King George and Queen Elizabeth and asked Nash how he was getting on with his 
wife. When Nash eventually had the opportunity to raise the question of New Zealand's 
defence, the President replied that the United States would protect New Zealand and 
Australia if they were threatened by Japan. 15 These encouraging words, comforting though 
they certainly must have been, were by no means a fonnal military commitment from the 
United States. Australia and New Zealand had received mixed messages from the United 
States and consequently they did not know how they would react if Japan did prove to be a 
threat. 
13 McGibbon, Blue-water, p 334-335. 
14 Note by S.M. Bruce of Conversation with F.D. Roosevelt; Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, vol 
II, (Canberra, 1976) Doc 82, attachment 11. (Hereafter referred to as DAFP II) 
15 K. Sinclair, Walter Nash, (Auckland, 1976) p 189. 
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The Australian and New Zealand governments had little more than token levels of 
contact with each other in the year or so before the Second World War. It was common 
that the Australian and New Zealand governments, although only separated by the Tasman 
Sea, heard about each others' activities through Britain, literally half a world away. To 
rectify this peculiar situation Michael Joseph Savage, the New Zealand Prime Minister, on 
23 September 1938 cabled Lyons suggesting that they exchange information directly with 
each other rather than through Britain. He cited the example of an Australian defence paper 
that reached New Zealand as a British paper. Savage suggested to Lyons that 'we establish 
the principle of complete mutual interchange of information between Governments as 
opposed to between individual services' .16 Such information would be useful in peace times 
and could undoubtedly become invaluable during war. Nothing was done immediately and 
two months later Lieutenant Colonel William George Stevens, Secretary of the Organisation 
for National Security, commented that it is 'really absurd, in that we are hearing ofthe 
others activities per medium ofCID [Committee ofImperial Defence] papers,.17 Lyons did 
not reply until 3 March the following year, even though Savage gave him a friendly 
reminder on 22 December. 18 Lyons effectively poured cold water over New Zealand's 
suggestion. Although he agreed 'in principle' to the exchange of information, he did not 
explain which information Australia would be willing to exchange. He was adamant that 
any information relating to how Australian policy was formulated was to remain 
confidential. However, Lyons did see value in the exchange of broad policy and plans. He 
agreed to forward to New Zealand the Australian War Book. This was the whole of 
Australia's national planning for war explained in one book. Its aim was to provide clear 
instructions to all authorities on what their responsibilities were in effecting a smooth 
transition from peace to war. This book was modelled upon the British War Book. Military 
information was already exchanged across the Tasman between the armed services and 
Lyons suggested that the New Zealand government make use of this source rather than 
exchange the same information through political channels. Obviously, the Australian 
government was not receptive to the prospect of closer political relations with New 
Zealand. 
16 Savage to Lyons, 23 September 1938, DNZER I, Doc 1. 
17 McGibbon, Blue-water, p 310-311. 
18 DAFP I, Doc 355. 
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After this tentative exchange Savage, on 22 December 1938, asked the Australian 
government for its views upon holding a defence conference in New Zealand, noting that 
the British had already agreed to the proposal. The Australian Government agreed on 11 
January 1939 that the conference would be held in New Zealand. The aim of this 
conference was to discuss the strategic situation in the Pacific, in particular the ability of the 
British Fleet to come to Singapore and its expected time of arrival after the outbreak of 
hostilities in the East. It was also intended that this conference would provide an 
opportunity to 'discuss closer liaison between Australia and New Zealand'. 19 The New 
Zealand government recognised that trans-Tasman relations were virtually non-existent and 
that as war in Europe seemed imminent, this situation should be addressed. 
By taking the initiative in organising this conference, the New Zealand government 
revealed its fears about security and defence. It wished to re-examine Britain's ability to 
defend Australia and New Zealand now that Italy was considered a potential threat. Sir 
Harry Batterbee, the newly arrived British High Commissioner to New Zealand, bought out 
with him a Committee of Imperial Defence paper entitled 'New Zealand Co-operation in the 
Imperial Defence', dated 1 February 1939. This paper renewed Britain's intention to 
defend New Zealand: 'It will thus be seen that no change has occurred to affect the 
considerations which governed the undertaking given at the Imperial Conference in 1937, 
that in the event of war with Japan we should send a Fleet to Eastern waters irrespective of 
the situation elsewhere. ,20 This qualifier 'irrespective of the situation elsewhere' was the 
strongest assurance to date that the New Zealand government had received from Britain 
that it would defend the dominions in the Pacific. A Chiefs of Staff Paper dated 4 April 
1939 based New Zealand's defence upon this promise that the British Fleet would intervene 
against a hostile Japan?1 New Zealand's defence still rested upon Singapore and the arrival 
of the fleet. 
Australia's lack of enthusiasm for the conference was revealed on 1 April (only 13 
days before the Conference was opened in Wellington) when Savage was told that the 
Australian Minister for Defence was unable to attend. This was because of the political 
19 Ibid, Doc 335. 
20 McGibbon, Blue-water, P 313. 
21 Chiefs of Staff Paper, EA 1 81/4/3 pt 1, (National Archives). 
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I {\ 
turmoil ~anberra following the death of Lyons and the resulting struggle for the 
Premiership that was won by Robert Menzies. 
The Pacific Defence Conference opened on 14 April in Wellington. Both Australia 
and Britain failed to send ministerial representatives. It was attended by service delegates 
from Britain and Australia and New Zealand MPs, Civil Servants, Chiefs of Staff and the 
High Commissioner for Western Samoa.22 It was decided that the discussions and 
proceedings of the conference should be secret and given no publicity. There were three 
main topics at the conference: strategic considerations, air routes and supply. After general 
discussion the conference split into three committees to consider these three aspects. 
Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, Australian Chief of Naval Staff, admitted that Australia had in 
very recent times been preoccupied with domestic matters. He said 'I confess I wish that 
one of the Australian Ministers had been able to come over, but owing to affairs and 
circumstances that was impossible. As you know, they are facing a session very shortly and 
owing to the death of Mr. Lyons the issue has been further complicated,.23 At the 
conference the New Zealand delegation was suitably impressed by the defence measures 
that Australia had and was taking at Port Kembla, Port Moresby and Darwin. Australia's 
preparations for war had begun well before this conference. On 16 January 1939 Lyons had 
said that Australia's planning for war was so extensive that it had 'ramifications affecting 
every section of the community and, in fact, every individual,.24 The national planning for 
war originated in the Defence Department and was most fully explained in the 
Commonwealth War Book, which had already been forwarded to New Zealand. 
22 The Conference was attended by the following. New Zealand Delegation: M.J. Savage (Prime Minister), 
P. Fraser (Deputy Prime Minister), W. Nash (Minister of Finance), F. Jones (Minister of Defence), D. 
Sullivan (Minister ofIndustries & Commerce), Maj-Gen J.E. Duigan (Chief of General Staff), Commodore 
HE. Horan (Chief of Naval Staff), Gp Cpt H. W.L. Saunders (Chief of Air Staff), Gp Cpt T.M. Wilkes 
(Controller Civil Aviation), C.A Berendsen (permanent Head ofPMs Dept), B.C. Ashwin (Secretary to the 
Treasury), L.J. Schmitt (Secretary of Council of Defence). British Delegation: H Batterbee (High 
Commissioner to NZ), H Luke (Governor of Fiji & High Commissioner for Western Pacific), Vice-Admiral 
R. Colvin (representing the Admiralty), Maj-Gen P.J. Mackesy (representing the War Office), Air Marshal 
A Longmore (representing Air Ministry). Australian Delegation: Vice Admiral R. Colvin (Chief of Naval 
Staff, Australian Naval Board), Col V.AH Sturdee (representing Australian Military Board). All advisers 
& secretaries omitted from this list. 
23 Verbatim of Pacific Defence Conference, p B2. (Hereafter referred to as Verbatim) 
24 Hasluck, Govt & People vol I, p 120. 
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On the first morning of the conference Berendsen launched a methodical and logical 
analysis of the main fleet to Singapore strategy, the strength of the British Fleet and its 
expected time of arrival in Eastern waters. He examined the worst possible scenario, a war 
against Gennany, Italy and Japan. All the British evaluations that the Australian and New 
Zealand governments had received before the conference had not taken into account the 
possibility of a hostile Italy. They did not consider the effects that a hostile Italian Navy 
would have upon the Royal Navy's ability to defend the southern dominions in the Pacific. 
Berendsen exposed the weakness of the British assurance of June 1937 that a fleet would 
come to New Zealand if hostilities broke out in the East. He demonstrated that this British 
assertion actually depended upon the Royal Navy maintaining a certain standard of naval 
strength. As late as July 1938, this specified standard was not yet approved. He continued 
his argument to its powerful conclusion that British assurances regarding the size of the 
fleet to Singapore had become 'completely invalidated' .25 This' startling reflection ,26 was 
more so because Italy had not yet entered the defence equation. He continued his analysis 
up to the present, describing Britain's most recent indications, earlier that month, regarding 
the fleet and its time of arrival in Singapore as 'inevitably - indefinite'. 27 Berendsen 
expressed no doubt that Britain would dispatch as strong a fleet as possible as quickly as 
possible to reach Singapore if war with Japan began. However, he felt that the fleet might 
be of insufficient strength and sent too late.28 The delay before the fleet arrived would be at 
least 70 days as well as an indefinite period before departure. Japan would, therefore, have 
supremacy of the seas in the early phase of the war. Sir Arthur Longmore, Britain's 
delegation leader, admitted in a typically British under-statement that Berendsen's speech 
'shattered us somewhat, of course,?9 
Much discussion followed Berendsen's speech about the size of the fleet and its date 
of arrival after hostilities had broken out in the East. It was accepted that the Japanese 
would have the initiative in the Pacific until the Fleet arrived which was expected to be, all 
things considered, 90 days after the war in the East had begun.30 Although the prospect of 
25 Verbatim, p D6. 
26 Ibid, pEl. 
27 Ibid, P E3. 
28 Ibid, P E4. 
29 Ibid, P Fl. 
30 Ibid, P J3. 
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Japan's taking Singapore seemed unlikely, Longmore conceded that 'It is not entirely ruled 
out. ,31 Nash asked Longmore 'what do we do then to defend Australia and New Zealand 
when Singapore is gone and the fleet that comes after it is smashed up?' Longmore replied 
'take to the Waitomo Caves.' Nash, able to see the funny side in an alarmingly serious 
situation, responded that the glow-worm caves were 'The only place where we can see 
anything that is glowing. ,32 But the point had been made that Singapore and the Fleet were 
vital to Australia's and New Zealand's defence. The situation was not made any lighter by 
uncertainty about what the United States would do. Commodore Horan, New Zealand's 
Chief of Naval Staff, was particularly pessimistic, saying 'Personally I do not reckon on 
U. S.A. coming in on our side, no matter what happens. ,33 General Mackesay, representing 
Britain's War Office, explored the concept that Singapore was impregnable. He said 'The 
word impregnable means nothing. Nothing is impregnable .... My point is that although one 
hopes Singapore is safe - everything possible is done to make it safe - no human being can 
predict the outcome of a battle'. He continued that 'if Singapore went then New Zealand 
would be open to the very highest form of invasion. ,34 
It was a sad irony that at the very moment when the British delegates were busy 
attempting to persuade their Australian and New Zealand counterparts to continue their 
adherence to imperial defence, the Admiralty was reassessing the situation in a way that was 
less than favourable to the southern dominions. Anglo-French talks which began in late 
March stressed that the Mediterranean was more important than Singapore. Of Britain's 
ten capital ships, six would be needed in home waters and four in the Mediterranean.35 Any 
fleet to Singapore would deplete the Mediterranean or home forces. This decision about 
whether to send a fleet to Singapore was left to be decided later and would depend on the 
circumstances at the time. The Admiralty's evaluation of the situation in April led it to urge 
British politicians to withdraw from earlier assurances and to decrease their naval 
obligations to the Pacific. These developments show that Berendsen's analysis was 
31 Ibid, P n. 
32 Ibid, P L3. 
33 Ibid, P M3. 
34 Ibid, P 1Dl. 
35 W.D. McIntyre, New Zealand prepares for War: defence policy, 1919-1939, (Christchurch, 1988) p 216-
217. (Hereafter referred to as McIntyre, NZPW) 
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remarkably accurate. However, the British delegates in Wellington were not aware of these 
developments. 
Despite the New Zealand government's concerns about Singapore and the fleet, its 
commitment to the concept of sending an expeditionary force to Europe still remained 
strong. This was evident when Nash commented that if the situation in Europe was 
disastrous 'it does not matter whether we in the Pacific are all right or not'. 36 Italy was now 
considered to be a potential enemy and this should have featured more upon the outcome of 
this conference. At the conference Britain attempted to reassure the southern dominions 
that Singapore was a fortress, the fleet would arrive in time and that Japan at present would 
not move aggressively southwards. 
The conference was also an occasion where trans-Tasman co-operation was 
encouraged and many positive intentions were expressed. Australian and New Zealand 
naval squadrons were already training together on an annual basis, and now there was to be 
co-operation in air reconnaissance in the Pacific. Australia agreed to carry out air 
reconnaissance from New Guinea to the New Hebrides and New Zealand from the New 
Hebrides to Tonga, which involved establishing air strips at Suva. There was agreement 
that New Zealand and Australia should fully co-operate in the Tasman Sea with the Naval 
Board in Melbourne controlling sea lanes there and the New Zealand Naval Board in 
Wellington controlling the seas east of New Zealand .. Measures for improving New 
Zealand's defence were also discussed at the conference. 
Stevens raised concerns that communications across the Tasman were lacking. He 
said that all he knew about what was happening in Australia was what he read in the 
newspapers. When planning for defence, he wanted to know what the Australians were 
doing. 'Nothing comes from Australia to tell us what is the scheme they are proposing to 
establish.' He believed that this was an important issue that needed addressing. 'Whereas 
we do get from England the annual and quarterly reports, there is still something lacking 
that we get nothing of a similar nature from Australia, nor do we reciprocate. ,37 Peter 
Fraser, New Zealand's deputy Prime Minister, said that 'it is rather embarrassing for us to 
36 McGibbon, Blue-water, P 319. 
37 Verbatim P X2. 
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read in the cable news, information about what they (Australia) are doing when we have no 
information about the matter at all'.38 Berendsen supported New Zealand's complaint at the 
lack of information saying that 'we in New Zealand know less of our what our nearest 
neighbour [Australia] are doing than what the United Kingdom are doing. ,39 He wanted to 
know what Australia's equivalent of New Zealand's Organisation of National Security was 
doing, saying that Australia might benefit from information New Zealand could give. 
To facilitate trans-Tasman communication Nash suggested that representatives from 
New Zealand should attend meetings of Australia's Defence Council and that Australian 
representatives should be at New Zealand defence discussions. 40 Savage raised the adverse 
political implications of having a New Zealand representative on the Australian War 
Council. He said that such a representative 'might hear during an election campaign of 
certain things they do not want to hear' .41 Nash picked up this theme saying that if the 
Australian government was discussing compulsory military training, Australian politicians 
would not want New Zealand representatives 'eavesdropping' on such a controversial issue, 
especially if an election were near. It could be politically suicidal. Nevertheless, the New 
Zealand government and defence planners would be vitally interested in Australia's position 
on such an important issue. Colvin admitted reluctance in giving information to New 
Zealand. He said that this was because 'so many things touch on domestic politics and one 
can understand that even if one is not a politician. ,42 Savage sympathised with Colvin's 
position. 
In summary, many good intentions were expressed to improve trans-Tasman 
consultation. However, they were largely empty words, lacking substance. The views of 
Savage, Nash and Colvin demonstrated clearly that domestic politics were a higher priority 
that consultation across that Tasman. Trans-Tasman communication was directed by 
politics within Australia and New Zealand. This was a situation that suited politicians in 
Canberra and Wellington. 
38 Ibid, P X3. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, P Xl. 
41 Ibid, P X6. 
42 Ibid, P Yl. 
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The theme of imperial defence continued to persist in Australia and New Zealand, 
although its weaknesses had been exposed. David Day suggests that for Australia to doubt 
Britain's ability to hold Singapore was to doubt the strength of the Royal Navy that held 
together the Empire-Commonwealth. This was an uncomfortable thought for defence 
planners and foreign policy advisers. Accepting the declining power of the Empire-
Commonwealth had unwelcome political implications. It meant that Australia would have 
to spend vast amounts of money upon defence. This expense would possibly have involved 
increased taxes which would have been unpopular, especially following the recent political 
instability after Lyon's death. On a more positive note, Day mentions that the British, 
French and the Dutch had colonial possessions in the Pacific. Their combined navies 
together with the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor would provide a deterrent to the 
Japanese. This theory rested upon the assumption that Britain, France and the Netherlands 
would have navies available to serve in the Pacific as well as in the Mediterranean. It also 
assumed the willingness of the United States to become involved in hostilities or deterring 
the Japanese. This was by no means a certainty. The strongest element in Australia's and 
New Zealand's defence was their distance from Japan which would necessitate long supply 
and communication lines if they were invaded. Australia was also a vast country that would 
require a substantial invading force to occupy. 
In his first broadcast speech as Australian Prime Minister on 26 April 1939, Robert 
Menzies associated Australia with New Zealand in the Pacific. He asserted that Australia's 
place was in the Pacific; and declared that it could not rely on the Royal Navy without 
taking action itself As part of this, Australia needed to consult with other dominions, 
especially New Zealand. He said on 26 April 1939 'We must have full consultation and co-
operation with Great Britain, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada. But all those 
consultations must be on the basis that the primary risk in the Pacific is borne by New 
Zealand and ourselves,.43 This comment was particularly surprising coming from Menzies 
who had earned the reputation as a staunch loyalist to the Empire-Commonwealth. Yet in 
his first public broadcast he advocated acting independently of Britain and forming closer 
trans-Tasman relations. This shows that Menzies was not a blind loyalist but wanted to act 
in Australia's best interests. Menzies was receptive to closer trans-Tasman co-operation 
43 Broadcast Speech by Menzies, DAFP II, Doc 73. 
when he felt that Australia was faced with an unwelcome external influence such as the 
threat of war. 
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Chapter 3 
Independently following similar policies: Australia and New Zealand, 
September 1939- December 1941 
19 
There were striking similarities between the policies of Australia and New Zealand, in their, 
attitudes, actions and reactions to the war in Europe. The Australian and New Zealand 
governments had watched with concern as the situation in Europe in the late 1930s grew 
increasingly perilous. Events in Europe suggested that war was close at hand. The 
Gennans had moved into the Rhineland in 1936 and annexed Austria in 1938. They 
marched into Prague on 15 March 1939 and effectively destroyed the facade of the Munich 
agreement. Britain and France extended a guarantee to Poland on 31 March that would 
secure its independence from a hostile Gennany. The Australian government was infonned 
on 24 August that the British Prime Minister had two days earlier sent a letter to the 
Gennan Chancellor informing him that Britain fully intended to honour its guarantee to 
Poland. Consequently, when Gennan troops then crossed into Polish territory the 
Australian government realised that war was likely and at about 3.00 a.m. on 2 September 
Menzies broadcast on radio that Australia was on 'the very brink of war' . 1 
Australian and New Zealand politicians listened intently to Neville Chamberlain's 
solemn broadcast on 3 September announcing that Britain (not the Empire-Commonwealth) 
was at war with Gennany. However, poor atmospheric conditions and the resulting static 
in Wellington caused considerable uncertainty there about the message's meaning. Political 
authorities in Wellington had not heard Chamberlain clearly and did not know whether 
Britain was at war? The Tasman neighbours had expected official telegrams that would 
confinn the authenticity of Chamberlain's broadcast. None arrived, but telegrams were 
received at the Navy Office in both countries and these were taken as confinnation. 
Menzies, leading a minority coalition government (United Australia Party and 
United Country Party), without parliamentary debate or consulting his cabinet, responded 
1 Hasluck, Govt & People, vol 1, P 151. 
2 John Henderson Interview with Berendsen. 
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positively to Chamberlain's broadcast little over an hour later. At 9.15 p.rn. (Australian 
time) he announced to the nation 'It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially that, in 
consequence of a persistence by Germany in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain had 
declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war'. 3 Australia's response 
to Chamberlain's declaration was prompt as a symbol ofloyalty to Britain. From his 
statement, Menzies indicated that Australia had no option than to go to war. Hasluckf ~ 
commented that Australia went to war for three reasons: because of its membership to the 
Empire-Commonwealth, because if Britain were overrun Australia might suffer the same 
fate at the hands of Germany or Japan and finally because of Australia's views upon 
international morality.4 Menzies cabled Chamberlain and informed him that his seemingly 
uninspiring broadcast had 'moved Australia deeply'. 5 
New Zealand's response to Chamberlain ~as also prompt. Savage was ill, so _!<. 
Fraser his deputy, unlike Menzies, consulted the Cabinet and shortly before midnight (New 
Zealand time) the New Zealand government decided to declare war on Germany.6 At 1.55 
a.m. (4 September) the New Zealand government despatched a cable to Britain declaring its 
support and intention to participate in the war. It read 'His Majesty's Government in New 
Zealand desires immediately to associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom in honouring their pledged word,.7 This 'pledged word' was Britain's 
guarantee of Poland's neutrality from German aggression. These remarkably similar 
responses were the result of both countries' governments independently sharing similar 
assumptions about imperial defence. Both were members of the League of Nations and 
were strongly opposed to countries with powerful military forces overrunning countries 
with less powerful armed forces. As members of the Empire-Commonwealth, the 
Australian and New Zealand governments were inclined to follow Britain in external Affairs. 
It was almost inconceivable that Britain could be at war whilst the Tasman neighbours 
remained passive. 
3 Menzies to Chamberlain, 4 September 1939, DAFP II, Doc 192. 
4 Hasluck, Govt & People, vol 1, P 156. 
5 Menzies to Chamberlain, 4 September 1939, DAFP II, Doc 192. 
6 Henderson Interview with Stevens, p 10. 
7 Galway to Eden, 4 September 1939, Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second 
World War 1939-1945, vol I, (Wellington, 1949) Doc 9. (Hereafter referred to as Documents 1) 
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Although contact between Australia and New Zealand was minimal, relations were 
favourable on the outbreak of war in Europe. The Briti~had encour'!ged the exchange of 
CXJ teofl'{?,4tl { 
High Commissioners between Australia and Canada and ~supportlve of strengthening 
relations between all the dominions. The Australian Cabinet agreed on 5 September 1939 
to exchange High Commissioners with Canada, who made the request two days earlier. 
Menzies then wanted to follow suit with New Zealand. The Australian Cabinet 'resolved 
that negotiations should be opened with ... the Prime Minister of New Zealand for the 
reciprocal exchange of High Commissioners'. 8 Despite good intentions, these negotiations 
did not eventuate at the time. High Commissioners were not exchanged between Australia 
and New Zealand until 1943. 
An indication of the low level of trans-Tasman contact was reflected in the trading 
relations between the two countries. The bel~ illustrate that trade across the 
Tasman was limited while trade with Britain was heavy. 
TABLEt 
New Zealand's Exports by percentage 
1938 1939 1940 1941 
Australia 
Britain 
New Zealand 
Britain 
3.77 
84.17 
3.91 
80.99 
2.95 
87.60 
TABLEU10 
Australia's Exports by percentage 
1938-1939 1939-1940 1940-1941 
5.45 
54.45 
4.35 
64.10 
5.70 
42.64 
3.57 
78.15 
1941-1942 
4.29 
27.07 
The low level oftrade across the Tasman is immediately apparent in these tables. 
8 Cabinet Minute 181, 5 September 1939, DAFP 11, Doc 198. 
9 Figures from The Official New Zealand Year-Book 1945, p 695. 
10 Figures from Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 36 - 1944-1945, P 348. 
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The Australian and New Zealand governments feared that Japan might take 
advantage of the war in Europe to further its ends in Asia and the Pacific. They were 
apprehensive because Japan had a recently proven record of military opportunism in China. 
The Tasman neighbours were greatly relieved when the Japanese Government said on 3 
September that it wished 'to devote its energies to settling the China incident' . 11 The 
British government told the southern dominions that they need not be concerned about 
Japanese aggression towards them which was, it claimed, an extremely unlikely eventuality. 
Many British politicians had deluded themselves into believing that imperial strategy would 
allow them to switch priorities easily between the Middle East and the Far East, without any 
serious or immediate consequences upon its defence. Many British ministers sincerely 
believed that Singapore was impregnable and that consequently the southern dominions had 
no need to be concerned about Japan. The Admiralty believed that it would be free to send 
naval forces to the Far East because Japan was occupied in China, the United States was 
taking a tougher attitude towards Japan and Italy remained neutral. 
New Zealand's Organisation for National Security (ONS) acted according to the 
relevant regulations in the recently finished War Book on 4 September. The ONS was 
modelled on the British Committee of Imperial Defence. It consisted of committees of 
politicians, servicemen and civil servants with Stevens as the co-ordinating secretary. It was 
under civilian control. The findings of these committees formed the substance of the War 
Book. The purpose of the War Book was to ensure a smooth transition from peace to 
war. 12 
Savage announced New Zealand's support for the war the following day. 'Both 
with gratitude for the past, and with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without 
fear beside Britain. Where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand. ,13 The next 
logical step for the New Zealand government was to decide whether or not to send an 
expeditionary force overseas, as had been done in the Boer War and the Great War. This 
decision was relatively straightforward. The New Zealand government had been assured by 
the British government that the Japanese armed forces were not a threat. As early as 5 
11 Lissington, NZ & Japan, p 138. 
12 Henderson Interview with Stevens. 
13 WoocI, NZPW, P 11. (Hereafter referred to as WoocI, NZPW) 
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September, the New Zealand Council of Defence recommended that a 'special force' be 
raised. Although it did not mention that it would serve overseas, this was the assumption 
behind the force. This advice was accepted by the government which made the 
announcement on 8 September. Recruitment for the force of6 600 began on 12 September 
and within a week 12 000 had volunteered. 14 New Zealand formally made the offer on 13 
September to send an expeditionary force of one trained division overseas. However, this 
offer was conditional upon the attitude of Japan and on Britain's willingness to supply 
weapons, shipping and protection for the convoy. 
The decision to send an expeditionary force overseas was more complex in Australia 
than it was in New Zealand. The Opposition in Australia demanded to have a say in the 
extent of involvement that the country would have in the war. On 5 September when New 
Zealand politicians were being advised by the Chiefs of Staff to raise forces, Menzies was 
uncertain of Australia's position. He told Bruce in London that until he was certain of 
Japan's position it would be 'useless even to discuss the sending of [an] expeditionary 
force'. 15 Richard Casey, the Minister for Supply and Development, went to London to 
meet with dominion leaders. He wanted an assurance from Britain that Japan would not be 
a threat to Australia. 16 Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was happy to 
give a verbal commitment, believing that a war in the Pacific would not occur 
simultaneously with a war in Europe. The rest of the British Cabinet preferred to give 
vague replies to Casey. Consequently, British attempts to assure Australia of Japan's 
neutrality did not put Menzies' fears to rest. It was only after press pressure from across 
the Tasman that a reluctant Menzies on 15 September (2 days after New Zealand's offer) 
offered an expeditionary force. This was to serve either at home or overseas depending on 
the circumstances at the time. 
The Australian government in the first few months of the war was more concerned 
with local defence than with imperial defence. The Labor Party, which remained in 
opposition until October 1941, was traditionally opposed to sending expeditionary forces 
overseas and to conscription. Its opposition to sending expeditionary forces overseas was 
14 Wood, NZPW, P 98. 
15 Horner, High Command, p 23. 
16 Day, Great Betrayal, p 24. 
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primarily because it did not agree with participating in 'imperial' wars overseas as this was 
betraying its 'working class' ideals. Also, it cost the government money and while the 
forces were away the defences of Australia were greatly depleted. The Labor Party 
opposed compulsory military training as the government failed to use all the volunteers and 
paid the men too little. 17 In response to this, Menzies announced on 27 October 1939 that 
there 'will be no conscription for service outside Australia and its territories as far as my 
Government is concerned'. 18 At the same time the Australian Cabinet introduced 
conscription for home defence. This was partly because many had left the Militia to join the 
Australian Imperial Force (AJF) because it served overseas. The Labor Party's opposition 
to expeditionary forces serving overseas mellowed when its members conceded that it was 
what most Australians wanted. 19 
Australia and New Zealand contributed to the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) 
for training pilots in Canada to fight in the Royal Air Force in Europe. The Australian 
government agreed to recruit 57 473 men over the next three years to train in this scheme. 20 
This decision was announced in February 1940. The first draft of Australian EATS trainees 
left Sydney for Vancouver on 5 September 1940. The New Zealand government agreed to 
recruit 1 000 men a year to be trained through this scheme to serve in the RAF. The extent 
of New Zealand's involvement was seen when more 'Kiwi' pilots died in the Battle of 
Britain than any others except British and Poles. 
The main defence problem was that Australia and New Zealand, both Island nations, 
were ignorant of each others' naval relations with Britain on the outbreak of war. The New 
Zealand Navy had agreed that its ships would not automatically pass into the hands of the 
Admiralty when war began. However, on 2 September 1939, it learnt that Australian naval 
forces had been placed at the disposal of the British Admiralty. The New Zealand Navy 
wrongly concluded from this that the Admiralty had full control of Australian vessels. In 
fact, the Australian position was that vessels would revert to Admiralty control on the 
condition that they would not leave Australian waters without prior consultation.21 The 
17 Hasluck. Govt & People, vall, p 166. 
18 Ibid, P 167. 
19 Ibid, P 166. 
20 Ibid, P 166-167. 
21 McGibbon, Blue-water, p 344. 
New Zealand Navy, after jumping to the wrong conclusion, felt out of step with its 
Australian counterparts, and on 7 September it offered the Admiralty full control over its 
two vessels. This offer was accepted two days later. New Zealand's defence was 
dependent upon naval forces, yet the government and Chiefs of Staff were ignorant of 
Australia's naval position. Despite the information shared at the Pacific Defence 
Conference, there remained a significant amount of ignorance about each other. 
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The limited nature of the consultation that existed between the Australian and New 
Zealand governments was again demonstrated in November 1939 by an ignorance of each 
others' intentions about sending expeditionary forces to Europe. The Australian 
government was reluctant to contemplate sending forces overseas until it was certain that 
Japan was not a threat. Casey argued that a Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East 
Indies would put Japanese forces on Australia's doorstep. The British government was 
unable to give the Australian government a definite assurance about the Netherlands East 
Indies until the position of the United States was known. Britain was unsure of the United 
States position for some time to come. Cordell Hull, the United States Secretary of State, 
remembered a cable he received on 22 March 1940 from Kennedy. Kennedy said that Lord 
Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, 'said that Britain had promised Australia to send a 
fleet to Singapore, but now felt unable to spare a fleet from European waters and wondered 
whether we would consider transferring the fleet back to the Pacific at the psychological 
moment. ,22 
hi-> 
In the meantime Menzies by delaying its decision about sending an expeditionary 
force to Europe, had secured British agreement to buy wheat?3 This was particularly 
satisfactory to the Country Party. On 13 November Australia's Chiefs of Staff (on the 
advice of Casey in London) had recommended that the 6th division go to Egypt or Palestine 
and another division be raised. Menzies was not convinced and wanted an up to date 
British appreciation. This was because on the same day, the British government had told 
the Australian and New Zealand governments that the Pacific was safe, yet Britain and 
France had removed all their soldiers from North China as Japan had demanded. Menzies 
sent a cable to the New Zealand Prime Minister on 21 November outlining his government's 
22 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, voll, p 630. 
23 Day, Great Betrayal, p 29. 
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views about sending an expeditionary force overseas. Menzies said that although the 
Admiralty and Foreign Office had made assurances about the strength of Singapore, he was 
still concerned that Germany might invade Holland, creating a power vacuum in the 
Netherlands East Indies. He also noted the lack of urgency in the European war theatre, 
and said that while Britain struggled to find shipping and protection for Australian exports 
to Britain it could apparently find shipping and protection for Australian soldiers to Europe. 
Menzies finished by saying that Australia wished to 'watch developments of next three or 
four weeks before committing ourselves to dispatch of our division overseas.' He continued 
that 'At the same time we do not wish to be out of step with you as we think that from 
every point of view the closest co-ordination between our policies is essential'. 24 
However, on the previous day the New Zealand government had informed the 
British government that it would dispatch the first echelon of its expeditionary force 
overseas. Consequently, on 22 November Savage had to inform Menzies of New Zealand's 
decision that inevitably put Australia 'out of step'. Savage explained that this decision was 
made on the advice of Fraser, New Zealand's representative at the ministerial meeting in 
London where Casey, Australia's representative, was present. Savage continued that New 
Zealand's problems were different from Australia's. Because oflimited facilities, New 
Zealand could train only one echelon at a time and the present echelon had to be sent 
overseas before another could be trained. Also, New Zealand's voluntary system of 
recruitment was based on the acceptance that the men would serve overseas. Savage said 
that the most important reason why he had overlooked informing Menzies was that 'I had 
assumed that the matter was one of common arrangement with our Ministers in London. ,25 
Savage thought that the Australian government was already aware of the situation because 
Casey knew. Menzies cabled Savage on 28 November to express his disappointment at 
New Zealand's failure to consult or even inform the Australian government of this decision. 
Menzies referred to Savage's cable on 23 September 1938 in which the New Zealand Prime 
Minister had stated: 'I suggest for your consideration that we establish the principle of 
complete mutual interchange of information between Governments as opposed to between 
24 Menzies to Savage, 21 November 1939, DNZER 1, Doc 4. 
25 Savage to Menzies, 22 November 1939, Ibid, Doc 5. 
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individual services,?6 This incident demonstrates Australia's and New Zealand's lack of 
communication. 
Nash believed that New Zealand's decision had embarrassed the Australian 
government politically. He received unofficial information that Menzies believed that he 
should have been consulted before the decision was taken. This was because John Curtin, 
Leader of the Opposition, had publicly stated on the previous day that he opposed 
despatching troops overseas. Menzies, faced with this opposition, felt that his hand was 
forced by New Zealand's decision. 27 Fraser was surprised at the reaction of the Australian 
government to New Zealand's decision. He explained his bewilderment in clear terms. 
'Negotiations for the dispatch of the Australian forces have been proceeding here 
simultaneously with those for the dispatch of the New Zealand forces, and indeed ... I stated 
on 16 November at a meeting with War Cabinet, in the presence of Casey, our intention to 
dispatch the force. ,28 Furthermore, Fraser said that Casey 'left no doubt as to the intention 
of Australia to dispatch the force' when naval protection of both countries' forces was 
discussed. Yet Menzies was still angry at New Zealand's decision. He felt that he was 
faced with pressure that he would find hard to resist and that he had to follow New 
Zealand?9 Finally, on 28 November the Australian Cabinet approved the dispatch of the 6th 
division to the Middle East. It sailed for the Middle East on 10 January 1940. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments were concerned about the situation in 
the Pacific. They wanted the United States to playa more active role in deterring any 
Japanese military expansion in the Pacific. Both countries wanted the United States to 
throw offits isolationist policy and to embrace the role of defending them from Japan. 
However, their assessments of United States attitudes had been ambiguous. They were not 
sure what the official United States' line towards them was and at times may even have 
doubted that one existed. At the meeting of the visiting dominion ministers in November 
1939, Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, said that there was not 'any 
particularly strong feeling ... for Australia or New Zealand, though they were popular as 
26 Ibid, Doc l. 
27 Nash to Fraser, 29 November 1939, Documents 1, Doc 59. 
28 Fraser to Savage, 30 November 1939, Ibid, Doc 6l. 
29 Homer, High Command, p 29-30. 
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young democracies,.30 He continued on a rather encouraging note. The Pacific had 
increasingly become to be seen by the United States as an American pond. Consequently, it 
would regard any Japanese expansion into this territory as decidedly undesirable. If 
Australia or New Zealand were threatened by Japanese aggression the United States would 
soon be at war with Japan. Australia particularly, wanted closer relations with the United 
States. Keith Officer became Australia's first Counsellor to Washington in May 1937. He 
worked with Lothian, essentially supporting Britain's views. Justice Herbert Vere Evatt of 
the Australian High Court was not impressed by Officer's position in Washington. He said 
that it 'galled him to find Canada, Ireland and South Africa well set-up and playing a role 
here, and then to find Australia's representative in a cubby-hole at the end of the long 
corridor in the British Embassy. ,31 Despite this, the Australian government was a step 
ahead of the New Zealand government which did not at this stage have any diplomatic 
representation in the United States. 
In New Zealand the distractions of party politics continued well after the outbreak 
of war. From October 1939 Savage was so ill that many of his speeches and broadcasts 
were more the views of Fraser, his deputy, than his own.32 It was John A. Lee, who rocked 
the boat. He published an article called 'Psycho-Pathology in Politics' on 6 December 
193933 strongly suggesting that the time had come for Savage to resign. He wrote 'An odd 0\ d I, 
politician becomes physically, becomes mentally sick, and while he is physically and 
mentally sick sycophants pour flattery upon him.' Although he was careful not to mention 
Savage's name it was obvious that the article was directed at him. He continued that 'There 
is no instance yet recorded in history of a party winning a people by carrying a leader in a 
sick bed in front, by asking to-morrow to grow reverent at the odour of iodine.' This article 
caused much outrage. The climax was reached when Lee was expelled from the party on 
25 March 1940. Savage died two days later on 27 March and was mourned throughout the 
country. Fraser succeeded him as Prime Minister. However, even as late as May 1940 war 
in Europe seemed distant to most New Zealanders. 
30 Wood, NZPW, P 193. 
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The Australian and New Zealand governments were concerned for the safety of their 
troops, which were about to leave Australia and New Zealand for Palestine and Egypt. 
Australasian troops would be at considerable risk if Italy entered the war when the troops 
were passing through the Red Sea or the Mediterranean. This was a likely scenario in late 
April and early May 1940. Anthony Eden, Britain's Dominions Secretary, suggested the 
diversion of both countries' forces to Britain.34 The Australian government replied that it 
could not decide until it had received a British Chiefs of Staff appreciation and meanwhile 
asked that the convoy be held in Colombo.35 The New Zealand government's memory of 
the Australian government's reaction to its decision regarding the first echelon was still 
fresh in the minds of the politicians. Fraser told Eden of the 'embarrassment which would 
result were Australia to take one course and New Zealand another,36 and asked Britain for 
immediate advice about diverting its forces. However, military experts in both countries 
preferred that the soldiers continue on their planned route to Palestine and Egypt, rather 
than splitting the divisions by diverting the men to Britain. Australia's War Cabinet was 
divided on the issue and reluctant to divide its forces and even suggested training in 
Northwest India. Britain informed the Australian government that this was not practical as 
it was too hot, there was no accommodation and no equipment. The situation became more 
perilous and it was decided that it was safer to divert the convoys to Britain. Australia's 
third convoy of its 6th division and New Zealand's second echelon of its 2nd division went 
to Britain. 
The seriousness of the war was beginning to be felt in New Zealand. Fraser 
responded by broadcasting to the people on 26 May 1940 the Government's decision to 
introduce conscription. He also announced the decision to form a War Cabinet with 
Ministers, Members of the Opposition and representatives from industry, trade and farmers. 
In the end this proved to be too large and on 16 July he announced the War Cabinet 
consisting of 1. G. Coates, who was the Prime Minister from 1925-1928, Adam Hamilton, 
Leader of the Opposition, Frederick Jones, the Minister of Defence, Nash and himself. The 
war took on a more local and threatening flavour when the German cruiser Orion laid 228 
mines across the approaches to Auckland harbour on 13-14 June. Less than a week later 
34 Eden to Galway, 30 April 1940, Documents 1, Doc 123. 
35 Menzies to Fraser, 1 May 1940, Ibid, Doc 126. 
36 Galway to Eden, 2 May 1940, Ibid, Doc 128. 
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the trans-Tasman steamer Niagara struck one and was sunk with £2, 112 million worth of 
gold bullion plus half a million New Zealand small arms which were on their way to 
Britain.37 The government and Chiefs of Staff were concerned that New Zealand was 
threatened with coastal attack and did not have any reconnaissance planes. The British "'- . 
+0 " 
government was not sympathetic with New Zealand's position when the Battle of Britain / 
----began on 10 July 1940. Britain was fighting for its survival. 
The fall ofFrance38 upset the naval balance of power in Europe. The French navy 
was lost and Britain was faced with the prospect of fighting the Italian and German navies. 
This forced Britain to reassess the situation. Consequently, the Australian and New Zealand 
governments received a telegram from the British on 13 June 1940, which gave a general 
survey of the strategic situation and the implications for Australia and New Zealand in the 
Pacific. 
In the unlikely event of Japan, inspite of the restraining influence of the United 
States of America, taking the opportunity to alter the status quo in the Far East we 
should be faced with a naval situation in which, without the assistance of France, we 
should not have sufficient forces to meet the combined German and Italian navies in 
European waters and the Japanese fleet in the Far East. In the circumstances 
envisaged it is most improbable that we could send adequate reinforcements to the 
Far East.39 
Fraser cabled Churchill, now the British Prime Minister, on 15 June. He expressed his 
disillusionment that New Zealand's defence policy was based upon a British assurance that 
had been withdrawn at the last possible moment. He claimed that this British pledge had 
been 'reinforced by repeated and most explicit assurances, that a strong British fleet would 
be available to, and would, proceed to Singapore should the circumstances so require even 
if this involved the abandonment of British interests in the Mediterranean'4o. Despite his 
reservations he said that his government 'do not in any way demur to this decision (which 
they have always regarded as a possibility) if, as they assume, it is necessary in order to 
safeguard the position in the central and critical theatre of war, and they are quite prepared 
to accept the risks which they recognise are inevitable if the most effective use is to be made 
of Commonwealth naval forces.'41 While accepting Britain's decision, Fraser made it clear 
37 McGiblxm, Blue-water, P 346. 
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that New Zealand's defence policy was based upon the Fleet's arriving in Singapore. This 
telegram by Fraser to Churchill has been referred to as the single most important document 
in the formation of New Zealand's foreign policy.42 It is difficult to understand why Wood 
believes this when Fraser says that his government 'do not in any way demur' to Britain. 
New Zealand's foreign policy at this stage was still within the framework of the Empire-
Commonwealth and this telegram did not represent any significant departure. 
McGibbon notes that the fall of France caused three things; 'an upset in the naval X 
balance in Europe, the 13 June telegram to the dominions from Britain, and a power 
vacuum in French Indo-China which Japan exploited the following year. The New Zealand 
government's response was Fraser's telegram on 15 June, the decision to send a Cabinet 
Minister to Washington, a desire to improve the defences of Fiji and hesitation before it 
agreed to send the third echelon of the Expeditionary Force.43 On 5 June 1940 the New 
Zealand government had decided to send a brigade group to Fiji and the men were sent in 
October. Two squadrons of the RNZAF were based in Fiji. 
The Australian government's response was more subdued than that of the New 
Zealand government. Menzies, unlike Fraser, does not seem to have responded to this 
telegram. The Australian government had anticipated this development and its implications 
earlier than the New Zealand government had. Earlier, on 25 May Bruce met A. V. 
Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to discuss the position of Australia if France fell. 
Obviously Australia was already considering this possibility. Australia's War Cabinet met 
on the day before the 13 June British statement. As if anticipating the British telegram that 
would arrive the following day, the question was asked 'whether or not we should continue 
to rely on the pre-war undertaking that a British squadron of capital ships would proceed to 
Singapore immediately on hostile action in the Pacific' .44 The Australian government 
responded to the fall of France by requesting a British appreciation in the light of the new 
situation. This arrived on 28 June.45 Churchill said that in the new situation the significance 
of Malaya was vital and asked Australia to move one division there as soon as possible. 
42 Wood, NZPW, p 194. 
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Later on 20 June the British government told Australia that there was 'no hope of being 
able to dispatch a fleet to Singapore,.46 
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The Australian government had made diplomatic moves towards the United States. 
In March 1940 Casey was appointed as Australia's first Minister to the United States. As 
early as September 1939, Menzies had offered Bruce the post of Australian Minister to the 
United States. If Bruce had accepted, Menzies would have sent Casey to replace him as 
High Commissioner in London. Bruce modestly replied that he was the best man for the job 
either in London or Washington but that he preferred to stay in London while Casey should 
go to Washington. He even got Chamberlain, Maurice Hankey and Montagu Norman to 
support his staying in London. Bruce, however did agree to move to Washington 
temporarily to establish a legation there, intending to return to London afterwards. At this 
point Eden intervened, telling Menzies that he was deeply concerned that Bruce may be 
absent from London even for a short time.47 Consequently, on 6 March 1940 Casey became 
the head of the Australian legation to Washington and presented his credentials to 
Roosevelt. Another reason why he was sent was because he was regarded by Menzies as a 
political threat to his leadership. Menzie(leanings towards the United States did not end ?< 
with the establishment of a legation in Washington. He made three personal appeals to 
Roosevelt in May and June 1940 to help the British Commonwealth. 48 
New Zealand's diplomatic moves towards the United States were partly in response 
to Churchill's suggestion in June that the United States could provide some security in the 
Pacific. The New Zealand government asked the British government for approval of the 
dispatch of a New Zealand Cabinet Minister to Washington. Churchill replied that the 
timing Wi not appropriate. F responded that the situation in the Pacific was urgent « 
and that L shed to follow the Australian government towards the United States.49 On 23 
December 1940 the United States government agreed to New Zealand's dispatching a 
diplomat to Washington. Yet it was not until November 1941 that this position was filled. 
This delay of eleven months was caused by Peter Fraser's inability to decide who to send. 
46 Horner, High Command, p 36. 
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In the interim it was agreed in May 1941 to send Coates to discuss the supply of munitions 
and Frank Langstone, the Minister of Lands, External Affairs and Native Islands, to 
negotiate the sale of dairy produce and meat and to make the necessary preliminary 
arrangements for establishing a legation. Coates later returned, urging that a diplomat be 
sent. 50 Fraser struggled between choosing someone who could not be spared from ;< 
Wellington and someone JJ~ would be inadequate in a crisis. He chose the former, Nash. 
-This decision was made easier for Fraser as Nash had made a bid for the leadership of the 
party. Fraser, who did not welcome such a challenge to his leadership, welcomed the 
opportunity of sending Nash to Washington instead. However, it was not until 18 
November 1941 that Nash was appointed to this position. Both Nash and Casey were 
posted to Washington, in part, because they were felt to be a challenge to their countries' 
leaderships. 
The Japanese government realised that Britain's resources were strained in Europe 
after France and the Netherlands fell and Italy entered the war, and that the time was right 
to exploit this in the Far East. On 24 June 1940 the Japanese Foreign Office told Sir Robert 
Craigie, Britain's Ambassador in Tokyo, that it demanded that Britain close the Burma 
Road, close the Hong Kong frontier and withdraw its garrison from Shanghai. The 
Japanese government's concern was that it was at war against China and that supplies were 
reaching China through the Burma Road. However, the Burma Road issue was a moral 
one, as only a trickle of trade passed this way into China. Britain was conscious that the 
United States was strongly pro-Chinese in this war. Still, Craigie was concerned not to 
drag the United States into a war with Japan at the expense of it losing interest in the war in 
Europe. The British government preferred a Chinese-Japanese settlement and was 
embarrassed by the Japanese demands. However, the British government realised that it 
would not have the support of the United States if a refusal of Japanese demands led to war 
and agreed on a compromise. The Burma Road was closed on 18 July, for three months 
and during this time Japan was to find a solution to the Sino-Japanese war. Although 
Britain actually conceded little, this episode was seen as a grave loss of face. Closing the 
Burma Road was supposed to lead to negotiation, but Japan spent these three months 
50 Ibid, P 195-196. 
infiltrating into Indo-China and pressuring the Netherlands East Indies for economic 
concessIons. 
The New Zealand government was firmly opposed to the closure of the Bunna 
Road. It was opposed to appeasement and was reluctant to be associated with the British 
over this issue. Fraser told Eden on 30 July 1940 that 'while we neither understand nor 
sympathise with the policy that has been adopted vis-a-vis Japan we are nevertheless 
unwilling to add unnecessarily to the difficulties' of the British government. 51 Fraser was 
also annoyed that New Zealand was not kept infonned of events. However, despite 
Fraser's strong feelings over the issue, the New Zealand government accepted Britain's 
decision deferentially. 
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In contrast, the Australian government had urged Britain to close the Bunna Road. 
The Australian government did not have a consistent policy towards Japan for some time. 
Initially, Australia favoured a policy of appeasement, being willing to give economic 
concessions and accepting Japan's guarantees not to attack French, British and United 
States colonies in the Pacific. From January 1940 Australia had been considering 
appointing an Australian Minister to Tokyo. The War Cabinet felt, on 14 June, that this 
should be done without delay before the situation got any worse. Consequently, Sir John 
Latham was appointed to this position on 18 August. However, he did not arrive for 
another four months. This appointment and Australia's willingness to concede to Japan 
over the Bunna Road were attempts to maintain peace with Japan. However, its attitude 
hardened in August and Menzies said that that his Government is 'completely hostile to the 
mere appeasement of Japan'. 52 The Australian government was also conscious that Britain 
should avoid war with Japan whilst it was involved in war in Europe. Yet, by October 1940 
Menzies was assuring Churchill that if Britain found itself at war with Japan, without the 
help of the United States, Australia would declare war on Japan. 
Australia's and New Zealand's diplomatic relations and probes towards the United 
States were encouraged by British evaluations of the situation. The British Chiefs of Staff 
prepared a new Far East Appreciation on 31 July 1940, the first since June 1937. This 
51 Ibid, P 198. 
52 Bell, Unequal Allies, p 17. 
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review had rested upon two assumptions: firstly that any threat to British interests would be 
from the sea, and secondly that the Royal Navy could send a fleet to provide protection 
within three months of any given incident. However, Japanese advances into Southern 
China and Hainan, combined with the acquisition of aerodromes in Thailand, meant that 
Japan could provide a land and air threat as well as a naval threat. Britain did not have the 
resources and ability to send a fleet to Eastern waters whilst facing Gennan and Italian 
navies in the Mediterranean. Consequently, the two assumptions upon which the June 1937 
Far East Appreciation was based were now invalid. The new appreciation was based on the 
assumption that Japan's aims were to free itself and the Far East from Western influence 
and to secure raw materials. To do this, Japan had to capture the Singapore base. The 
likelihood of Japanese expansion southwards depended upon five factors: (1) military and 
economic commitment to China, (2) economic consequences of war against Britain and the 
United States, (3) the threat of Russia, (4) the fear of United States military action, and (5) 
the possibility of an Axis victory in Europe, that would enable Japan to take what it wanted 
in Asia and the Pacific without any repercussions from the Allies. The situation in Europe 
meant that Britain had to avoid or at least delay war with Japan. Ideally, a comprehensive 
Far East settlement would be reached that would be acceptable to both Japan and Britain. 
The basic defence problem in the Far East was that Britain had no Eastern Fleet. 
The Appreciation was clear about this. 'In the absence of a Fleet, we cannot prevent 
damage to our interests in the Far East. Our object must, therefore, be to limit the extent of 
the damage and in the last resort to retain a footing from which we could eventually retrieve 
the position when stronger forces become available. ,53 Although it was possible that Japan 
could attack British possessions,54 the Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines it was 
more likely that it would first attack Indo-China or Thailand. A Japanese invasion of 
Australia or New Zealand was seen as unlikely as long as the Singapore base remained in 
British hands and the United States Fleet remained intact. The scale of attack on Australia 
and New Zealand was likely to be cruiser raids, perhaps with light air attacks on ports. 55 
Trade routes across the Tasman and the trans-Pacific route could be threatened. Both 
53 British Chiefs of Staff Far East Appreciation, 31 July 1940, P 4. 
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Australia and New Zealand were dependent upon trade for economic survival, and evasive 
routing was the only option available to meet this threat. It was possible that Japan could 
establish advanced fuel bases in the southern seas that would threaten the Southwest Pacific 
area. 56 
Aware of their weakness in the Far East, the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the most 
important objective was the defence of Malaya and denying the Netherlands East Indies to 
the Japanese. However, Dutch co-operation was not a certainty and Britain was unsure 
whether it would be able to stop Japan attacking the Netherlands East Indies. Britain's 
decision about what action to take if Japan attacked the Netherlands East Indies depended 
on whether the Dutch resisted and if they did to what extent. 57 The assessment was that at 
present 'it would not be possible to offer the Dutch any effective military support in the 
event of Japanese aggression. ,58 For this reason, immediate talks with the Dutch were not 
recommended, but they would be important in the future. 
The British government was clearly unable to send any material or military aid to 
Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific, so instead sent Far Eastern Appreciations. The 
British Chiefs of Staff sent an appreciation to Fraser and Menzies on 11 August 1940. In 
the foreword to this assessment was a message from Churchill that outlined Britain's desire 
to avoid war with Japan. Churchill promised that if Australia or New Zealand were invaded 
Britain would leave the Mediterranean to 'proceed in good time with a fleet able to give 
battle to any Japanese Force' .59 In the worst possible scenario, Churchill promised that 
Britain would not desert Australia or New Zealand. 
Ifhowever contrary to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading 
Australian and New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of the 
Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and 
proceed to your aid sacrificing every interest except only the defence and feeding of 
this Island on which all depends.60 
Churchill, however, was gambling that his promise would never be put to the test, because 
he did not have any intention of sending a fleet to Australia or New Zealand. He said that at 
56 Ibid, P 15, paragraph 43. 
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any time the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet could pass through the Suez Canal to Singapore. 
Yet such a transfer of naval forces 'would entail the complete loss of the Middle East and 
all prospect of beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be gone. ,61 It seems extremely 
unlikely that that Churchill would have been willing to save the Far East at the cost oflosing 
the Middle East, if he was faced with this choice. On 13 May 1941 Churchill wrote to 
General John Greer Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, about the importance of 
Singapore in relation to the Middle East. 'I gather you would be prepared to face the loss 
of Egypt and the Nile Valley, together with the surrender or ruin of the Army of half a 
million we have concentrated there, rather than lose Singapore. I do not take that view'. 62 
The Australian and New Zealand governments were not convinced by Churchill's 
statement that Britain could defend them. Both Australia and New Zealand received the 
British statement of 11 August as mere rhetoric. Far from reassuring the Australian 
government, it motivated them to look closely at their defence and the relative importance 
of Singapore and the Middle East. The Chiefs of Staff considered that if Japan had 
possession of the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore was either reduced or in its hands, 
then it could invade Australia. Consequently, on 23 August the Australian Chiefs of Staff 
recommended that the 8th division should go to Malaya or India. The New Zealand Chiefs 
of Staff found Churchill's pledge to sacrifice the Mediterranean for the Far East 'most 
heartening,.63 However, New Zealand 'did not entertain any great expectations of what 
Britain could do to help if war came to the Pacific, and if it did come its main hope was in 
the United States. It seems a fair assumption that this remained the case after Churchill on 
11 August restored the British guarantee'. 64 Perhaps the apparent generosity of Churchill's 
words only helped to increase the scepticism with which were received. In general, the 
New Zealand Chiefs of Staff agreed with Britain's assessment. They continued to adhere to 
the policy of imperial defence, believing that 'Singapore still remains the key-stone of 
British defence in the Far East,.65 They concluded that when Britain had its defence talks 
with the Dutch, Australian and New Zealand representatives should be present. However, 
their hope rested with the United States. 
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In mid August 1940, John McEwen, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, 
submitted a proposal to the Australian Cabinet for exchanging liaison officers with New 
Zealand's Department of External Affairs. McEwen seemed to be overlooking the fact that 
at this stage New Zealand did not actually have a department of external affairs. Its foreign 
policy was managed in the Prime Ministers Department under the able hand of Berends en. 
McEwen wanted to encourage trans-Tasman defence co-operation and consultation before 
policies were formulated. He said that Australia and New Zealand might soon find 
themselves alone in the Pacific threatened by Japan. He recalled that lack of consultation in 
1939 over expeditionary forces had caused Australia political embarrassment. This policy 
of exchanging liaison officers had obvious advantages. Despite this, McEwen still felt that 
he had to stress how economical this proposal was as it meant that it would not be 
necessary to exchange High Commissioners between the countries. Although this proposal 
was approved, it was not implemented. Day suggests that this was because Australia did 
not want to appear to be pursuing policies separate from those in London. However, it also 
reflected the low priority that external affairs had in Australia at this time and that Australia 
was still operating within an imperial framework. 66 
The Australian government's most ambitious aspect of its foreign policy in this 
period was its support of the Free French movement. After France had fallen in June, the 
French colonies in the Pacific found themselves in an awkward position. The Vichy 
Minister for Colonies stated in August 1940 that French colonies which continued to fight 
against Germany were committing an act of treason. A 'Free France' movement led by 
French nationalist Charles de Gaulle aimed to continue the war from the French colonies. 
Australia agreed to encourage the French colonies to continue their resistance against the 
Axis powers. As part of this policy, Australia decided in late June to send representatives to 
the French in the New Hebrides and New Caledonia. Menzies appointed B.C. Ballard to 
~ ~ 
Noumea to be High Commissioner ofNew Caledonia where he arrived on 23 August 1940. 
---This move was intended to assist the French officials in the Pacific and to encourage trade 
relations with Australia. The New Hebrides, which was administered as an Anglo-French 
Condominium, had already declared itself in favour of the 'Free France' stance after 
66 Day, Great Betrayal, p 99. 
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consultation between French Resident Commissioner M. Sautot and British Resident 
Commissioner RD. Blandy. Pressure was mounting upon the Governor of New Caledonia, 
M. Pelicier, who was tom between the supporters of de Gaulle and those of Marshal 
Philippe Petain, the leader of Vichy France. Because Pelicier had divided loyalties, the 
Vichy government wanted him to be removed. The Vichy government then appointed 
Colonel Denis as Governor of New Caledonia on 30 August. Sautot was asked by de 
Gaulle to visit New Caledonia to inspire the 'Free France' movement. Later on 6 
September de Gaulle asked him to overthrow Denis and take up the position of Governor of 
New Caledonia, which he accepted. The Australian government decided on 9 September to 
support this 'coup de force'. Most of the inhabitants of New Caledonia were in favour of 
continuing the war except for a few local Japanese. Sautot was escorted to Noumea by the 
Australian cruiser Adelaide. Obviously, the Australian government realised that its navy 
was no match for the Japanese Navy and was therefore careful to avoid any incidents with 
these Japanese locals which could be used as an excuse by the Japanese to establish a 
puppet government. The Adelaide arrived on 19 September and Sautot was greeted by an 
enthusiastic crowd. Denis was arrested that afternoon and Sautot assumed command 
without any blood being shed.67 Australia fostered trade with New Caledonia, buying its 
nickel. Throughout its involvement in the 'Free France' movement Australia was anxious 
to avoid being seen as acting in an imperial or dictatorial manner. 
The shocking condition of the defences of Singapore was revealed at the Far East 
Defence Conference, held at Singapore from 22 to 31 October 1940. Representatives from 
the British Commonwealth attended. Discussion at the conference focussed upon the likely 
Allied response to Japanese aggression into the Far East and the Pacific. Air Chief Marshal 
Brook-Popham was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Singapore. The conference noted 
the dangers faced by the Tasman neighbours, concluding that while 'the possibility of a 
major expedition against Australia and New Zealand may be ruled out initially, we must still 
maintain in Australia and New Zealand such army and air forces as are necessary to ensure 
the maintenance of vital trade, protect troop and other convoys and carry out necessary 
local defence duties,.68 Menzies described to the Advisory War Council on 25 November 
67 Hasluck, Govt and People, vall, p 303-311. 
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the 'alarming position in regard to the defence ofSingapore,.69 All three armed services 
were operating at dangerously low levels, below what were seen to be the minimum 
requirements. For example, the desired number of aircraft in the Far East was 582, with a 
minimum of336. In November 1940 there were only 48. 70 Britain's declining strength in 
the Pacific was now fully realised by Australia and New Zealand. Although the critical 
condition of Singapore's defences was now glaringly apparent, there were no substantial 
plans to take any significant action to rectify the situation. 
The defences of New Zealand were inadequate. Fraser cabled Churchill on 4 
December 1940 asking for help in defending New Zealand. He wrote that 
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local naval forces are far from adequate to protect New Zealand shores and shipping 
against attack, and it is a plain fact that at present the New Zealand Air Force 
possess not one single aircraft suitable either for reconnaissance or for attack against 
a raider any substantial distance from the shores of New Zealand.71 
Fraser issued a statement on 12 February 1941 saying that the war had 'moved to a new 
state involving the utmost gravity'. The Australian government was also gravely concerned 
at the situation. Arthur Fadden, Leader of the Country Party, said that Australia 'was now 
entering upon a period in which its very existence is at stake'. 72 
In July 1941 Japanese forces occupied southern Indo-China with the moral support 
of the Vichy government. Although France had fallen in June 1940 leaving a power vacuum 
in French Indo-China, it was not until September that Japanese forces attacked the French 
garrison at Langson and moved into northern Indo-China. In July 1941 the Japanese forces 
completed what they had begun, and occupied the rest of Indo-China. The United States 
responded quickly to Japan's occupation of southern Indo-China by imposing economic 
sanctions upon Japan, virtually stopping all trade, including oil. The oil embargo meant that 
by December 1941 the Japanese Navy would have consumed four of its eighteen months 
supply of oil. Japan would be forced to choose between conceding to the United States or 
making war to obtain essential raw materials. 
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The New Zealand government was fully supportive of the United States' action and 
followed by renouncing its commercial treaties with Japan.73 The Australian government 
also supported strong action. But, Australia and New Zealand were never fully assured of 
the support of the United States. Both dominions therefore felt uneasy in the months 
leading up to Pearl Harbor. The only encouraging sign as far as the Empire-Commonwealth 
was concerned was a warning issued by Sumner Welles, the United States Under Secretary 
of State, to the Japanese embassy after Indo-China fell. He said that if Japanese forces 
moved into Thailand, Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies it was 'quite inevitable ... 
not necessarily tomorrow or next month, but sooner or later the Japanese Government 
would find themselves in war with the United States. ,74 
The British government was considering making a declaration that a Japanese attack 
upon a line from Malaya to New Zealand through the Netherlands East Indies would be 
seen as a threat to British interests. The South African and Australian governments 
objected to this because the position of the United States government was not known. 
Consequently Britain made no declaration, much to the disappointment of~ew '>( 
Zealand. 75 
There were many efforts to secure a declaration from the United States that would 
deter Japan from aggressive action especially after Indo-China had been occupied. There 
was discussion whether the Empire- Commonwealth should make a declaration without the 
United States, especially with regard to Thailand, which was threatened. Menzies told 
Churchill on 11 August 1941 that 'If Thailand is abandoned and we delay our action we will 
be one country nearer to war'. 76 Bruce believed that Australia, Britain and Holland should 
give a guarantee to Thailand, even without the support ofthe United States. He said 'Ifthe 
Japanese do not want war but are only testing how far they can go without precipitating it, 
the warning will halt them. If they are bent on war it will make no difference'. 77 He also 
believed that such a declaration would encourage the United States government to enter the 
war or at least secure sympathy from the American public. Menzies admitted to the Cabinet 
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that he was disappointed by the United States. The New Zealand government, in August 
1941, was reluctant to make any statement about Thailand. Nash, the acting Prime 
Minister, warned Menzies that 'The result of any hasty or ill conceived guarantee might well 
be a repetition of the circumstances surrounding the British guarantee to Poland in 1939,.78 
This was because if Japan exposed the Allies' bluff, this would be seen as a grave loss of 
face, and would encourage Japan to further aggression. The New Zealand approach was 
cautious and in line with British policy, while the Australian approach was bold. 
After much persuasion, Roosevelt did issue a warning to Japan on 17 August 1941. 
Roosevelt said that if Japan moved into neighbouring countries his government would act to 
protect the rights of the United States. The British, Australian and New Zealand 
governments were disappointed. It was a mild warning, avoiding mention of the word 
'war' or 'Netherlands East Indies'. Almost in desperation Churchill publicly declared that 
Britain would support the United States ifit became involved in a war with Japan. 
Meanwhile there was a political upheaval in Australia. Menzies resigned as Prime 
Minister on 18 August 1941 and said that he was prepared to serve under Fadden. The 
following day Fadden became Prime Minister. He formed a new ministry with Menzies as 
the Minister of Defence. However, this ministry did not last long. Fadden's 'forty days and 
forty nights' concluded when Curtin became Prime Minister on 3 October 1941 with the 
support of independents who held the balance of power. After being in Opposition 
throughout the war, Labor was now the government. The transition was smooth as Curtin, 
Francis Michael Forde, Norman John Oswald Makin, Evatt and lA. Beasley, Leader of the 
Non-Communist Labor Party, were already serving on the Advisory War Council and were 
familiar with what was happening in the War Cabinet and with the confidential dispatches 
that the Government had received throughout the war. Consequently, Forde was appointed 
the Minister of the Army; Makin became the Minister of the Navy and Munitions, Evatt 
became Attorney General and Minister of External Affairs, and Beasley became the Minister 
of Supply and Development. 
78 Nash to Menzies, 14 Aug 1941, Documents III, Doc 48. 
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The situation in the Pacific deteriorated rapidly causing the Dominions Office to 
inform the Australian and New Zealand governments on 29 November that the Washington 
talks were likely to break down. War with Japan was a likely possibility. It was not until 5 
December 1941 that the Allies received an assurance from the United States. This 
guarantee indicated that, if necessary, armed force would be used to stop Japan taking the 
Kra Isthmus or any part of Thailand, or if it attacked the Netherlands East Indies.79 The 
United States assurance also applied if the Japanese attacked any territory in the Empire-
Commonwealth. The assurance that Britain, Australia and New Zealand had sought a~ 
for so long was finally received two days before the dramatic Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 
The most striking feature of trans-Tasman relations from September 1939 until 
December 1941 was that despite the low levels of contact between the two countries the 
Australian and New Zealand governments independently followed very similar policies. On 
a political and diplomatic plane, neither country sought closer relations. The 
misunderstandings that had resulted from a lack of understanding or consultation were 
frustrating for politicians of both countries. Yet, it did not motivate them to closer 
consultation. Trans-Tasman relations were not a high priority as they would serve no 
immediate purpose. The benefits did not outweigh the costs at this stage. 
79 Cranborne to Curtin, 5 December 1941, DAFP V, Doc 162. 
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Chapter 4 
Twelve Months of Turmoil: Australia and New Zealand's efforts to get a 
Voice in London and Washington, December 1941-November 1942 
Japan launched its attack upon United States, British and Asian territory on 7/8 December 
1941. Japanese forces attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor and colonial 
outposts from Hong Kong to Manila and from Malaya to Singapore. At the same time 
Japan began landing forces in Thailand. This surprise attack was on a massive scale 
covering 9500 km, one quarter of the earth's circumference. It revealed that Japan's 
diplomacy with the United States in the previous weeks in which Kurusu, Japan's special 
envoy to the United States, had talked with Hull, was little more than a highly successful 
piece of strategic deception. This attack dramatically opened the war in the Pacific, 
intensified the war in Asia, and linked the war in Asia with that in Europe and the Middle 
East. It changed the nature of the war making it global. 
The first that Curtin heard of the attack was when he was woken from his sleep at 
Victoria Palace Hotel in central Melbourne after important material was gathered by the 
Department of Information. 1 By breakfast the Australian Service Chiefs and War Cabinet 
had met at Victoria barracks. They knew that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, but had not 
confirmed that Japan was the aggressor. A telegram arrived from the Dominions Office 
saying that Malaya was being attacked by the Japanese and that the British Admiralty was 
commencing hostilities against Japan immediately. After discussion, the Australian 
government agreed to declare war on Japan on 8 December. 
The opening of the war in the Pacific raised unwelcome strategic questions and 
considerations for the Australia and New Zealand governments. While Australia had three 
divisions and New Zealand had one division of battle-hardened soldiers in the 
Mediterranean Theatre, Japan posed a threat closer to home. For Australia this meant that 
although from 8 December 1941 its main war effort was directed against Japan, its best 
1 -Hasluck, Gov! & People vol 2, P 4. 
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soldiers were in the Middle East. Australia was fighting two wars, a distant one against 
Gennany and Italy and a closer one against Japan. New Zealand responded by reinforcing 
its forces in the Pacific to create a two brigade division. New Zealand's B Force of2NZEF 
adopted the title of New Zealand's 3rd division on 14 May 1942. 
The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff met with the politicians on 8 December 1941 to 
advise them of the situation. They reacted soberly and said that 'until Singapore fell and 
until the United States naval forces suffered a major defeat, invasion of New Zealand was 
most improbable'? It was felt that at least six months would have to pass before New 
Zealand could be in danger of invasion. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff reassessed the 
situation on 30 December. Their verdict was essentially the same: Singapore had to fall and 
the United States Fleet be destroyed before New Zealand was in danger. It was felt that 
although highly unlikely, it was possible for the United States Fleet to be destroyed in a 
matter of hours. In the worst case scenario, if invasion was coming, New Zealand had only 
three months to prepare. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff's assessment on 10 January 
1942 was virtually the same. There was much calmness in Wellington since New Zealand 
could not be invaded until after the United States Navy had been eliminated. It was felt that 
Japan would try to cut New Zealand-United States sea routes instead of invading New 
Zealand. However, the government on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff acted responsibly, 
and preparing for the worst case scenario ordered mobilisation on 10 January 1942. 
The Australian government's military response to Pearl Harbor was the decision to 
suspend the dispatch of trainees overseas to the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Royal 
Australian Air Force recalled forces to defend northern Australia. Apart from three 
divisions in the Middle East, Australia in December 1941 had a two brigade division in 
Malaya, one battalion in Rabaul and two battalions eannarked for Ambon and Timor. 3 
Because of an agreement made with the Dutch, Australia sent the two battalions from 
Darwin to Ambon and Timor on 8 December. The Australian battalion which had been at 
Rabaul since April 1941 remained. These were drops in the bucket in the face ofthe 
Japanese onslaught. 
2 Wood, NZPW. P 214. 
3 Robertson. Australia at War, p 78. 
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The Australian and New Zealand governments were gravely concerned by the rapid 
advance of the Japanese in the early phase of the war in the Pacific. The Japanese forces 
took Guam and landed forces in the Philippines on 10 December. That same day, they sank 
Britain's naval reinforcements to the Far East: the battleship Prince of Wales and the 
battlecruiser Repulse. These two ships had arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941, but 
the aircraft carrier assigned to accompany them had run aground and not arrived. They, 
therefore lacked air cover and were easily sunk by Japanese aircraft. This was a heavy blow 
as British naval power was destroyed. David Day writes that 'Churchill later claimed to 
have suffered nightmares from the shock of losing these ships that had been sent at his 
insistence, though he had been forewarned that they were "far more likely to act as bait than 
as deterrent"'. 4 
The Australian War Cabinet was disturbed by the situation and met after receiving 
advice from the Chiefs of Staff and the Advisory War Council. The Chiefs of Staff's 
position on 11 December 1941 was that they expected Japan to attack New Caledonia, New 
Guinea and Papua. Worse still, they expected Japan to attempt to seize Darwin and to 
launch raids on concentrations of industry in Sydney, Newcastle and Port Kembla.5 
The Australian nation was transformed to a total war footing from December 1941 
until February 1942. Lighting restrictions began, trenches were dug, glass was removed 
from windows, barbed wire was installed on beaches and mid-week sport was banned. The 
War Cabinet ordered on 16 December 1941 that women and children be evacuated from 
Darwin. Many others in northern areas moved south by choice. By the first week of 
February, 6 800 people had left Cairns and Townsville by train.6 
As they contemplated their new predicament, the Tasman neighbours had to 
reconsider their role in the allied war effort. When strategy at the highest level was 
discussed, neither Australia nor New Zealand was present. For example, the Arcadia 
Conference was opened on 22 December 1941. This was an Anglo-American conference 
which centred on talks between Churchill and Roosevelt about the war in the Pacific and the 
4 Day, Great Betrayal, p 210. 
5 Hasluck, Govt & People, vol 2, p 12-13. 
6 Hasluck, Govt & People, vol 2, p 64-69. 
Middle East. At this conference the 'Gennany First' policy was confinned by the United 
States and the ABDA Command in the Pacific was established. 
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The United States had accepted and adhered to a 'Gennany First' policy. This was 
the result of a great deal of persuasion by Churchill. Although Roosevelt agreed to this, 
there was a strong 'Pacific First' lobby in Washington. From January to March 1942 
United States troops leaving for the Pacific outnumbered those going to Britain by four to 
one. 7 As late as December 1942, the United States had 350 000 men in the Pacific and 
approximately the same number in the Mediterranean Theatre. 
Fraser and Curtin were infonned of Roosevelt's and Churchill's agreed command 
structure for the Pacific on 29 December 1941 that was later known as the ABD A 
Command. Australian and New Zealand consent was urgently needed as the plan was to be 
publicly announced on 1 January 1942 at the latest. General Wavell, who was the 
Commander -in-Chief of the Middle East, would be appointed Commander -in-Chief of all 
United States, British, Dutch and Empire-Commonwealth land, naval, and air forces for the 
Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Area. 8 The boundaries of this theatre were not finally ( 
settled but would probably include Malaya, Bunna, the Philippines, Port Darwin and 
Northern Australia. The important commands within the Southwest Pacific area were 
Bunna, Singapore and Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and Southern 
Communications via the South Pacific and Northern Australia. There was also India and>" v\.,"(,·\ 
-
Australia. Commanders of sub commands of ABDA Area were not allowed to transfer their 
allocated forces out of their command area. The telegram concluded on an encouraging 
note for Australia and New Zealand. 'The United States Navy will remain responsible for 
the whole Pacific Ocean east of the Philippine Islands and Australasia, including the United 
States approaches to Australasia. ,9 The United States Navy was then responsible for the 
Pacific east of the Philippines including the Northeastern approaches to Australasia. 10 
7 Robertson, Aust at War, p 107. 
8 Cranborne to Fraser; 29 December 1941, Documents 111, Doc 112. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Lissington, NZ & US, p 40. 
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Curtin expressed his disapproval to Churchill of the piecemeal way in which Allied 
forces would be deployed in the Pacific on 1 January 1942. His concern was that the 
Australian mainland was excluded from the proposed Southwest Pacific area. This, he felt, 
would leave Australia and New Zealand isolated to defend themselves without the help of 
the United States naval, military and air support. 11 The Australian government also had its 
concerns about the ABDA Area. It did not like the Pacific being divided, New Zealand 
being separated from Australia, or the British Eastern Fleet being in the Indian Ocean and 
not in the Pacific. 12 
The command structure in the Southwest Pacific Area was referred to as the 
agreement between the ABDA governments (American, British, Dutch, Australian). The 
boundary of the command was finalised on 4 January 1942 and the command was known as 
ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command). It included Burma, 
Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Western New 
Guinea, and Northern Australia above a line running from Onslow on the west coast to the 
Southeast comer of the Gulf of Carpentaria. 
The New Zealand government's main concern about the structure of the commands 
was that it was possible for Japan to effect a piecemeal defeat ofthe Allied forces in the 
Pacific. This was because the commanders in the units within the ABDA Area were not 
allowed to transfer forces into or out of their command area. Although the New Zealand 
government supported Wavell as Commander -in-Chief, it wanted all naval forces to be 
concentrated under an American Admiral. 13 Fraser was concerned that the sea 
communications between Australia and the United States were not protected. Viscount 
Cranborne, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, responded to Fraser's concern. He 
said that he was 'trying hard to get the Americans to assume naval responsibility' for the 
waters east of Australia. 14 He said that it would be natural for the United States to assume 
operational control over Australia's and New Zealand's vessels. Fraser also said that 
although he realised the importance of making quick decisions in war, his government 
11 Curtin to Churchill, 1 January 1942, DAFP V, Doc 247. 
12 Hasluck, Govt & People, vol 2, P 49-50. 
13 Fraser to Cranborne; 30 Dec 1941, Documents III, Doc 113. 
14 Cranborne to Fraser; 8 January 1942, Ibid, Doc 116. 
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wanted to receive more information from London and Washington to allow it to make more 
informed decisions. Fraser wanted co-operation between the New Zealand navy and the 
Australian navy because ABDACOM did not include the mainland of Australia or New 
Zealand. 
The Australian government gained valuable insight into American strategic thinking 
in the Pacific through information gleaned from Casey in Washington. He said that 'While 
lip service is paid to the importance of Singapore its importance is clearly subordinated to 
Philippines in American minds. ,16 Curtin and Evatt made strenuous efforts after Pearl 
Harbor to influence the higher direction of the war, both in London and in Washington. 
Curtin asked Churchill and Roosevelt for more modem equipment and more men to defend 
Australia. He urged Britain to join its Eastern Fleet with the remains of the United States 
Pacific Fleet. Frederick Shedden, the Secretary of the Australian Defence Department, War 
Cabinet and Advisory Council, wrote a report on 26 December 1941. He argued that 
Australia should be involved in deciding Allied strategy. He said that the positioning of 
forces should be according to the degree of danger present in each theatre ofwar.17 Curtin 
. 
told Churchill that he opposed any suggestion of dividing naval forces to attempt to cover 
large areas of the oceans. 18 If the United States and British fleets were combined it would 
make a decisive naval victory over the Japanese fleet possible. 
The Australian government felt a desperate need to have input into decisions 
affecting the war in the Pacific. It strongly felt that it was necessary for Australia to playa 
significant role in the forming of strategy and in the high command in the Pacific. The 
government's anxiety to playa large role in the Pacific, severely strained Anglo-Australian 
relations. Curtin was furious when Churchill told him on 25 December 1941 that although 
he planned to reinforce Malaya, North Africa had priority over Singapore. Curtin did not 
accept this, especially after V.G. Bowden, Australia's official representative in Singapore, 
told Evatt on 14 December that Singapore will 'shortly be in a virtual state of siege' .19 
Curtin responded the following day, telling Casey that 'The stage of gentle suggestion has 
16 Casey to External Affairs Dept, 20 Dec 1941, DAFP V, Doc 210. 
17 Day, Great Betrayal, p 216-217. 
18 Curtin to Casey, 29 December 1941, DAFP V, Doc 237. 
19 Bowden to Evatt, 14 December 1941, Ibid, Doc 193. 
now passed. ,20 He stressed that the situation in Singapore was urgent and reinforcements 
were needed immediately. Churchill was still in Washington attending the Arcadia 
Conference. Casey had the opportunity to speak with Churchill alone at the White House 
on 27 December. Casey's efforts to convince Churchill of the importance of Singapore, 
failed. Churchill told Casey, 'You can't kick me round the room, I'm not kickable. ,21 
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Curtin recognised that Britain could do little to assist Australia in the Pacific and his 
New Year statement was designed to encourage assistance from the United States. This 
'turning to America' statement was published in the Melbourne Herald on 27 December 
1941. _ Curtin disputed the Germany First policy: 'We refuse to accept the dictum that the 
Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. '22 .. , He said f 
that the United States should concentrate its main effort in the Pacific and called for the 
Soviet Union to attack Japan.23 This attitude, Churchill recalled, was 'flaunted around the 
world by our enemies', displaying a worrying lack of unity in Allied war policy. Curtin 
expressed his disillusionment with the British: 'Without any inhibitions of any kind, 1 make 
it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links of 
kinship with the United Kingdom. ,24 This provoked much reaction from the British 
government. Churchill was stung by this comment and instructed his Dominions Secretary 
that he 'should take a firm stand against this misbehaviour'. 25 He then wrote to Curtin, 'I 
have been greatly pained in all my labours by the harsh tones which have characterised your 
various messages. ,26 In response to Churchill's strong reactions Curtin later stated that no 
one was 'more steadfast in loyalty to the king than Australia,.27 
Despite Churchill's accusation that Curtin's statement 'made a very bad impression 
in high American circles,28 this was not the case. Roosevelt was not concerned by divisions 
within the Empire-Commonwealth. Bell writes that 'during the war and immediate post-
20 Quoted in Robertson, Australia at War, p 79. 
21 Casey, Personal Experiences 1936-1946, p 8l. 
22 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol IV: the Hinge a/Fate, (London, 1953) p 22. 
23 Day, Great Betrayal, p 227. 
24 Quoted in Robertson, Australia at War, p 79. 
25 Bell, Unequal Allies, p 48. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Robertson, Australia at War, p 79. 
28 Bell, Unequal Allies, p 49. 
war months, the U.S. consistently sought to undermine Imperial economic and political 
unity to restrict British Commonwealth influence in the Pacific. ,29 
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New Zealand, like Australia, also wished to have a voice in the higher direction of 
the war in the Pacific. Fraser sent a telegram to Churchill on 12 January 1942 expressing 
his views on the war situation. He analysed the present state of the war emphasising the 
critical position in the Pacific. Although Fraser appreciated Britain's efforts, he said 'to be 
completely frank, we have not always felt that the potential problems of the Pacific here had 
the importance attached to them in London which we, more intimately concerned therewith, 
have considered that they have perhaps deserved. ,30 Fraser said that it was imperative that 
the Pacific be treated as being as important as the Mediterranean Theatre. Fraser 
considered the use of the term 'Southwest Pacific' by the United States to be misleading as 
it included neither the Australian mainland nor New Zealand. He repeated his concerns 
about the way ABDACOM was divided into smaller commands which dispersed forces and 
at the wayan American admiral commands the rest of the Pacific and a British admiral 
commands the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean. Fraser said 'Frankly this seems to us to be 
a step in the wrong direction. ,31 He preferred a unified strategic command covering the 
whole of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Stressing the importance of gaining naval 
supremacy over the Japanese, he said that a single naval command was imperative. He said 
that 'we must concentrate our forces or we will run a serious risk or be defeated 
piecemeal,.32 Fraser also pointed out that although New Zealand was not part of the 
ABDA Command and had few men in the Pacific its safety depended on what happened in 
the Pacific. Consequently, the New Zealand government wanted consultation. 
Fraser told Churchill that as the nature of the war had changed New Zealand wanted 
to have a say in how it would be run. He said that in the past New Zealand was content to 
adhere to what the British Chiefs of Staff decided, as the war had been confined to the 
Middle East and Europe. 'Now, however, that the war has moved to our doorstep. I am 
sure you will agree that where matters under discussion are of immediate and direct concern 
29 Ibid. 
3°F raser to Cranborne; 12 January 1942, Documents III, Doc 117. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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to us there must be some method devised by which we can intelligently form and explicitly 
express our views before action is taken. ,33 He recognised that there might be some 
difficulty in achieving sufficient consultation. He was against the idea of dominion Prime 
Ministers constantly meeting in London or of one Prime Minister representing all the 
dominions. He said that his government was gravely concerned about the situation: 'the 
unthinkable is now in everybody's mind' - the fall of Singapore. Fraser said that his 
government was responsible for the welfare of its people and that it must prepare for the 
worst. Fraser was conscious that the New Zealand government knew very little of the 
higher direction of the war and was almost completely ignorant of the intentions of the 
United States. He concluded by telling Churchill: 'We feel we must have an eye, an ear 
and a voice wherever decisions affecting New Zealand are to be made and we are by no 
means happy with the arrangements so far as we know them for the conduct ofthe war 
against Japan. ,34 Somewhat cynically, the writer of one of New Zealand's war narratives 
commented: 'One might point out here that although New Zealand desired an arrangement 
whereby she would be more fully consulted on developments in the Pacific, there is no 
evidence that the PM was able to provide any constructive suggestions. ,35 
In response to these concerns from the Australian and New Zealand governments, 
Roosevelt agreed to establish a naval area known as the Anzac Command. Churchill told 
Fraser on 14 January 1942 about this command, agreed to by the United States Navy and 
Roosevelt. The Anzac Command covered the east coast of Australia, eastern New Guinea, 
the Tasman Sea, the South Island and the western half of the North Island of New Zealand 
and the seas to the north.36 The aim of this command was to protect the Northeastern 
approaches to Australia and New Zealand. The Anzac Command was a concession that the 
United States offered to Australia and New Zealand because of the concerns that they had 
expressed. The United States said that it undertook to provide Australia and New Zealand 
with all ships, planes and munitions they needed to defend themselves and to carry out 
duties in the Anzac Area. However, the concession offered was small: Britain would supply 
only one aircraft carrier and the United States only one light or heavy cruiser. The bulk of 
33 Quoted in Wood, NZPW, P 217. 
34 Ibid, P 218. 
35 The Defence of the Pacific 1942, p 17-18. 
36 Lissington, NZ & US, P 41. 
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forces would come from Australia which would supply two heavy cruisers, one old light 
cruiser, three armed merchant cruisers, three destroyers, three sloops and two anti-
submarine patrol vessels. New Zealand would supply two light cruisers and one armed 
merchant cruiser. The Anzac Command was under the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Pacific Fleet, and the forces therein were seen as an extension of the United States Pacific 
Fleet. Australia's naval force were divided between ABDACOM and the Anzac Command. 
The New Zealand government did not want to respond to Britain or the United 
States with its views about the Anzac Command until it had consulted with Australia first. 37 
The New Zealand government felt that the best aspect ofthe Anzac Command was that it 
would guarantee a United States naval presence. It accepted the proposal, assuming it to be 
a temporary one while the Allies were on the defensive in the Pacific. The New Zealand 
government was consistently opposed to the division of naval forces in the Pacific. 
Although the Anzac proposal encouraged this division of naval forces, it was the best offer 
that New Zealand had received. Fraser informed Curtin of these views and asked for his 
opinions on the matter. Curtin does not seem to have replied. The Anzac Command was 
established on 30 January 1942. 
Churchill replied on 17 January 1942 to Fraser's frank expression of views about the 
war situation of 12 January. He addressed Fraser's desire for a naval command that would 
cover the whole of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Churchill said 'Frankly, I find this idea 
more attractive in theory than, in my view, it could work out in practice, unless it were 
possible for the United States Navy Department and the British Admiralty, with the Naval 
Boards of Australia and New Zealand and the Dutch Government, to be merged into one 
large United National Navy Department. ,38 He said that the United States Navy controlled 
the naval forces in the ABDA Area, Pacific Ocean and Anzac Area. Churchill still wanted 
to exert some control in the Pacific, even though British power had been virtually destroyed 
in this theatre. He suggested that a ministerial body be formed in London consisting of New 
Zealand, Dutch and Australian politicians to provide the representation that the Tasman 
neighbours required. This would of course depend upon Roosevelt. One suspects that 
Churchill's reasons for his criticisms were directed by his concerns that a unified command 
31 Fraser to Curtin; 16 January 1942, Documents 111, Doc 120. 
38 Cranborne to Fraser; 17 Feb 1942, Ibid, Doc 121. 
would operate under the United States. This would demonstrate clearly that the United 
States was controlling the Pacific and not the Empire-Commonwealth; a concept that 
Churchill was reluctant to accept. 
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Curtin asked the British government if it would allow a representative to sit on 
Britain's War Cabinet. On 22 January 1942 Britain agreed to the Australian government's 
request on the condition that this representative could commit Australia on urgent matters. 
Sir Earl Page then represented Australia on Britain's War Cabinet. Fraser asked Churchill if 
New Zealand would be allowed similar representation. Churchill told Fraser on 27 January 
that New Zealand was welcome to send a special representative who would be on a par 
with Page.39 Fraser replied that he was considering who would be a suitable representative 
to send. However, the only time that a New Zealand representative sat on Britain's War 
Cabinet was when Fraser or Nash visited London. This is an example that typifies the 
differences between Australia's and New Zealand's attempts to get a voice in the higher 
direction in the war. Australia asked Britain for representation and when the request was 
accepted used Page to exert influence. New Zealand, while following Australia and 
requesting representation, did not send a representative. The Australian government was 
more prepared than the New Zealand government to push hard to gain a voice in the higher 
direction in the war and more likely to take advantage of any opportunities that were 
offered to achieve this objective. Although the Australian government did not find having a 
representative on Britain's War Cabinet had a significant influence upon war policy, at least 
it afforded some insight and information into Britain's war policies. 
Meanwhile, the Australian government was growing nervous about the war situation 
in the Pacific. On a single day, 23 January 1942, the Japanese captured Rabaul in New 
Britain40, Kaviengin in New Ireland, landed at Bougainville in the Solomon Islands and 
invaded Borneo and Celebes in the Netherlands East Indies. The position of Malaya was 
desperate. The Australian government responded by calling an emergency War Cabinet 
meeting, that was presided over by Forde as Curtin was in Western Australia. Members of 
the War Cabinet began to blame Britain for the situation. Beasley said that 'Unless the 
39 Cranborne to Fraser; 27 January 1942, Ibid, Doc 131. 
40 The War Cabinet was not aware that Rabaul had fallen. They did know that it had been invaded and that 
if it was taken it would place Japanese forces within striking distance of New Guinea. 
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British Empire wants its annals to contain another Dunkirk, another Greece, another Crete, 
more guns, aeroplanes, troops and ships must get to Malaya now,.41 The War Cabinet 
approved the dispatch of a telegram to Churchill requesting urgent reinforcements for 
Malaya. 
After this meeting Evatt received two vital pieces of information, and responded by 
dramatically amending the third paragraph of the telegram that the War Cabinet had agreed 
to send to Churchill. The first new piece of information was a telegram from Page who said 
that the Defence Committee in London had just considered the evacuation of Malaya and 
Singapore. Page wrote that Churchill received a message from Wavell noting that the 
situation in Malaya was grave. Singapore had no defences on its northern shores facing 
Malaya or across the Iohore Straight. This had prompted Churchill to call a special meeting 
of the Defence Committee. At this meeting it was asked whether the evacuation of 
Singapore should now be considered and if the proposed reinforcements should instead be 
sent to keep the Burma Road open. Page said that he had argued strongly against 
evacuation. 'Evacuation would cause irreparable damage to the Allied cause quite apart 
from its military aspect. ,42 The second new piece of information was the fall ofRabaul. 
With Curtin on holiday in Western Australia, Evatt intervened and ensured that the 
telegram sent a powerful message.43 . Specifically, Evatt wrote 
.----
Page has reported the Defence Committee has been considering evacuation of 
Malaya and Singapore. After all the assurances we have been given, the evacuation 
of Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal. 
Singapore is a central fortress in the system of Empire and local defence ... we 
understood that it was to be made impregnable and in any event it was to be capable 
of holding out for a prolonged period until arrival of the main fleet. 44 
The telegram concluded that as far as supplies and reinforcements were concerned 'we have 
acted and carried out our part of the bargain. We expect you not to frustrate the whole 
purpose by evacuation. ,45 On the following day the War Cabinet met and Evatt informed it 
of Page's telegram and secured their assent to his dramatic amendments to the telegram to 
41 Quoted in Has1uck, Govt & People, vol 2, P 3. 
42 Page to Curtin, 22 January 1942, DAFP V, Doc 292. 
43 Horner, High Command, p 151. 
44 Curtin to Churchill, 23 January 1942, DAFP V, Doc 294. 
45 Ibid. 
Churchill. The Advisory War Council also agreed that day to Evatt's telegram seemingly 
without any discussion. Menzies and McEwen later claimed that they had disagreed, but 
Shedden did not record any dissent. 46 In Curtin's absence, Evatt's powerful telegram was 
sent to Churchill. 
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Churchill was shocked by this language. He told Curtin 'I really cannot pass 
without comment such language to me as "inexcusable betrayal". I make all allowances for 
your anxiety and will not allow such discourtesy to cloud my judgement or lessen my efforts 
on your behalf ,47 Churchill was stung by Australia's telegram and this was evident in his 
comments in the House of Commons on 27 January 1942. When assessing the grim Far 
Eastern situation he said, 'everything in human power that we can do to help Australia, or 
persuade America to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust that reproaches and 
recriminations of all kinds will be avoided, and that if any are made, we in Britain shall not 
take any part in them. ,48 
The United States Chiefs of Staff were not impressed with the strong reactions of 
the Australian government. When a battle was being lost, there was a point when the 
decision to withdraw had to be made before all was lost. Drawing up evacuation plans was 
a standard part of formulating military policy. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed 
that it would have been 'criminally negligent' if Britain had not planned for the worst case 
scenario.49 
Fraser told Churchill that as New Zealand's naval forces would be used in the Anzac 
Area, some means of communicating with and making representation to and consulting 
directly with the United States Navy was needed. He told Churchill on 22 January 1942 
that he welcomed the prospect of close naval co-operation with the United States. Fraser 
suggested that New Zealand could be represented by a liaison officer on the staff of the 
46 Horner, High Command, p 152. 
41 Quoted in Homer, High Command, p152. 
48 Churchill's Speech to the House of Commons, The War Situation, 27 January 1942; R.R. James, Winston 
Churchill; His Complete Speeches, vol VI, (New York, 1974) p 6568. 
49 Horner, High Command, p 153. 
United States Admiral. 50 However, Fraser desired that New Zealand should be in direct 
contact with representatives from the United States and other Pacific powers. 
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On 24 January, Churchill explained to Fraser about the proposed Far Eastern 
Defence Council in London that he had mentioned earlier. 51 Churchill would be the 
chairman and there would be one ministerial representative each from Australia, New 
Zealand and the Netherlands plus any advisers who might need to be summoned. This body 
would also be in contact with the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. In Washington, there 
would be the Combined Chiefs of Staff which included representatives of Britain's three 
Chiefs of Staff and the United States' three Chiefs of Staff Churchill offered to represent 
the combined views of New Zealand and Australia and all those on the London Far Eastern 
Defence Council to Roosevelt. Essentially, the Far Eastern Defence Council in London was 
to be a political one and the Washington Council a strategic one. The London Council was 
attractive to Churchill as he would have the opportunity to exert his influence over the 
dominions, whilst excluding the United States from influencing them. 
Fraser responded that Churchill's explanation of the Far Eastern Council in London 
left him 'perplexed and, to be candid, unconvinced. ,52 Churchill explained that if any of the 
ABDA governments had a proposal it would simultaneously proceed to both conferences. 
The New Zealand government again had to remind the British that it was not one of the 
ABDA governments. Fraser said that New Zealand needed direct representation with 
Roosevelt because of the Anzac Command. He said that the structure of the two councils 
(one in London one in Washington) 'are not attractive to us'. Further, it 'would surely be 
cumbersome' .53 
The United States did not look favourably upon the idea of Australia and New 
Zealand having input into military decisions that were made in Washington. Churchill 
forwarded to Fraser the opinions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2 February. The 
general feeling was that 
50 Fraser to WSC, 22 January 1942, Documents Ill, Doc 125. 
51 Cranbome to Fraser; 24 January 1942, Ibid, Doc 126. 
52Fraser to Cranbome; 26 Jan 1942, Ibid, Doc 129. 
53 Ibid. 
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all political and Governmental matters concerning New Zealand, Australia, and the 
Netherlands East Indies should continue to be handled in London and that military 
matters be resolved here. However, to have all these countries represented by three 
men on the Joint Staff considering ABDA problems would provide for an altogether 
unwieldy body. 54 
The New Zealand government still held serious doubts about the viability of the Far 
Eastern Defence Council in London. Fraser told Churchill on 6 February 1942 that if the 
Far Eastern Council in London proceeded without the representation of the United States 'a 
mistake is being made which in our opinion may prove serious. ,55 The United States had 
already made it clear that it did not want New Zealand military advisers telling it what to do 
with its forces. 
Nash, in Washington, was also gravely concerned about the proposal to establish a 
Far Eastern Council in London. He had ten reasons why he opposed the suggestion: (1) a 
unified high command was essential; (2) a council in London was disadvantageous 
geographically, strategically and politically; (3) it encouraged a sectarian British and 
Commonwealth view; (4) strategically, it encouraged the idea of Britain advancing east 
from the Indian Ocean and the United States advancing west from Hawaii; (5) London was 
too far away geographically to make a proper appreciation; (6) London should direct war in 
Europe and the Mediterranean, while Washington should direct war in the Pacific; (7) 
Australian and New Zealand representatives should sit on the Washington War Council; (8) 
Command should be unified under one person in London and one person in Washington; (9) 
pre war policies and present loyalties count for nothing if we lose the war; and (10) you can 
only carry out a successful Pacific campaign from Washington. 56 Nash's seventh suggestion 
had already been rejected by the United States as being 'unwieldy'. 
Despite Fraser's reservations, he decided that New Zealand would give the Far 
Eastern Council in London a 'fair trial'. 57 Nash, assumed that he was the best man to 
represent New Zealand on the London council and should supersede William Joseph Jordan 
who was New Zealand's High Commissioner in London. Nash said this before Fraser 
54 Defence of the Pacific, p 32. 
55 Fraser to Cranborne; 6 February 1942, Documents III, Doc 135. 
56 Nash to Fraser; 6 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 136. 
57 Fraser to Nash; 19 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 145. 
confirmed he was the suitable candidate for this position. Consequently, he arranged for 
Nash to travel to London to represent New Zealand. 
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Despite Curtin's concerns about Japan, it was Churchill who first raised the 
possibility of returning any of the Australian divisions from the Middle East to the Far East. 
Churchill sent a telegram to the United States Chiefs of Staff Committee on 16 December 
1941 suggesting that one Australian division be transferred to Singapore. 58 It was 
eventually agreed by Britain and Australia that the 6th and 7th divisions would leave the 
Middle East to reinforce Singapore. The aim was that they would land in Singapore to 
launch a counter-attack upon Malaya. However, while the reinforcements were on their 
way to the Far East the situation deteriorated quickly. Malaya was occupied and then 
Singapore fell on 15 February. Curtin reacted to the news of Singapore's fall by asking 
Churchill that all remaining Australian AIF troops in the Middle East, as well as those 
currently being transferred, be sent immediately to Australia. 
This was a significant landmark. The only real influence that Australia could exert 
upon Britain and the United States was a negative one by controlling its armed forces. 
Even then, the Australian government found that it had to fight for what it wanted. This 
was demonstrated by what happened to the 7th division in 1942. Churchill later described 
this incident as 'a painful episode in our relations with the Australian Government,.59 
Wavell suggested on 16 February that either the 6th or 7th division be sent to Burma. At 
the Pacific War Council meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Washington on 18 February 
the situation in the Far East was discussed.60 It was accepted that Australia should bring 
the 6th and 7th divisions to the Pacific. Because Singapore had fallen the Australian 
government was to be asked ifthe 7th division would instead be diverted to Burma, to save 
Rangoon and keep the Burma road and communications with China open. This was 
because the 7th division was close enough to be diverted to Burma while the 6th division 
had not yet left the Middle East. Bruce in London told Curtin that he believed that the 7th 
58 Robertson, Australia at War, p 79. 
59 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p 136. 
60 Page to Curtin; 28 February 1942, DAFP V; Doc 341. 
division should be diverted to Burma.61 However, Curtin responded to Churchill on 19 
February saying that he could not allow the 7th division to be diverted to Burma. 
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Churchill tried to pressure Curtin about this. Cranbome, on the advice of General 
Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, offered the Australian government a 
United States division to leave for Australia in March if the 7th division went to Burma. 
Churchill pleaded with Curtin to reconsider the situation. He referred to the telegram in 
which Curtin had said that the evacuation of Singapore would be an 'inexcusable betrayal', 
noting that the 7th division had the opportunity to avert a 'vital war emergency'. 62 
Churchill continued that if Australia persisted in refusing, then 'a very grave effect will be 
produced upon the President and the Washington circle on whom you are so largely 
dependent. ,63 The following day Churchill sent a telegram to Curtin that he had received 
from Roosevelt. Roosevelt regarded the diversion of the 7th division to Burma as being of 
the 'utmost importance. ,64 Roosevelt also sent a message to Curtin through Casey in 
Washington, again stressing the importance of Burma. 65 Evatt felt that Churchill was 
applying excessive pressure upon the Australian government to change its decision: 
'Churchill seems to have a deep hatred of labour governments and a resentment of 
independent judgement which make it almost impossible for us to work with him. ,66 As if 
to confirm Evatt's worst fears, Churchill sent a cable to Curtin that day admitting that on 
the 20th he had already ordered the ships with the 7th division AIF convoy to Burma 
without prior Australian permission. This diversion was made on the assumption that 
Curtin would agree to the diversion.67 Curtin was outraged as was Bruce, who immediately 
cabled Curtin with his reactions: 'I am appalled by it and its possible repercussions. It is 
arrogant and offensive and it contradicts the assurances given to Page that the Convoy was 
not being diverted from its direct route to Australia.' Although he felt that 'Any reaction on 
your part would be justified', he nevertheless urged restraint. 68 Curtin replied to Churchill 
that it was 'quite impossible to reverse a decision which was made with the utmost care and 
61 Bruce to Curtin; 18 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 344. 
62 Attlee to Curtin; 20 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 352. 
63 Ibid. 
64 British Dominions Office to Curtin; 21 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 353. 
65 Casey to Curtin; 21 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 355. 
66 Evatt to Stirling; 22 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 360. 
67 Attlee to Curtin 22 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 362. 
68 Bruce to Curtin, 23 February 1942, Ibid, Doc 364. 
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which we have affirmed and re-affirmed'. Curtin demanded that the convoy go to Colombo 
to refuel and then return to Australia. This, however, was not the end of the matter. Curtin 
was informed by Page and Bruce that Churchill wanted the 7th division to be diverted to 
Ceylon. The Australian government offered to divert two brigades of the 6th division to 
Ceylon, whilst insisting that the 7th division return to Australia. 
Australia and New Zealand took different approaches to ensure that their voices 
were heard in London and Washington. The New Zealand government was more tactful 
and restrained while the Australian government was more forthright and defiant. Berendsen 
recalled that Australia's approach to foreign affairs was 'from time to time ... like a bull at a 
gate, with little thought or care for the consequences'. 69 Australia was determined to have a 
voice and to be heard by others and so adopted this distinctly outspoken approach. Which 
approach was more successful, the tactful New Zealand approach or the more forthright 
Australian approach? More was gained from Britain and the United States by loudly 
pestering them, then by making polite requests. Evatt's diplomatic style illustrates this point 
particularly well. He would loudly make an unrealistically ambitious request that he knew 
Britain or the United States would not seriously consider. Then in private, he would 
moderate his claim, prepared to settle for far less than he publicly claimed. Carl Bridge 
accurately observes that 'Roosevelt and Churchill soon discovered Evatt's games and, to 
humour Australia at little cost to themselves, connived to give him token trophies to take 
back to his party and electorate and to allow him to claim more influence on grand strategy 
than he ever had. ,70 As far as Australia was concerned Britain was no longer the Imperial 
power that it once was, and consequently little value was placed upon securing influence 
with the British. Instead, its focus was upon influencing the United States. Although 
Australia only gained 'token trophies', they were of great political value for demonstrating 
to the people that the government was achieving results. Achieving very little was better 
than achieving nothing. 
This fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 shocked both Australia and New 
Zealand. Thousands of Australians and Britain's 18th division were incarcerated in Changi 
69 Berendsen 's Memoirs, bookfour, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington) p 284. 
70 C. Bridge, 'Impossible Missions: H.V. Evatt in Washington and London in 1942 and 1943', in D. Day 
(Ed), Brave New World: Dr H V. Evatt and Australian foreign policy, (8t Lucia, 1996) p 32. 
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pnson. Curtin said on 16 February that 'The fall of Singapore opens the Battle for 
Australia,.71 Darwin was bombed for the first time on 19 February. It was the single 
greatest air raid since the attack on Pearl Harbor with 100 Japanese planes. That afternoon 
there was a great rush southwards to the Adelaide River. Darwin was left a ghost town. 
Many RAAF men deserted their stations. Further raids followed on 4 March, 16 March, 19 
March, 22 March, 2 April, 4 April and 5 April. By February 1942 about 2500 civilians had 
left Darwin. 
There was much fear in political circles in Canberra. Typists were copying 
important documents in case the capital had to be moved in a hurry and the files had to be 
destroyed. Records show that officials in Canberra expected the capital to be bombed and 
even occupied. The Advisory War Council on 18 February 1942 considered a scorched 
earth policy for the whole of Australia. There was much panic in Australia's political circles 
from February 1942. Cecil Brown, ajoumalist from Colombia Broadcasting system, wrote 
that Forde was 'one of the most incredible men I have ever encountered in political life .... 
In his office in Parliament House he acted as harassed as if a Japanese division were chasing 
him. His manner was to keep saying "Yes, yes, yes", whether you were saying anything or 
not.,72 Curtin became ill and Evatt took another opportunity to draft telegrams to 
Churchill. On 23 March 1942 Evatt told Bruce that the 'position in Australia for the next 
two months is a desperate one.,73 
The public was scared. People had believed that their security rested with Singapore 
and the Royal Navy and they had seen both destroyed in the Pacific. Curtin said to the 
public on 16 February that the nation must now work as it never had done before. 'On 
what we do now depends everything we may like to do when this bloody test has been 
survived. ,74 On 31 March, W.S. Robinson, a leading Australian businessman, said that the 
country may 'have only six weeks to live.'75 
71 Robertson, Australia at War, p 93. 
12Quoted in Horner, High Command, p 16l. 
73 Quoted in Robertson, Australia at War, p 99. 
74 Quoted in Hasluck, Govt & People, vol 2, p 73. 
75 Quoted in Robinson, Australia at War, p 99. 
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In the wider arena it was significant that the Australian and New Zealand 
governments were drawn together by the common threat of the advancing Japanese forces 
especially after the fall of Singapore. Fraser suggested to Curtin on 18 February that a New 
Zealand delegation should be sent to Australia to discuss immediate defence and supply 
problems. Curtin agreed. The New Zealand delegation consisted of Dan Sullivan, Minister 
of Supply, and Coates, who was a member of the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff. The 
most pressing concern was that the advance of Japanese forces meant that Australia and 
New Zealand feared that they faced invasion. Darwin, Port Moresby, New Caledonia and 
Fiji were immediately threatened. Protecting communications between Australasia and the 
United States was considered vital. Australia and New Zealand wanted the United States to 
playa greater role in the Pacific and they felt that the Anzac Command needed to be 
enlarged immediately. Achieving these goals was the focus of the consultation that took 
place in Australia between members of the Advisory War Council, the Australian Chiefs of 
Staff, the New Zealand delegation (including the Chiefs of Staff), Lieutenant-General Brett, 
the Deputy Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and Brigadier-General 
Hurley from the United States Army. The result ofthis consultation was that a telegram 
was drafted on 1 March to be sent to Churchill and Roosevelt recommending widening the 
Anzac Area to include the mainland of Australia, New Zealand, Timor, Ambon, New 
Guinea and the seas south of Australia. An Anzac Council was sought with government 
representatives from the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. This council 
would meet in Washington and be responsible for the Anzac Area and could be enlarged if 
other countries had forces serving in this strategic area. The Anzac Council would come 
under the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington. However, when the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed Anzac strategy naval, army and air officers should be 
present from Australia and New Zealand. A supreme commander would be appointed to 
the Anzac Area who would be responsible to the United States Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
This commander would have control over naval, air and land forces in the Anzac Area. It 
was felt that an Anzac Council was essential as it provided Australia and New Zealand with 
a voice in the higher direction of the war. This draft telegram concluded by suggesting 
General Brett as an acceptable candidate for supreme commander. The approval of the 
New Zealand government was urgently needed before the telegram could be sent. 
65 
The New Zealand government replied on 3 March with a number of suggestions. 
While agreeing in general terms with the scope of the telegram it felt that certain aspects of 
it had to be clarified. It was assumed that the Anzac Council would not replace the Far 
Eastern Defence Council in London. Fraser felt that, although the Far Eastern Defence 
Council in London was not ideal, both Australia and New Zealand had agreed to it and they 
were obliged to try to make it work. He also foresaw some awkwardness if the Anzac 
Council and the London Council held contradictory views. Nevertheless, he welcomed 
closer relations with the United States through the proposed Anzac Council, so long as it 
was not at the expense of the London Council. Fraser also felt that the Dutch should be 
included on the Anzac Council as they had forces in the Area. The New Zealand 
government also suggested that the proposed telegram should not be communicated directly 
to Roosevelt. Instead it should be sent to Churchill with the request that he pass it on to 
Roosevelt. All the suggestions that the New Zealand government made were accepted by 
the Australians. 
The amended telegram was sent by Curtin on 4 March to Clement Attlee, the 
Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs. 76 Fraser also sent a telegram two days later 
confirming that the New Zealand government fully supported Curtin's plans for the Anzac 
Area. Churchill replied on 7 March that he had passed on the telegram to Roosevelt and 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were in London, were examining Australia's and New 
Zealand's proposals. The Tasman neighbours combined their influence to try to get the 
United States to playa greater role in the Anzac Command. 
The United States took control ofthe situation. Roosevelt, on 13 March 1942, 
approved a proposal that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff should divide the world into 
three areas: Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific. Churchill and the British Chiefs of 
Staff would concentrate on the battles in Europe, Roosevelt and the United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific and both would share oversight in the Middle East. The Pacific 
was divided into three areas: the Pacific Ocean Area, the Southwest Pacific Area and the 
Southeast Pacific Area.77 In this division Australia found itself in the Southwest Pacific 
Area and New Zealand in the Pacific Ocean Area. The Pacific Ocean Area was divided into 
76 Curtin to Attlee; 4 March 1942, Documents III, Doc 151. 
77 Lissington, NZ & US, P 46. 
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three smaller commands: north, central and south. New Zealand was in the South Pacific 
Ocean Area which also included Fiji and New Caledonia. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was 
later confirmed as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area. These new commands 
replaced the Anzac Command. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area was 
responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Douglas MacArthur was 
Commander -in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area. 
Despite all the suggestions that Australia and New Zealand had made about the 
command in the Pacific, the United States did as it pleased. Fraser supported the fact that 
the United States had acted quickly saying that it was important not to waste valuable time 
arguing about the finer points of strategy. Then Fraser added, somewhat inconsistently, that 
his government expected to be consulted about anything that might affect New Zealand. 
The New Zealand government was strongly opposed to being separated from 
Australia strategically. Fraser felt that the separation of Australia and New Zealand into 
separate strategic areas would create numerous practical difficulties. He wanted the 
proposed Anzac Area to be established and if this was not possible, that Australia and New 
Zealand would not be separated into different strategic commands. It is significant that the 
Australian government did not express this degree of concern about being detached from 
New Zealand. However New Zealand's protests to the United States achieved nothing. 
The American leaders refused to allow their hands to be tied. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments' dissatisfaction with the Far Eastern 
Defence Council in London led to the establishment of the Pacific War Council (PWC) in 
Washington. Although both countries had agreed to attend the Far Eastern Council, it was 
not seen as ideal and the meetings were oflittle consequence. The collapse of the ABDA 
Command in February and continued trans-Tasman discontent with the Far Eastern Defence 
Council in London led Roosevelt to reconsider the situation. Although Roosevelt was not 
keen to broaden allied consultation he told a Washington Press Conference on 30 March 
1942 that a council 'with a fancy name' could be established 'ifit would make anybody 
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happy,.8o Much to the delight of the Australian and New Zealand governments, Roosevelt 
announced on 30 March his decision to establish the PWC that would meet in Washington 
with its first meeting on 1 April. It included representatives from the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Canada and China. Roosevelt was Chairman. 
Australia and New Zealand had finally achieved what they had been striving for: a 
voice in Washington. Better still, they had direct access to Roosevelt. What then did this 
actually amount to? The PWC was not an executive body but an advisory one. It was set 
up by Roosevelt and suited his purposes. It had no secretariat, no formal executive powers, 
no official minutes, no formal records and no agenda. The meetings were personally 
dominated by Roosevelt in a casual conversational way. It was not designed to give the 
Australian and New Zealand governments any decision-making powers, but as a means of 
making them feel consulted. It provided a mechanism that Roosevelt used to appease 
Australia and New Zealand. Lord Halifax described the PWC as 'merely a facade,.81 The 
United States Chiefs of Staff tolerated the PWC because they saw it being used to 
encourage the Australian and New Zealand governments to 'let off steam, but not ... in any 
way that would affect the United States in its military decisions. ,82 Roosevelt described his 
motives for the PWC to Winant, the United States Ambassador to Britain: 'my own Pacific 
War Council serves primarily to disseminate information as to the progress of operations in 
the Pacific - and secondly to give me a chance to keep everybody happy by telling stories 
and doing most of the talking. ,83 In this respect it was a useful innovation. 
Although Australia and New Zealand gained a voice in Washington and direct 
access to Roosevelt, their influence upon the higher strategy of the war in the Pacific 
remained at best token. Australia had achieved more than New Zealand through its forceful 
and persistently loud approach. For example, the 7th division was not diverted to Burma. 
The establishment of the Anzac Area and the Pacific War Council can also been seen as 
token successes for Australia and New Zealand. In real terms Australia and New Zealand 
had at best a minor influence upon Britain and the United States. This was because both 
80 Quoted in Bell, Unequal Allies, p 60. 
81 Quoted in R.H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, (New York, 1985) p 143. 
82 Jbid. 
83 Quoted in Kimball, 'Merely a Facade? Roosevelt and the Southwest Pacific', in Day (Ed) Brave New 
World, p 14. 
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Britain and the United States, as large powers, were reluctant to spend time consulting two 
small dominions in the Southwest Pacific when their valuable time could be spent on 
winning the Second World War. 
Chapter 5 
The Crisis point of trans-Tasman relations: divergent policies from 
November 1942 to June 1943. 
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Australia's and New Zealand's attempts to secure a voice in Washington, demonstrated the 
different diplomatic styles of the two countries. This was not the only respect in which they 
were different. The year 1942 had brought great changes for both countries. The 
Australian government had accepted that the power ofthe Empire-Commonwealth had 
expired and that Australia's future lay with the United States. Consequently, Anglo-
Australian relations had soured. New Zealand, while realising that the United States was 
now the 'great power', still clung emotionally to Britain. New Zealand's foreign policy still 
seemed to be operating partly within the old imperial system. The changing ways in which 
the Australian and New Zealand governments saw the world affected the way that they 
related to Britain and the United States. Consequently, Australia and New Zealand began 
to follow different policies especially with respect to their expeditionary forces. These 
divergences resulted in a crisis in trans-Tasman relations. Ironically, it was deteriorating 
political relations between Australia and New Zealand that led Fraser to send a High 
Commissioner to Canberra. 
When the Australian government recalled the 6th and 7th divisions from the 
Mediterranean Theatre it intended to recall the 9th division at a later date. However, 
securing the return of the 9th division to the Pacific theatre proved to be a lengthy and 
arduous process which the Australian government believed New Zealand came close to 
jeopardising. As early as 14 April 1942 the Australia government had requested that the 9th 
division return but agreed to postpone its journey until shipping could be supplied. l Three 
months later, on 30 July, Churchill pleaded with Curtin and succeeded in securing his 
agreement to postpone again the return of the 9th division.2 In October, Australia once 
more pressed Churchill to help the 9th division withdraw from the Mediterranean. It 
seemed that Australia had finally got its way on the 23rd when Churchill told General 
1 Curtin to Churchill, 14 April 1942, DAFP V, Doc 465. 
2 Curtin to Churchill, 30 July 1942, DAFP VI, Doc 12. 
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Alexander that the 9th division was to withdraw.3 However, the issue was not yet resolved. 
Alexander received Churchill's instructions on the eve of the Allied offensive led by 
Montgomery against Rommel at El Alamein- an offensive in which the 9th division was 
intended to playa crucial role. Withdrawing the 9th division at this late stage would have 
caused cancellation of the whole operation. For a third time Curtin was asked to postpone 
the withdrawal. He agreed and the 9th division took part in the battle ofEl Alamein. 
Roosevelt on 1 November offered to transfer a United States division from Hawaii to 
Australia to allow the 9th division to remain in the Middle East. 4 Evatt insisted to 
Roosevelt5 on 16 November that Australia was plagued with manpower problems and could 
not maintain the 9th division in the Middle East. After these seemingly countless efforts by 
Australia to secure the return of the 9th division, the New Zealand government raised its 
desire that its own 2nd division be returned. Fraser asked Churchill on 19 November. The 
timing of Fraser's request infuriated the Australian government which feared that it would 
delay or stop the return of the 9th division. Australia's less than favourable position had 
been, as Curtin saw it, complicated by New Zealand's action. Curtin was highly incensed. 
He told Bruce in London, in a strongly worded telegram, that New Zealand's request must 
not be allowed to prejudice or delay the return of the 9th division.6 The Australian 
government undoubtedly felt that it deserved to receive priority over New Zealand because 
it had asked to leave first. On 2 December, Churchill instructed that the 9th division be 
withdrawn. It left the Middle East in January 1943 reaching Fremantle on 7 February. 
The New Zealand government had been considering withdrawing the 2nd division 
for some time before it made the request to Churchill. New Zealand had two divisions in 
the field, the 2nd division in the Middle East and the 3rd division in the Pacific. 7 
Maintaining two full divisions as well as supplying the demands of industry put strains upon 
New Zealand's manpower resources. New Zealand's primary sector was already strained 
by the demands of war and this was increased by the presence of United States Marines 
who arrived in Wellington on 14 June 1942. The pressures of industry were increasing as 
New Zealand supplied food to Britain and to the United States forces in the South Pacific. 
3 Ibid, P 139n. 
4 Roosevelt to Curtin, received 1 November 1942, Ibid, Doc 68. 
5 Evatt via Dixon to Roosevelt, 16 November 1942, Ibid, Doc 76. 
6 Ibid, pl72n & 174n. 
7 The 3rd division was technically born on 14 May 1942. Before this it was referred to as B Force 2 NZEF. 
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Because ofthese considerable manpower shortages the New Zealand government 
. considered withdrawing the 2nd division to relieve the pressure. On 14 November 1942 
Attlee cabled Batterbee in Wellington that Britain wanted the 2nd division to remain in the 
Middle East. Fraser told Churchill on 19 November that New Zealand wished to withdraw 
its division from the Middle East, saying that it had declined mentioning this earlier because 
of the military situation there. Fraser argued that because of the increase in British and 
United States forces after Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa on 8 
November, New Zealand's forces in the Middle East were of 'diminishing importance'. 8 
The New Zealand government was also embarrassed by the United States' requests for 
increased troops in the Pacific. 9 
Fraser used Australia's position to further New Zealand's case for the return of its 
troops. He said that his government would face irresistible pressure 'should it become 
known that all three Australian Divisions have returned. ,10 This was just the sort of 
argument that the Australian government so feared. Churchill replied to Fraser's request 
that he would 'very much regret to see the New Zealand Division quit the scene of its 
glories' but he understood 'how embarrassing' the withdrawal of the 9th Australian division 
would be for New Zealand. l1 
In a secret session of the New Zealand House of Representatives (on 3 December) it 
was unanimously decided to leave the 2nd division in the Mediterranean East for the time 
being. In an open session of parliament on 4 December Fraser, although he fully agreed 
with the decision to leave the 2nd division in the Middle East, said he did 'not believe in the 
theory of a holding war in the Pacific' . 12 This comment reveals the difficulty of the decision 
that the New Zealand government had faced. It felt tom between the Mediterranean and 
the Pacific and decided to maintain both divisions for the time being. In effect New Zealand 
had decided to postpone the decision. Sidney Holland, leader of the Opposition, 
commented on the improved situation in the Pacific in the last twelve months. Twelve 
months earlier Japan had entered the war and its armed forces had advanced rapidly through 
8 Fraser to Churchill, 19 November 1942, DNZER I, Doc 7. 
9 Attlee to Batterbee, 14 November 1942, Documents II, Doc 175. 
10 Fraser to Churchill, 19 November 1942, Documents I, Doc 7. 
11 Churchill to Fraser, 24 November 1942, Ibid, Doc 8. 
12 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates [NZPD}, vol 261, p 952. 
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Asia and the Pacific causing widespread concern. The Japanese onslaught continued 
unchecked until the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 1942. Sidney 
George Holland, Leader of the Opposition, then turned to New Zealand's manpower 
shortage and claimed that it was not possible to maintain two full divisions overseas as well 
as the home forces stationed in the country and a large workforce devoted to food 
production. He said New Zealand's manpower was overcommitted because Parliament had 
no say in the decision to send the 3rd division to the Pacific earlier in the year. He said 'The 
War Cabinet has done it. Parliament has not done it - Parliament never does. ,13 Holland 
resented the War Cabinet's increase of New Zealand's commitments without consulting X 
f parliament first. His attitude reflected the fact that he had had the opportunity to become a 
tember of the War Cabinet on 17 April 1941, but had declined Fraser's offer. Holland was 
using this issue to earn some political points against the government. This was evident as 
he did not say which division he wanted to be returned to New Zealand. Instead he was 
inclined to say that New Zealand's home forces should be reduced and a complete overhaul 
of the defence forces should be made. In response to Holland's plea that Parliament be 
consulted before any more commitments were made, Fraser made a pledge to the House 
that 'provided there is plenty of time to consult Parliament, this will be done' .14 This meant 
that when the future of the 2nd division was later considered Parliament expected to play an 
active role in making this decision. The decision to leave the 2nd division in the 
Mediterranean was communicated to Churchill and Curtin on 4 December 1942. Although 
the New Zealand government did not jeopardise the return of the 9th division this was not 
immediately apparent, especially to Curtin. Later, on 14 December 1942, after the issue 
was resolved, Curtin send Fraser a friendly telegram saying that New Zealand and Australia 
had similar defence and foreign policy interests and there was no reason why they could not 
present a united front against Japan. 
After this political tension between the Australian and New Zealand governments, 
Fraser felt that the time had come to extend diplomatic representation between the 
countries. He sent a telegram to Curtin on 20 February 1943 requesting that Australia 
accept a New Zealand High Commissioner to Canberra, naming Carl Berendsen as the man 
he wished to send. He also encouraged the Australian government to send a High 
13 Ibid, P 957. 
14 Ibid, P 974. 
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Commissioner to Wellington. Curtin replied on 23 February that Australia would receive 
Berendsen as High Commissioner to Canberra. Berendsen later recalled that there had been 
some reluctance by Curtin to receive any High Commissioner from New Zealand. The 
Australian government was concerned that having a High Commissioner in Canberra would 
mean that it would be obliged to consult with New Zealand. It meant that a New Zealand 
representative would have the opportunity constantly to press its views upon an indifferent 
Australian government. As the Australian government did not regard New Zealand as an 
equal partner, it felt no need to consult with New Zealand. When the Australian 
government wanted something from New Zealand it could send a relevant telegram to 
Wellington. Curtin regarded the presence of a New Zealand High Commissioner as nothing 
but a nuisance. He told Fraser that Australia had not considered sending a High 
Commissioner to New Zealand and had no desire to do so at present. He did not wish to 
send an Australian to Wellington only to be constantly badgered by New Zealanders. 
This was not the first time that Australia and New Zealand had considered 
exchanging diplomatic representatives. As early as 5 September 1939, Menzies had 
announced that his Cabinet wanted to make a reciprocal exchange of High Commissioners 
with New Zealand. However, nothing came of this. When Fraser had visited Australia in 
May 1941 the exchange of High commissioners was again discussed. Although there is no 
fonnal record of these discussions, both Fraser and Curtin recalled these oral discussions. IS 
Fraser had been considering the exchange of High Commissioners with Australia for some 
time prior to his fonnal request to Curtin in February 1943. Why then did he choose to 
raise the issue again at this time? One reason is that from a military point of view increased 
trans-Tasman co-operation was needed. From March 1942 onwards New Zealand and 
Australia had been in different war commands. Australia was part of the Southwest Pacific 
Area under General MacArthur and New Zealand was part of the South Pacific Ocean Area 
command under Admiral Halsey. New Zealand's forces were under the command of Halsey 
and Australia's forces were under the command of MacArthur: New Zealand was in a naval 
command, Australia in an anny command. Because of these different war zones, although 
New Zealand and Australia had similar defence and foreign policy problems, they had little 
contact with each other. The emergence of different policies also hindered the progress of 
15 DAFP VI, Doc 122 & 124. 
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stable relations between both countries. Fraser told Nash in Washington, that he had been 
concerned about liaison with Australia for some time. He wrote that there was a need for 
'fuller mutual understanding of the defence and foreign policies,16 of the Tasman 
neighbours. 
Another reason for extending diplomatic representation to Australia was to lessen 
the adverse effects of the political falling-outs between the countries. In late November 
1942, Curtin was furious that the New Zealand government had asked for its 2nd division to 
be returned. Now that the Australian 9th division was in the Pacific, the Australian 
government was furious that New Zealand's 2nd division remained in the Mediterranean 
theatre. New Zealand's position, Curtin now felt, was to fight along side Australia in the 
Pacific. 
However, it is extremely controversial to claim that the return of the 9th division 
was in any way vital to the outcome of the war in the Pacific. It is even more controversial 
to claim that Australia's manpower shortages necessitated the return of the 9th division. 
The 9th division arrived in Australia in February 1943 where the men were given 21 days 
leave. It was concentrated in the Atherton area in Queensland where it was re-equipped 
and reorganised as a jungle division. It then fought in the New Guinea campaign from 
September 1943. Although the 9th division was used in the Pacific war, it would be 
inaccurate to claim that it was necessary to withdraw it from the Mediterranean Theatre 
because Australia did not have forces available to go into combat in New Guinea. This was 
evident in October 1943 when the War Cabinet directed that 15000 experienced rural 
workers should be released from the armed services and from munitions and aircraft 
industries. 
Fraser realised that New Zealand's manpower problem of November 1942 had not 
been resolved, just delayed. It was certain that a decision would have to be made soon 
regarding the future of the 2nd division in the Mediterranean theatre. If this future decision 
would upset Curtin and the Australian government, it would be to New Zealand's 
advantage to have a High Commissioner to lessen any adverse effects of such a decision. 
16 Fraser to Nash, 25 February 1943, AppOintment of a High Commissioner (National Archives). 
Berendsen later recalled that it was 'primarily because of the apparent divergence of 
Australian and New Zealand policies ... that the Australians were asked and with some 
reluctance agreed, to accept a New Zealand High Commissioner.,17 Fraser saw the 
appointment as an opportunity to smooth over past misunderstandings and to prepare for 
possible future ones regarding the 2nd division. 
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Carl Berendsen had been head of the Prime Minister's Department since 1932, the 
Secretary of External Affairs and acted as the Secretary of the War Cabinet. He was in 
effect a one man external affairs department before it was officially created. On 13 June 
1943 he was officially appointed to be New Zealand's first High Commissioner to Canberra, 
but he had already arrived in March. His first task was to find accommodation that was 
suitable for the position that he held. He also had to set up an office. Just after he left for 
Canberra, the New Zealand Department of External Affairs was created. 
Fraser had taken a long time to decide to send Berendsen to Australia. He first 
mentioned his intention to Berendsen over a year before the final decision was taken. In his 
memoirs Berendsen recorded that this may have been due to the traditional resentment that 
Labour politicians had for civil. servants. Many in the Labour Party held the view that if 
Fraser was to appoint someone to Canberra it should be an elected Member of Parliament 
c. .!i r? 
rather than a Civil ~ervant: Being elected by the people was seen as being democratic, , 
honourable and prestigious. It was almost seen by some as a way of proving yourself 
Fraser shared this belief that Members of Parliament always ranked higher than civil 
servants. This party pressure contributed to the length of time that it took for Fraser to 
decide to send Berendsen to Australia. 
At first glance, it seems strange that a man in Berendsen's position of great 
responsibility would wish to leave Wellington for Canberra. Although it was undisputed that 
Berendsen was the best man for the job there were other reasons why he went. His 
working relationship with Fraser was increasingly strained. Fraser was an extremely able 
statesman but a monster of a man to work for. He worked long hours and expected those 
around him to do likewise. He continually and unnecessarily had a habit of being late, often 
17 Berendsen Memoirs, p 299. 
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for trivial or petty reasons. Civil Servants complained of being urgently summoned to see 
him only to be kept waiting for hours. This also happened to senior military experts who 
were summoned to War Cabinet. They would wait for hours only to be sent away as their 
particular subject was not being discussed that day. If allowed, Fraser would bully others 
by ruthlessly cutting them down verbally. Berendsen was not a man to be bullied but he 
resented Fraser's lack of even the simplest of courtesies. Stevens later recalled simply that 
Berendsen 'couldn't get on with Fraser'. 18 The tension between the two men was so great 
that McIntosh said he 'feared Berendsen might kill Fraser'. 19 Fraser's attitude was that 
even the lowest back bencher ranked higher than the highest official and this may partly 
explain the strained relations between the two men. After being treated so well by Savage, 
Berendsen found that working for Fraser was a .nightmare. Savage had disliked working at 
night and had kept predictable hours allowing the Berendsens to socialise with other 
dignitaries on a regular basis. In contrast, Fraser drove himself to the limits of physical 
endurance and in consequence Berendsen also. Alister Donald McIntosh had worked in the 
Prime Minister's Department since 1935 and became the Secretary of External Affairs soon 
after Berendsen left for Canberra. He said that because of the stress that Berendsen was 
under, his appointment to Australia 'was due as much to threatened imminent physical 
collapse through over-work' as to the need to have a New Zealand voice in Canberra?O 
The stress of his heavy work load combined with the pressures of war had meant that his 
health had suffered and he had developed an ulcer. As a consequence of the personal 
friction between Fraser and Berendsen and his failing health, he took up the post in 
Australia. 
In April 1943 Churchill asked Fraser if the 2nd division could take part in the 
invasion of Sicily for which it would have to be withdrawn to be trained.21 However, 
because Fraser had told parliament that he would consult it before making further 
commitments on New Zealand's behalf, he was unable to give Churchill an immediate 
18 Henderson Interview with Major-General WG. Stevens, p15. 
19 F. Comer, In the Beginning ... Recollections From one 'Present at the Creation', p 3. 
20 AD. McIntosh, 'The Origins of the Department of External Affairs and the Formulation of an 
Independent Foreign Policy', New Zealand in World Affairs, vol 1, p 18. 
21 Fraser to Berendsen, 15 May 1943, DNZER I, Doc 19. 
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answer. McIntosh said that the decision ahead was so complex and intricate that Fraser was 
unable 'even to hint that Parliament might decide one way or the other. ,22 
When the North Africa campaign ended on 13 May 1943 with the Axis defeat at 
Tunis the New Zealand government realised that the time had come to consider the future 
of the 2nd division. The decision was a delicate one directed by manpower shortages and 
influenced by internal politics. The New Zealand government could not maintain the 
manpower for two full divisions. Eventually it would have to withdraw one to reinforce the 
other. New Zealand's underlying strategy was that its troops should serve in the theatre 
where they could make the greatest contribution to the war as a whole. Churchill urged the 
New Zealand government to continue to maintain both divisions and said that if this was not 
possible the United States would provide assistance, implying that the priority should be in 
the Mediterranean. 
However, the return of the Australian troops from the Middle East had an unsettling 
effect upon the New Zealand public. Fraser also realised that if New Zealand retained the 
2nd division in the Mediterranean the Australian government may feel that 'we are taking 
our share of responsibilities in the Pacific too lightly.'23 Curtin was told that the New 
Zealand government was about to make an extremely difficult decision and gave his advice. 
He strongly believed that the 2nd division should withdraw from the Mediterranean to 
reinforce the Pacific: 
Basic strategy imposes upon Australia holding the Pacific until Hitler has been 
defeated. A holding war in the Pacific imposes prolonged attrition on Australia and 
New Zealand whose manpower resources already strained may well be exhausted 
before Hitler is defeated. Should this happen the failure would be disastrous in that 
the strategy would collapse and its collapse would be due to our failure to provide 
the role assigned to US?4 
Curtin believed that New Zealand's role was to hold Japan in the Pacific. 
However, his analysis was over-dramatic. Curtin conveniently forgot to mention the 
important United States effort in the Pacific or the fact that the situation was not by any 
22 McIntosh to Stevens, 14 May 1943, McIntosh Papers, STE 1143/006. 
23 Fraser to Berendsen, 15 May 1943, DNZER I, Doc 19. 
24 Berendsen to Fraser, 17 May 1943, Ibid, Doc 21. 
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means as critical as it had been twelve to fifteen months ago when it was feared that Japan 
might invade Australia. The change of circumstances in the past twelve months had not 
been the result of Australia's bringing back its divisions back from the Middle East, 
although they undoubtedly did play an important role. It was because the United State's 
presence in the Pacific was strong enough to slow, halt and finally reverse the Japanese 
advance. Twelve months after Pearl Harbour, the 6th and 7th divisions had returned from 
the Mediterranean while the 9th division remained. The 7th division had been wholly 
committed to the New Guinea campaign where it had been severely depleted by those killed 
in action and by tropical diseases. The three brigades of the 6th division were deployed 
separately: the 16th brigade had been depleted in New Guinea, the 17th brigade was at 
Milne Bay and the 19th brigade fonned the core of the Northern Territory Garrison in 
Australia. The return of the 6th and 7th divisions were justified in tenns of the good use 
that they were put to. But it was the United State's efforts, not the return of the 6th and 
7th divisions, that played the vital role in the war in the Pacific. This did not stop Curtin 
from pressuring Fraser to withdraw the 2nd division from the Mediterranean to reinforce 
the Pacific. 
The general election of September 1943 had an influence upon the New Zealand 
government's decision about the 2nd division. This election had been put offfor some time 
and was in the back of the politicians' minds when they faced this difficult decision in May. 
McIntosh said that until the country had gone to the polls 'we are not going to get any 
sense out of anybody. ,25 There was a danger that the House would divide on party lines on 
this issue and that the Opposition would use it as an election platfonn. The National Party 
and John A Lee were keen to attack the Government's manpower policy and to insist upon 
the return of the 2nd division. However, if Fraser agreed to bring back the 2nd division the 
Opposition could then claim that Labour had let down Britain and use this as an election 
platfonn. Either way, Fraser was conscious of the political consequences of the decision 
ahead, especially when Holland was 'quite prepared to treat the matter as a political 
question. ,26 This was an extremely agonising decision for Fraser to have to make. 
McIntosh said that he was 'in a complete dither. ,27 
25 McIntosh to Berendsen, 22 April 1943, McIntosh Papers, AER, 1143/009. 
26 Mclntosh to Berendsen, 17 May 1943, Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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On 21 Maya secret session of the House was held to decide the future of the 2nd 
division. Fraser had already discussed the issue with the War Cabinet first, then his 
domestic Cabinet, and then his caucus. Initially, the House was divided on the issue. 
Holland criticised Fraser for having consulted Curtin, saying 'he did not give two hoots for 
Australia,.28 Fraser responded by defending Australia's courageous war effort. After much 
discussion the House decided to leave the 2nd division in the Mediterranean and to bring 
back 6 000 men of the first three echelons on furlough. The furlough scheme was a political 
sweetener offered to the public that eventually became a political nightmare. Fraser had 
created a Frankenstein. Over 6 000 men of the first three echelons of the 2nd division 
arrived in New Zealand in July 1943 for three months furlough. This was an unusual 
scheme whereby men were bought half way around the world for three months leave in the 
midst of the greatest world war. Their return to Europe after their leave was a hot issue 
which simmered and reached its climax in January 1944. Some of the men demanded that 
those from industry should return instead of themselves saying that it was unfair that they 
would serve twice while others not at all. There were some difficulties with this as the 
returned men were battle hardened trained soldiers while new recruits from industry would 
have little training and no experience. Despite this, the men succeeded in securing public 
sympathy courtesy of Holland's using the furlough grievance to gain support in the 
September 1943 election. The military issue became one that was riddled with politics. By 
January 1944,430 of the 1660 liable to return had refused, demanding that those from 
industry take their tum. They were courtmartialled for desertion and dismissed from the 
Army. 
That the decision to leave the 2nd division in the Mediterranean was almost 
unanimous was a tribute to Fraser's skill in leading the House through the debate. The 
logic behind the decision was that New Zealand could offer a greater contribution in the 
Mediterranean Theatre than in the Pacific one. Another factor contributing to New 
Zealand's decision to leave the 2nd division in the Mediterranean Theatre was the attitude 
of the United States. As usual, the New Zealand government had received little information 
about the opinion of the United States. However, Fraser realised that the United States 
28 A.D. McIntosh, 'Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime: Personal Reminiscences', New Zealand Journal 
o/History, (Vol 10, 1976, P 13). 
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viewed the war in the Pacific as an American affair. This position was confirmed in early 
June when Rear-Admiral S.T. Wilks on, Halsey's deputy, met with New Zealand's War 
Cabinet. His opinion about what New Zealand's priorities in the Pacific should be, was that 
'Air came first, Navy second, production third and Army fourth,?9 
When New Zealand informed Britain and Australia of its decision on 21 May, it 
could not have received more contrasting responses. Churchill replied that he and his 
colleagues were moved by New Zealand's 'loyalty and courage,.30 Curtin and his advisers 
were disturbed by New Zealand's decision. A minute from Shedden to Curtin dated 26 
May revealed the extent to which he believed that 'the New Zealand division in the Middle 
East should return to the Pacific to play its part in the war against Japan. ,31 Shedden felt 
that Australia was being left to defend the Pacific without the help of the New Zealand 
armed forces. Again, he conveniently overlooked the role of the Americans in the Pacific 
War. Shedden recalled that in the previous November the New Zealand government had 
almost upset the return of the 9th division and that now Australia was faced with the 
'spectacle' of a decision. He concluded 'either that New Zealand is less co-operative 
towards Australia than to the United Kingdom, notwithstanding our common interests in 
the Pacific, or they feel they are overshadowed by Australia and show up better by playing a 
lone hand, even if it is prejudicial to their vital interests. ,32 Curtin was also upset by New 
Zealand's decision. He angrily replied to Fraser on 1 June that for every soldier New 
Zealand kept in the Mediterranean Theatre an American or an Australian would have to fill 
his place in the Pacific Theatre. This was a very strange telegram from Curtin because what 
he asserted was wrong. Australia played a secondary role to the United States in the Pacific 
War. It is true that Australian forces were fighting a long bloody battle in New Guinea and 
that the outcome of this was also important to New Zealand. However, the war was not by 
any means as desperate as it had been twelve months earlier. Australia was no longer 
threatened and did not face the prospect of invasion. Japanese naval strength had been 
destroyed at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway a year earlier. Therefore, Australia did 
not need New Zealand troops in the Pacific. This is why this strongly worded telegram 
29 Wood, NZPW, P 260. 
30 Churchill to Fraser, 26 May 1943, Documents II, Doc 241. 
31 Shedden to Curtin, 26 May 1943, DAFP VI, Doc 198. 
32 Ibid. 
from Curtin left New Zealand officials stunned. McIntosh said that 'We took it very 
badly'.33 
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Although Berendsen believed that the 2nd division should have returned to the 
Pacific, this did not make his dealings with Curtin any easier. His interview with Curtin 
immediately after New Zealand's decision had been difficult because the Australian Prime 
Minister had reacted so strongly. McIntosh expressed his sympathy to Berendsen for the 
position he was in, saying that he could not 'imagine any mission being more complicated 
by a sudden unfortunate stroke than yours'. 34 Berendsen had the following to say about 
Curtin's harshly worded telegram and its effects on trans-Tasman relations: 'We have 
certainly had a jolt - which probably broke nothing - and we shall have to go on quietly and 
carefully for awhile until we see how best we can arrange things. ,35 
Curtin's reaction was dramatic and harsh. His strong reaction reveals his attitude 
towards New Zealand. He sent the telegram (1 June 1943) to try to reorientate the New 
Zealand government away from Britain's influence and towards the Pacific. It was an 
attempt by Curtin to make New Zealand follow Australia's lead in the war. Berendsen said 
that Curtin tended to look down upon New Zealand and upon Fraser. When the New 
Zealand government did not follow the Australian government, Curtin regarded New 
Zealand as a 'small and rather embarrassing member of the Commonwealth group, which 
should be put in its proper place. ,36 
That Curtin was trying to get the New Zealand government to follow Australia's 
lead was blatantly evident when, after rebuking Fraser for leaving troops in the Middle East, 
he only nine days later, on 10 June, announced to the world that the threat to Australia had 
been lifted. Curtin said 'I do not think the enemy can now invade this country. ,37 
Wellington was staggered by this about face. McIntosh's disbelief at Curtin's statement 
was conveyed to Berendsen on 16 June: 'Having taken this blow between the eyes, so to 
33 McIntosh to Berendsen, 16 June 1943, I. McGibbon, Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters between Carl 
Berendsen and Alister McIntosh 1943-1952, (Auckland, 1993) p28. 
34 McIntosh to Berendsen, 17 June 1943, Ibid, P 3l. 
35 Berendsen to McIntosh, 5 June 1943, McIntosh Papers, BER 1143/018. 
36 Berendsen Memoirs, p 300. 
37 Hasluck, Govt & People vol 11, vol n, p 218. 
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speak, we doubted whether we were seeing correctly when we read Mr Curtin's statement 
last week,38. Curtin's earlier reaction was now seen by New Zealand officials as 
unreasonable. McIntosh was stunned. He said that the Australians were 'perfectly content 
to lead one up the garden path and then, without the slightest warning, to dash off in any 
direction, leaving one groping, bewildered and lost in darkness,.39 There were bitter 
feelings in New Zealand's official and political circles after Curtin's statement. This was 
reflected in a letter McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 17 June when he said that 'New 
Zealand had nothing to gain by teaming up with Australia either in the old Anzac Command, 
or for that matter, in any other enterprise'. He continued that New Zealand would be better 
to work alone without Australia. He then asked a perhaps sympathetic Berendsen 'has 
there ever been a time in your experience when we have attempted to collaborate with the 
Australians that we have not had just cause for complaint?,40 Relations were soured on 
both sides ofthe Tasman by New Zealand's decision and Australia's reaction. 
Bereildsen had reported earlier on 17 May that Curtin was reluctant to export war 
materials to New Zealand while its main effort was in the Mediterranean theatre. It did not 
wish to see war materials leave the Pacific Theatre for another theatre of war. The New 
Zealand government felt that Curtin was unjustified in this complaint saying that the 
majority of what Australia exported to New Zealand remained in the Pacific. New Zealand 
exported some goods to the Eastern Supply Group, a supply council of all British territories 
south or east of the Mediterranean Theatre which sat in Delhi from March 1941. This 
council was responsible for planning and co-ordination of supply and it is reasonable to 
suppose that what New Zealand sent there was used in the war against Japan. Despite this, 
the Australian government was still suspicious of New Zealand's requests for imports. 
The Australian and New Zealand governments saw the war in different ways and 
this explains Curtin's strong reactions to New Zealand's decision about the 2nd division. 
New Zealand saw the war in global terms; as one war with many overlapping campaigns. 
What happened in one theatre could vitally affect other theatres of the war and the overall 
outcome of the world war. In contrast, Berendsen informed McIntosh of Curtin's approach 
38 McIntosh to Berendsen. 16 June 1943, McIntosh Papers, BER 1/43/021. 
39 McIntosh to Berendsen. 17 June 1943, Ibid, BER1I43/022. 
40 Ibid. 
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to the war: 'As Mr Curtin sees it ... we have, if not two separate wars, certainly two 
separate campaigns against different enemies. One is close at home and one is far distant. ,41 
Although Curtin would agree with New Zealand that it should place its forces at the place 
where they would be most useful, he disagreed that this place was in the Mediterranean. He 
felt that it was imperative that Australia and New Zealand co-operate with the United 
States, in pushing back the Japanese armed forces. These different outlooks led to the 
different policies regarding the positioning of each country's armed forces. Australia felt 
that it was imperative that its forces be used in the Pacific. New Zealand's underlying 
strategy was that its best contribution was in the decisive theatre, and it agreed with the 
British and American governments that this theatre was the Mediterranean. 
Berendsen's time in Australia was not particularly fruitful. He later recorded that he 
failed to achieve effective liaison between the New Zealand and Australian war machines. 
Admittedly he was thrown into Australia at a difficult time, but he did encounter opposition 
as the following incident demonstrates. In preparation for Anzac Day ceremonies in 1943 
Berendsen was concerned that New Zealand, which had fought alongside Australia at 
Gallipoli, would be virtually invisible at the planned commemorations in Australia. 
Berendsen's attempts to achieve a New Zealand presence were met with resistance by 
Australian officials. The level of resistance encountered caused Berendsen to threaten to 
resign from his post and return to New Zealand. Fraser supported Berendsen in this stand. 
After much persistence by Berendsen, a New Zealand wreath was laid alongside the 
Australian one in the Anzac Day commemorations. 
The different policies pursued by the two countries were complicated further by 
strained personal relations. Berendsen later recorded that he disliked Curtin and Curtin 
disliked him. He later recalled 'I cannot say that 1 look back with any pleasure on my 
relations with John Curtin. ,42 There were other forces at work which may help explain the 
soured relations between Curtin and Berendsen. MacArthur, the newly appointed 
Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, arrived in Australia to a hero's welcome on 17 
March 1942. After his dramatic escape from the Philippines he arrived in Australia raising 
the hopes of the people and the morale of a depressed government. Curtin was won over 
41, Berendsen to McIntosh, 5 June 1943, McGibbon, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p25. 
42 Berendsen Memoirs, p 305. 
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by MacArthur's theatrical exuberances and overriding self confidence. MacArthur was an 
egotistical man who surrounded himself with 'yes men' and expected devout loyalty from 
them. In time, Curtin came to resemble one of MacArthur's followers. MacArthur, in an 
army command, did not get on with Admiral Nimitz of the United States Navy and had only 
contempt for those under Nimitz such as Ghormley and subsequently Halsey. 
Consequently, Curtin who 'was in some way hypnotized by MacArthur'43 seemed to take 
aboard MacArthur's dislike for the naval command and expressing it by disliking the 
commanders in the naval commands. He extended his dislike to New Zealand and its 
politicians which were in this command. This helps explain Curtin's coolness towards 
Berendsen. 
After his unpleasant experiences in Canberra, Berendsen reflected rather cynically in 
his Memoirs about the calibre of Australian and New Zealand politicians: '1 must express 
my conviction that with conspicuous exceptions our own New Zealand politicians are rather 
below the average politician elsewhere - except in Australia, where the standard falls very 
low indeed. ,44 This comment can only be understood in the light of Berends en's 
experiences with both Fraser and Curtin, whilst remembering that his personal relations with 
both were extremely difficult. 
Relations between the Australian and New Zealand governments from November 
1942 to June 1943 were at best strained, and at worst in crisis. McIntosh once said that 
'the history of relations between the two countries is one of the two countries making an 
agreement, then Australia getting ready to double-cross New Zealand, but then New 
Zealand getting in first. ,45 The sentiment expressed in this comment accurately reflected the 
state of trans-Tasman relations in this period. They were reluctant, awkward and at times 
down right frustrating. The strained trans-Tasman relations were caused by the Australian 
and New Zealand governments following different policies, and making different decisions 
about their expeditionary forces. This was because New Zealand was still partly under the 
'imperial influence' of Britain, while Australia had made significant moves towards self-
assertion and alliance with the United States. 
43 Henderson Interview with Berendsen, P 20. 
44 Berendsen Memoirs, p 3. 
45 Comer, In the Beginning, p 14. 
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Chapter 6 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement (the Canberra Pact) 
After the political and diplomatic spats that had characterised recent trans-Tasman relations, 
the Tasman neighbours wanted to make amends. This process was was helped by a new 
apparent uncomfortable outside influence that Australia and New Zealand faced. Ironically, 
this challenge came from the United States, which had been the Tasman neighbours 
'saviour' in the dark days of 1942. From mid 1943 the Australian and New Zealand 
governments felt decidedly uncomfortable by the United States infiltration into the Pacific. 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement was largely the result of the efforts of 
Evatt. At face value it was an attempt to achieve Australian-New Zealand co-operation. 
Although, on one level this is correct, it was more an attempt by Evatt to pool the support 
of New Zealand with Australia's own, to influence the United States. This was because 
Evatt and the Australian government felt threatened by the United States intentions in the 
Pacific. This uncomfortable outside influence united the Australian and New Zealand 
governments. On 14 October 1943 Evatt gave a speech to Parliament where he put 
forward his views on foreign affairs and his aspirations for Australia's role in the world. He 
said that Australia had an 'undoubted' right to take part in all post-war discussions and 
settlements. This was because twice Australia had gone to war because of the situation in 
Europe. Evatt insisted, though, that the Pacific should be Australia's dominant focus. He 
said that in the Pacific' Australia has a leading part to play'. 1 Specifically, he announced his 
intention to 'take steps to obtain a frank exchange of views between accredited 
representatives of the various governments interested in the South Pacific' .2 Evatt 
mentioned the importance of trans-Tasman relations. As an indication of this, was the 
recently appointed New Zealand High Commissioner in Canberra and Australia wanted to 
make a reciprocal appointment as soon as possible. He said that together Australia and 
New Zealand were a powerful force in the Western Pacific and that they would have heavy 
1 Evatt's speech on International Affairs to the House of Representatives; 14 October 1943; Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates; vol 176; p 572. 
2 Ibid, P 575. 
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responsibilities there: 'I regard pennanent collaboration between Australia and New Zealand 
as pivotal to a sound post-war Pacific policy. ,3 
Evatt's thinking at this time was far more visionary than his speech indicated. lW. 
Burton, Secretary of the Political Section of the Department of External Affairs and Evatt's 
private secretary when he was overseas in 1943, was well aware of his thinking. In a memo 
to Lieutenant-Colonel William Hodgson, the Secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs, on 13 October, Burton expressed some of Evatt's ideas. These included the 
suggestion that Australia and New Zealand should develop common trade, foreign and 
defence policies. This partly was to combat the adverse effects of the fact that Australia and 
New Zealand were trade competitors on the world market. He went as far as to suggest 
that in time Australians and New Zealanders should have full rights of common citizenship 
and full freedom of movement as well as a common currency and customs union.4 Burton 
knew that Evatt had long believed that if Australia and New Zealand acted together they 
would be in a more favourable position to influence Britain and the United States. Burton 
wrote that 'The Minister [Evatt] has indicated on a number of occasions that he believes a 
more effective tie-up between Australia and New Zealand might place us in a better position 
from a point of view of political and economic discussions with the United Kingdom and the 
United States.,5 This essentially was Evatt's main motivation for close trans-Tasman 
relations: to increase Australia's bargaining power with Britain and the United States. 
In response to Evatt's speech in parliament, the Australian Department of External 
Affairs suggested on 16 October that he should arrange talks with New Zealand in 
Canberra. Accordingly, on 21 October, Evatt spoke to Berendsen about his speech in the 
House. He planned to call a conference of all governments interested in the Southwest and 
South Pacific to consider defence and post-war problems. He believed the future prosperity 
and safety of Australia and New Zealand depended on their having a decisive voice in the 
Pacific. Evatt then proposed a preliminary conference between Australian and New Zealand 
ministers to discuss post-war security in the South Pacific, and the future of various Pacific 
islands (including some that were under United States, British, French, Portuguese and 
3 Ibid. 
4 Burton to Hodgson, 13 October 1943, DAFP VI, Doc 297. 
5Ibid. 
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Dutch control). He also wanted to discuss aviation, 'social bettennent' and economic 
development. This was intended as a first step before discussions with the other 
governments interested in the Southwest Pacific. Berendsen wrote that Evatt 'is inclined to 
suggest that it would be wise for Great Britain to transfer all British colonies in these areas 
1 
to Australia and New Zealand, Australia gradually to take Solomon's area and NZ to take 
-
Fiji etc.' Berendsen reported that Evatt believed that Australia and New Zealand should 
play an important role in the Pacific since they were 'particularly qualified to do so by their 
special knowledge and experience. ,6 
McIntosh in Wellington disagreed with Evatt's position. He said 'I would like to 
observe at this point that I think it is wrong and also stupid for Australia and New Zealand 
to discuss the disposal of the Pacific Islands in the absence of United Kingdom 
representatives.,7 Moreover, he continued, the Governor-General had copies of 
Berendsen's telegrams from Evatt and they would be passed on to the British. The end 
result would probably be that Britain would 'feel that Australia and New Zealand are 
behaving a little queerly. ,8 McIntosh believed that the notion that Britain should hand over 
its colonial possession in the Pacific to Australia and New Zealand because of their 'special 
knowledge and experience' was absurd. More bluntly, he said 'Personally, I think it will be 
a case of handing the matter over to what the New Yorker would call "The Department of 
Utter Chaos.",9 McIntosh's views show that New Zealand was still acting within the 
'imperial framework' and was sensitive to Britain's views. The Australian government 
attached far less importance to the views of Britain. 
Evatt wanted the proposed Australian-New Zealand conference to take place in 
November 1943. Berendsen replied on 1 November that the New Zealand government 
agreed to 'take part in a preliminary exchange of views as suggested and also in any further 
conference to be attended, inter alia, by representatives of the United Kingdom on matters 
of common interest relating to the post-war political settlement in the Pacific'. 10 However, 
the conference could not be held then because Fraser was twice hospitalised in November. 
6 Berendsen to Fraser, 21 October 1943, DNZER 1, Doc 35. 
7 McIntosh to Berendsen; 29 November 1943; McGibbon, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p 41. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 DAFP VI, P 558n. 
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Although only a few hours after the second operation he told McIntosh he had never felt 
better, he had in fact nearly died. In New Zealand, foreign policy was centred around the 
Prime Minister who held the External Affairs portfolio and his bad health held up any 
decisions. Berendsen suggested to Evatt that the conference be held from 13-18 December. 
Evatt replied that this would clash with the Australian Labor Party Conference. New 
Zealand was not willing to send a delegation to Canberra without Fraser and so told the 
Australia~ovemment that the conference would have to be postponed until January 1944. ~ 
-Churchill, meanwhile, had suggested that a Prime Minister's meeting be held in London in 
early December 1943, but Curtin was reluctant to leave until April 1944 and indicated this 
to Churchill twice (on 23 & 30 October 1943). 
The first that Ronald Cross, Britain's High Commissioner in Australia, heard of 
Evatt's planned Australian-New Zealand conference was through a telegram that he 
received from Batterbee in Wellington on 7 December 1943. Cross then asked Curtin if this 
conference was to agree upon views about local defence and regional councils for colonial 
administration. While Curtin agreed that this would be discussed, he added that many other 
minor local matters would be discussed. He gave as an example the shortage of hides in 
Australia that were needed to make boots for the Australian army and for the United States' 
forces. ll Curtin did not welcome Cross's interest in the upcoming Australian-New Zealand 
talks. He realised that if the British were present at the conference, then they would expect 
to dominate the proceedings. This was what Curtin wanted to avoid. He wanted the 
Australian delegation to take the lead. After the conference Cross realised that Curtin's 
explanation was at best misleading. Cross believed, naively, that it was quite possible that 
at this stage Curtin did not know the true nature of the proposed conference, because it was 
Evatt's baby. This assumption of Curtin's ignorance is hard to believe. It would be most 
peculiar for an international conference to be organised, while the Prime Minister of the 
host country remained ignorant of the nature of the conference. 
Evatt's determination that Australia would burst onto the world stage as an 
important player was again demonstrated on 28 December 1943. In a public statement he 
11 Cross to Cranborne; 27 January 1944, British Views o/the Canberra Pact. (Public Record Office, 
London) 
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announced that, after the Australian-New Zealand conference in January, there would be a 
conference held in Australia of all powers with interests in the Southwest Pacific. 
After this speech, Cross attempted to gain more information from him about the 
purpose and scope of the upcoming Australian-New Zealand conference. Cross found 
Evatt and the officials at the External Affairs Department uninformative. He said that 'an 
atmosphere of secretiveness which must have been a deliberate policy' prevailed both before 
and during the conference. 12 About a week before the conference opened Hodgson said 
that consideration was being given to providing Britain with more information about the 
upcoming conference. Nothing eventuated. In retrospect, Cross regarded the 'air of 
mystery' which surrounded this conference as both unnecessary and as an attempt to 
increase the impact and presence of Evatt. The purpose ofthis secrecy, however, was to 
keep Britain in the dark about the Canberra conference. Evatt was determined to take 
charge. He wanted this opportunity to persuade New Zealand to act as Australia wanted, 
without the distracting influence of Britain. 
Evatt's motivation for the Australia-New Zealand conference of January 1944 was 
largely derived from the way the big four (Britain, the Soviet Union, China and the United 
States) were inclined to organise things that would affect Australia and New Zealand 
without consulting them. From as early as 1942, the United States Navy was keen to 
secure Pacific bases from which it could operate its forces. Frank Knox, Secretary ofthe 
Navy, also owned the Chicago Daily News. An editorial printed in late 1942 stated the 
Navy's position. To operate effectively in the Pacific, the Navy needed a series of American 
bases. The editorial continued that it 'should be for the Navy to say what bases it requires, 
and where .... And if our Navy finds it needs bases in Australasian or Dutch East Indian 
waters, our Australian and Dutch friends can certainly be counted on, in the circumstances, 
to co-operate.,13 The Australian and New Zealand governments were apprehensive about 
the United States' eagerness for bases, particularly in Australasian territory. Throughout 
1943 and 1944 the United States Navy's demands for bases in the Pacific became insistent 
12 Ibid. 
13 Lissington, NZ and US, p 78. 
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and unrelenting. By March 1944 the Chainnan of the Naval Affairs Committee simply said 
'we will just take them' .14 
The Tasman neighbours' concern had been raised by comments Roosevelt made at 
the 29th meeting of the Pacific War Council on 31 March 1943. Roosevelt had already 
talked to Eden, who was now the British Secretary of State for Foreign Mairs, and to 
Halifax, the British Ambassador to the United States, about the post-war Pacific. Roosevelt 
expected that Japanese territory would probably be administered by China and the United 
States, while Korea, it was felt, was not yet ready for self-government. the precise future 
control of the Pacific had not been decided but it was clear that Britain and the United 
States were taking the initiative. 15 This was demonstrated in the Cairo Declaration on 1 
December 1943 which described Allied intentions in the war against Japan. Although, both 
Australia and New Zealand were engaged in war against Japan, neither was associated with 
the declaration, and neither was consulted about it or even infonned. 
Curtin and the Australian government were greatly disturbed that they were not 
consulted about the Cairo Declaration in spite of their great war efforts against the Japanese. 
They felt that if they did not protest, their position would become impossible when they did 
want to have some influence at the peace talks that would follow the war. Evatt was 
particularly incensed that Australia was not consulted. Nelson Johnson, the United States 
Minister to Australia, believed this motivated Evatt to ensure that Australia and New 
Zealand would act together to demand to be heard by the larger powers. Johnson wrote 'I 
am certain that Dr. Evatt has resented the Cairo Conference more than any other event 
which has thus far occurred. ,16 Australian ministers seriously considered a public protest, 
but decided to settle upon a personal telegram to Churchill expressing these sentiments. 17 
However, no such telegram has been traced and it does not seem that one was sent. 
Fraser sympathised with Curtin and shared his disappointment that neither country 
was consulted. Yet Wellington did not protest either. Berendsen said that he was 'rather 
14 Ibid, P 79. 
15 Cox to Fraser, 31 March 1954, DNZER I, Doc 32. 
16 Quoted in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p 290. 
17 Berendsen to Fraser, 4 December 1943, DNZER I, Doc 40. 
93 
sorry that no action was taken in Wellington' 18 in response to the Cairo Declaration. He 
reflected that it was now apparent that 'we shall have to fight very hard to have any say at 
all in world affairs'. 19 . On 10 December Berendsen communicated his concerns to 
McIntosh: 'Churchill and Roosevelt - and God bless them - are determined to run this war 
themselves, and I think: it quite probable that Britain and America will attempt to run the 
world after the war. ,20 Concerns about the shape of the postwar Pacific were prevalent in 
the minds of both the Tasman neighbours. Berendsen's emphatic answer was that New 
Zealand 'simply must take part in the Pacific War if our Allies are expected to allow us any 
say in post-war events in that area. ,21 The New Zealand government had already rejected 
the possibility of withdrawing the 2nd division from the Mediterranean Theatre to reinforce 
the Pacific. 
Roosevelt also considered the postwar Pacific at the Pacific War Council meeting on 
12 January 1944. He said that the hundreds of mandated Japanese islands must be taken 
away from Japan but was unsure which country should administer them. He was adamant 
that New Caledonia should not be returned to the French and suggested that it should be 
jointly administered by Australia and New Zealand.22 Nash, New Zealand's representative, 
asserted that New Zealand's interests in the Pacific went as far east as the Society and 
Tuamotu Islands. The United States government did not welcome or appreciate such 
assertiveness by New Zealand in the Pacific. 'President Roosevelt laughingly suggested that 
since they were so very ambitious perhaps New Zealand should extend its control to 
Australia. ,23 
The New Zealand delegation gave little prior thought to the Canberra conference 
and had no clearly defined, coherent policy to follow. Thomas George de Largie D' Alton, 
the recently appointed Australian High Commissioner in Wellington, tried to find out what 
the New Zealand approach to the conference would be. He wrote to Evatt: 'what has 
impressed me generally has been the scarcity of thought which has as yet [on 5 January 
18 Berendsen to McIntosh, 20 December 1943, McGibbon, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p 52. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Berendsen to Mcintosh, 10 December 1943, Ibid, P 47. 
21 Berendsen to McIntosh, 20 December 1943, Ibid, P 52. 
22 Dixon to Australian Department of External Affairs, 13 January 1944; DAFP VII; (Canberra, 1988) Doc 
13. 
23 Quoted in Sinclair, Walter Nash, p 234. 
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1944] been given here to the major topics on which it is hoped to reach agreement. ,24 
D' Alton said that he was endeavouring to stimulate the New Zealand delegation to 
formulate their views so that they can be expressed fully at the conference. He told them 
that Australia was preparing fully. However, D' Alton believed that although the New 
Zealand delegation had given little thought to the conference, he expected results as Fraser 
was a man who made decisions, while those accompanying him were expected to play only 
a minor role in the proceedings. 
Although he had been told very little about the nature of the Australia-New Zealand 
conference, Cross was asked by Evatt to give a speech welcoming the New Zealand 
delegation. Cross said that he pleaded that he be excused from this speech as he was feeling 
"'swimmy" in the head,25 from a recent airplane trip. However, Curtin would not accept 
this and pressed him again. He reluctantly agreed. Cross gave a general speech thanking 
Curtin for the privilege of giving a speech here especially as he understood the conference 
to be concerned with domestic matters. In retrospect, Cross suspected that Evatt was 
hoping that he would say something that would indicate British support for the 
conference.26 This was certainly the case and the very fact that Cross agreed to speak: made 
it seem that he supported the conference. Then, once he had spoken, he was ushered out of 
the conference and kept in the dark about the proceedings. When he gained an interview 
with Curtin on Wednesday 19 January, the latter agreed that the next logical step was to 
discuss with Britain the conclusions of this conference. However, Curtin would not discuss 
any details and only said that the conference 'had proved highly satisfactory, the agreement 
was already being drafted, and it would be signed on Friday.,27 The Australian delegation 
was running circles around Cross, using him to welcome the New Zealand delegation to 
symbolically give Britain's blessing to the conference and then deliberately keeping him in 
the dark throughout the duration of the conference. 
From Wellington, Batterbee sent a telegram to Sir Eric Machtig with information he 
had gained about the proceedings ofthe Canberra Conference. He said that F.E. Cumming-
24 D' Alton to Evatt; 5 January 1944; DAFP VII; Doc 5. 
25 Cross to Cranborne; 27 January 1944, British Views. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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Bruce, the Assistant Secretary at the British High Commission in Wellington, had a 
conversation with an official of the New Zealand Department of External Affairs who was 
present at the Canberra Conference. After this conversation Cumming-Bruce wrote down 
confidential impressions that he had gained about the conference. Although this official 
claimed that his comments were only a 'tentative assessment' they were nevertheless 
revealing insights into how the conference was run and who dominated the proceedings?8 
The New Zealand delegation arrived in Canberra in January 1944 with little preparation for 
the conference. They were aware of the agenda but were ignorant of any details or of any 
Australian proposals. The Department of External Affairs had written a paper suggesting 
what the New Zealand attitude should be going into this conference. It was intended that 
the members of the delegation would discuss the paper amongst themselves when they 
arrived in Canberra. However, when they arrived, Evatt handed them a paper outlining the 
views of the Australian Department of External Affairs. Consequently, the paper written by 
the New Zealand Department of External Affairs was not discussed, worse still it was not 
even read by the members of the New Zealand delegation. Instead of considering their own 
views as originally planned, they were discussing the views that were expressed in Evatt's 
paper.29 From the outset Evatt was stamping his authority upon the proceedings. Not even 
the full Australian delegation had seen Evatt's paper. When the conference began Eddie 
Ward, the Australian Minister for Transport and External Territories, was annoyed that the 
New Zealand delegation (which he referred to as the 'opposing team') was given this paper 
which, he and other member of the Australian delegation had not seen.30 
The conference itself was conducted more as an informal ministerial meeting than as 
an international conference. The proceedings were unstructured, unbusinesslike and 
unsystematic from the outset. Curtin arrived late to the designated committee room. When 
he arrived, he thought that the room was too small and insisted that the conference take 
place in the House of Representatives. Once arriving there it was discovered that the lights 
had been removed for cleaning. Consequently, the conference began an hour late when the 
28 F.E. Cumming-Bruce, Confidential Impressions of a NZ Official on his return from the Australian-NZ 
Conference at Canberra, 31 January 1944: Enclosed in telegram from Batterbee to Machtig, 9 February 
1944, British Views. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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lights had been replaced.31 Because of the late start, many items on the agenda had to be 
rushed through or were not considered. For example it was agreed that closer consultation 
between New Zealand and Australia should be maintained but how this was to be done on a 
practical level was not considered. In general the New Zealand delegation accepted about 
75% of Australia's proposals immediately and the remaining 25% were discussed. The 
immediate agreement was because they had examined Evatt's paper when they arrived in 
Canberra. Australia conceded most of the 25% to New Zealand. However these 
concessions were relatively minor, toning down some ofthe more extreme measures of the 
agreement. This included agreeing to omit a sub paragraph in which Australia and New 
Zealand would tell Britain that they would allow Britain and the United States to form an 
Anglo-American condominium over the Line Islands. The most significant disagreement 
was that the New Zealand delegation strongly wanted Britain to retain its possessions in the 
Pacific. It said that if Australia wanted to take the Solomons from the British that was their 
business and New Zealand wanted no part of it. The New Zealand delegation also had 
reservations about boldly asserting that the Tasman neighbours would police the Southwest 
and South Pacific areas after the war without the approval of an international conference. 
However, the final version of the Agreement did not take into consideration New Zealand's 
reservations on this issue. New Zealand also had reservations about Australia's desire that 
the Tasman neighbours control civil aviation and conduct services between both countries 
and New Caledonia, New Hebrides, the Solomons, New Guinea and Timor. There was also 
some disagreement over whether to conclude regional peace treaties before global peace 
treaties. 32 
Throughout the conference Evatt dominated the debates and was largely responsible 
for drawing up the draft of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement. Typically, most ofthis 
was done late at night when the delegates were tired and unable to scrutinise Evatt's 
proposals adequately. The rather informal nature of the conference was illustrated by the 
conduct of Paddy Webb, the New Zealand Postmaster-General and Minister of Labour. His 
contribution to the conference was a speech that he gave at a luncheon about industrial 
relations in coal mines. He boldly asserted that no war time strike in New Zealand had 
31 Ibid. 
32 Report of the Committee on the Agenda Presented by Evatt to the Australian-New Zealand Conference on 
18 January 1944, Pacific Conference Papers: Agenda No. 3~ Documents 1, Doc 45. 
lasted more than two days - a claim which was totally untrue and one that he would not 
have been expected to make when he was sober. For two hot afternoons during the 
proceedings of the conference he slept soundly while the discussions continued around 
him.33 After the conference, he decided to visit Mrs Curtin and he was last heard to be 
stranded in the desert on his way to Western Australia. 34 
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Evatt and Curtin wanted the Agreement to be published immediately, while Fraser 
had assumed that it would not be published at all. Fraser had not sent a copy or even a 
summary of the Agreement to Wellington or discussed its contents with his colleague there. 
To avoid disappointing Evatt and Curtin, after the minor concessions they had made in the 
conference, he let the Agreement be published when the Australians allowed that it was an 
agreement and not a treaty. Consequently, Fraser's colleagues in Wellington were annoyed 
that they had been ignored and were not consulted about the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement. Fraser had not discussed it with them as he would have liked to have done.35 
After the conference, Cross had the opportunity to speak with Evatt about his 
motives for calling the conference. Evatt told Cross what he wanted to hear. He said that it 
was mainly due to trans-Tasman anxiety at the United State's tendency to infiltrate into 
Pacific Islands south of the equator. He said that the conference was also designed to 
strengthen the Tasman neighbours' hands in their dealings with the United States. He said 
that it was to strengthen the influence of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific adding 
that there was a belief that Britain conceded too easily to the United States in the Pacific. 36 
While accepting these reasons for the conference, Cross was concerned at the secrecy 
surrounding it both before it started and during its proceedings. He had found that when he 
had approached the Prime Minister and other officials he was fed information that was too 
vague to be of any use. 
33 F.E. Cumming-Bruce, Confidential Impressions of a NZ Official on his return from the Australian-NZ 
Conference at Canberra, 31 January 1944: Enclosed in telegram from Batterbee to Machtig, 9 February 
1944, British Views. 
34 1bid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Memo by Cranborne to British War Cabinet; 2 February 1944, British Views. 
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Cumming-Bruce believed that Evatt had three motives for proposing the Australian-
New Zealand agreement. Firstly, he wanted himself and the Department of External Affairs 
to make the headlines. Secondly, he wanted the Australian public and many of the 
politicians to see the big picture and to realise the importance of external affairs. For 
example, Curtin seemed to be so absorbed with domestic affairs that he was reluctant to 
leave for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting in London. Finally, Evatt wanted to 
make it clear to the United States and Britain that Australia was determined to playa 
dominant role in the Southwest Pacific.37 
Cumming-Bruce's confidential source managed to fool him into believing that 
Australia's failure to supply Britain with infonnation about the Canberra conference and 
resulting pact was nothing more than an oversight. This source said that it was not 
deliberate. Instead, the Australian delegation had assumed that the next stage would be to 
consult Britain. This taken as read, they had not felt that it was necessary to infonn Britain. 
Cumming-Bruce's source chose not to mention that the Agreement had already been signed 
by the Australian and New Zealand delegation and consequently it was too late for 
consultation. It would be a case of telling the British government what Australia had done 
after the event, when it was too late for it to have any influence or say in the matter. 
Cumming-Bruce's source told him that 'As the existence of air is not appreciated by 
animals, so the main axioms of Empire relations were taken for granted to such an extent 
that they hardly emerged into consciousness and were not seriously questioned.' This could 
not have been further from the truth, yet Cumming-Bruce was convinced. He believed that 
the Australian delegation was in many respects unrealistic. He continued that 
Paradoxically the deep-rooted acceptance of British ties was responsible for any 
apparent ignoring of United Kingdom interest in the proceedings of the Conference: 
consultation in due course was taken for granted, and it never entered the Australian 
heads that the United Kingdom would wish to be consulted in the preliminary 
process of clearing up their own ideas.38 
Evatt, who had been staunchly anti-British since 1942, would have been quietly amused to 
hear this, yet Cumming-Bruce was convinced. This was because it was what the British 
government wanted to hear. It did not want to accept that Evatt had deliberately kept the 
37 F.E. Cumming-Bruce, Confidential Impressions ... at Canberra, 31 January 1944: Enclosed in telegram 
from Batterbee to Machtig, 9 February 1944, British Views 
38 Ibid. 
British in the dark. They were not receptive to the reality that the power of the Empire-
Commonwealth in the Pacific had dramatically declined, and that Australia and New 
Zealand were pursuing independent foreign policies without consulting Britain first. 
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The Australian-New Zealand Agreement (known as the Canberra Pact) was signed 
on 21 January 1944. The text ofthe Agreement was long and its scope was considerable. 
It covered a wide variety of topics including security and defence, civil aviation, 
dependencies and territories, welfare and advancement of native peoples in the Pacific, 
migration and machinery for co-operation. The main purpose of the Agre~ment was a 
demand by the Tasman neighbours to have 'representation at the highest level,39 of all 
armistice and postwar discussions on international peace. Not only did they wish to be 
represented but they wanted to 'actively participate,40 in any armistice commission. They 
referred to the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 that expressed the intentions of its 
signatories to establish an international organisation to maintain peace and security. In the 
transitional period from war to peace the Australian and New Zealand governments were 
willing to police or assist in the policing in the Southwest Pacific. One section stated that 
any power that constructed or used any military, naval or air installations during the war on 
land did not automatically have a claim to keep the land after the war. This was directed at 
the United States. The Tasman neighbours said that a change in sovereignty over any part 
of the Pacific could occur only after the agreement of the Australian and New Zealand 
governments had been secured. Section 34 caused much resentment in political circles in 
Britain and the United States. It stated that the Australia government was to call a 
conference to discuss the Pacific and that 'in addition to the two Governments' (Australia 
and New Zealand), Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, the French Committee of 
National Liberation and Portugal would be invited. 
Consultation and co-operation between the Australian and New Zealand 
governments formed an important part of this agreement. To ensure effective trans-Tasman 
consultation permanent secretariats were to be established one on each side of the Tasman. 
The New Zealand Department of External Affairs was to appoint an Australian-New 
Zealand Affairs Secretariat in Wellington and the Australian Department of External Affairs 
3!}The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, clause 7, DNZER I, Doc 53. 
40 Ibid. 
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was to appoint an Australian-New Zealand Affairs Secretariat in Canberra. Their roles were 
t~ ensure that the goodwin of the Canberra C~nference and Agreement was maintained and 
that effective c~nsultation continued. On 12 February, Robert Thomas George Patrick was 
appointed by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs to the Australian-New 
Zealand Affairs Secretariat in Wellington. He was to maintain daily contact with the 
Australian Liaison Officer and have regular meetings with the Australian High 
Commissioner, the Minister of External Affairs if necessary and the Secretary of External 
Affairs. 41 
Batterbee had doubts that the Australian-New Zealand agreement would lead to 
lasting trans-Tasman consultation. He wrote that it 'remains to be seen whether the 
provisions of the Agreement will last and develop into something of value. The New 
Zealand authorities believe that they will rapidly become a dead letter so far as Australian 
consultation with New Zealand is concemed,and New Zealand is not likely to be disposed 
to continue to observe without reciprocity. ,42 Berendsen was also cynical about the lasting 
effects ill the Agreement upon trans-Tasman relations. In an interview held many years 
after the event he recalled thinking '1 do not consider the Pact was worth a kettle of fish 
although there were some high hopes that it might develop into something valuable. ,43 
However, Berend sen' s comments may have been influenced by the miserable time that he 
had experienced as New Zealand's High C~mmissioner in Australia. 
The public reaction of the British government to the Canberra Pact was surprisingly 
mild. The first official infonnation Britain received about the Australia-New Zealand 
conference was on 30 December from the Australian High Commissioner in London. Also 
on that <lay Batterbee had said that Fraser wante<l to know Britain's opinion about the 
conference.44 Cranbome, the Dominion Secretary, noted that it was 'unfortunate' that 
Australia and New Zealand had organised, held -and published the agreement without 
consulting the British government. There was some irritation felt in the British War Cabinet 
at the lack of consultation, but it was felt that this should in no way be communicated to 
4l DNZER I, P 147n. 
42- Batterbee to Machtig, 9 February 1944Jlritish Views. 
43 Henderson Interview with Bcrendsen, p 21. 
44 Memo byCranborne to British War Cabinet; 2 February 1944, British Views. 
101 
Evatt. Cranbome believed that it was important to avoid giving the impression that Britain 
was applying any form of 'grandmotherly restraint by the mother country. ,45 He continued 
ona more positive note that 'on a broad view, I feel that the Conference may well have 
some useful results. ,46 He welcomed Australia's and New Zealand's interest in playing a 
role in the defence of the Pacific and believed that this agreement ~ould be important in the 
post war period. He also welcomed closer relations between members of the 
Commonwealth and hoped that this would improve trans-Tasman relations. The main 
consideration of Britain' s War Cabinet that day was to prepare a response to be sent to the 
Australian and New Zealand governments. Cranborne felt that organising an international 
conference in the Pacific at this stage would bea mistake. It would be premature especially 
since Britain had not had time to -examine the issues and discuss them with Australia and 
New Zealand. He wanted the British government to consult with the Australian and New 
Zealand governments before any international ~onference were ~alled, believing that it was 
premature, especially while much territory was still occupied by the enemy. The security of 
the Pacific could not he considered in isolation from other general postwar settlements. 
Cranbome felt that Churcllllland Roosevelt would need to agree upon some general 
principles for world peace before any arrangements in the Pacific could be made.47 Britain 
was also eoncerned that it did not know what the United States' views and intentions were 
and felt it was important to know this before attending such a ~onference. 
To draw attention to certain aspects of the Australia-New Zealand agreement Curtin 
and Fraser sent a joint telegram to Cranborne on 25 January 1944. It was basically a 
request for Britain's views. The Dominions Office gave the official British response to the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement on 12 February. It was <mrefully worded and open 
minded. It opened by ~ommenting that Britain understood that the Canberra meeting was 
to encourage Australian-New Zealand co-operation. Members of the British government 
fully supported the strengthening of relations between dominions and hoped that the 
meeting had achieved this objective. They welcomed the willingness of the Australian and 
New Zealand governments to participate in international peace keeping hodiesand in post 
war talks. They also welcomed Australia's and New Zealand's readiness to accept 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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responsibility for the defence of the Pacific. However, they were cautious in their 
comments about Evatt's plans to call an international conference. Pointing out that this was 
the first that they had heard of this proposal, Cranborne commented that the government 
would need time to consider the issues involved and to formulate a British policy and 
approach, before attending any international conference about the Pacific. He continued 
that a general concept or framework of international peace was necessary, and that in this 
respect, the concept of a regional pact was not ideal. Both the Australian and New Zealand 
governments agreed that peace was indivisible and could not be maintained by regional 
pacts. Neither country was striving for a regional pact, and they were reluctant to convey 
the impression that they were. Generally, the British government believed that a Pacific 
conference would be premature but said that it was willing to discuss any of the issues 
raised at the Canberra conference with Australian and New Zealand leaders. Cranborne 
suggested that the upcoming Prime Ministers' Meeting in London would be the ideal 
oppOrtunity.48 On the whole, apart from the lack of consultation, the British government 
felt that the agreement contained many positive aspects. It was particularly keen for 
Australia and New Zealand to increase their roles in the defence of the Pacific. 
The British government reacted favourably to the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement because they did not see it as a dramatic evolution in the foreign policy of 
Australia and New Zealand, but as a constructive innovation. Cranborile told Nash that the 
British government 'had been delighted with it [the Australian-New Zealand Agreement] 
and ... we thought that it had initiated a new and valuable inter-Imperial link. ,49 They did 
not see that the Tasman neighbours were asserting their voices without consulting the 
Mother Country because the Empire-Commonwealth had been superseded by a new 
international order. The attitude of Christopher Eastward, from the Colonial Office, to the 
Agreement was typical. Eastward wrote that although 'the two Dominions set about the 
matter rather tactlessly (the more wary New Zealanders being pushed into it by the 
Australians), on the whole the agreement between them seems to be rather a good 
document. ,50 
48 Dominion Office to Australian and New Zealand governments~ 12 February 1944~ British Views. 
49 Quoted in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p 302. 
50 Ibid, P 304. 
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In contrast to the British, some Americans were highly incensed by the Australian-
New Zealand Agreement. Louis sums up the United States reaction as 'suppressed 
outrage' but says that the 'State Department officials restrained their indignation because 
they did not want to give Evatt the satisfaction of knowing the extent of the provocation.'51 
Consequently, the New Zealand government was not aware of the full extent of the 
American reaction until Fraser visited Washington in April 1944. John Hickerson, head of 
the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, urged that the United States should not 
bother taking this agreement seriously. He described it as 'manifestly ridiculous. ,52 The 
State Department compared it with Japanese foreign policy before the war describing the 
agreement as 'bordering on a "co-prosperity sphere" for Australia,53 created by Evatt. The 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee printed a report on 4 March 1944 analysing the 
Australian-New Zealand Agreement. This committee assessed the military capabilities of 
Australia and New Zealand and concluded that the 'implication in the Australian-New 
Zealand Agreement that these countries are capable of defending all or part of these islands 
has no foundation in reality. ,54 The obvious conclusion was how then, could they be 
expected to defend Pacific Island territories when they could not defend themselves? The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the Australian-New Zealand Agreement was absurd. 
On 4 February Prescott Childs, Charge d' Affaires of the United States Legation in 
Wellington, handed a message to Fraser from Hull. Hull said that he understood the desire 
of Australia and New Zealand to make an agreement on items of common concern. But, he 
continued on a different note, 'I am frankly disturbed ... at the proposal of the two 
governments to call an early conference of powers with territorial interests in the South and 
Southwest Pacific to consider the problem of regional security and related matters. ,55 
Roosevelt also agreed that it was too soon to consider such a conference and this had 
already been indicated unofficially to the Australian government. Such a conference might 
have adverse effects upon the maintenance of a united war effort. It would focus upon 
conflicting opinions and downplay areas of agreement. Hull said that Fraser should have 
discussions with himself before any conference was called. The real reason for Hull's 
51 Ibid, P 306. 
52 Ibid.. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Childs to Fraser; 4 February 1944; DNZER 1, Doc 59. 
opposition to the international conference was because he was adamant that if any such 
conference was to be called, it would be called by the United States, not by a small 
dominion in the Southwest Pacific. 
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Curtin and Fraser both agreed to visit Washington in April 1944 on their way to the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London. Hull took this opportunity to dress 
down both Fraser and Nash (who accompanied him) about the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement. He said that it was outspoken and directed against the United States. Curtin 
received similar treatment when he visited Hull. On 25 April, Curtin had lunch with 
Roosevelt. Afterwards they spoke about the Australian-New Zealand Agreement. 
Roosevelt said that he assumed that it had been mainly the work of Evatt. Curtin agreed. 
Roosevelt commented that 'it will be best for us to forget the whole incident'. 56 
Admiral King, the United States Chief of Naval Operations was exasperated by the 
Australian-New Zealand agreement. This was not surprising given the intentions of the 
United States Navy to secure bases in the Pacific. In May 1944, King refused to allow New 
-~r 
Zealand squadron~ participate in operations against the central Pacific Islands. Fraser 
instructed Nash to seek an interview with King. Nash did so and realised that King had 
taken the Australian-New Zealand Agreement personally. It was not until the matter had 
been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that New Zealand was allowed a continuing limited 
role in the Pacific War. 
Why did the United States react so strongly to the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement? It labelled the agreement as a regional pact - a perception which Australia and 
New Zealand had hoped to avoid. The United States government was particularly sensitive 
to the Tasman neighbours challenging American infiltration into the Pacific. The Pacific 
was regarded by it as an American pond. It was the United States which was directing the 
war in the Pacific. It was American blood that was being spilt. It was the strength of the 
United States fleet that turned back the Japanese fleet at the crucial battles of the Coral Sea 
and Midway. Australia and New Zealand benefited from these crucial battles. The 
combined numerical contribution of the Australian and New Zealand war effort beside that 
56 Note by Brown of Conversation between Curtin and Roosevelt; 25 April 1944; DAFP VII; Doc 116. 
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of the United States was small. Consequently, the United States was not going to allow 
two small powers to dictate that their permission was necessary before any land in the 
Pacific could change hands. Evatt's intention to call an international conference of all 
powers interested in the South and Southwest Pacific evoked a particularly sour response 
from the United States. It was determined that this would not happen. The Australian 
government's determination to call an international conference to discuss the Pacific was 
seen as outrageous and insulting. The United States had assumed that it would be the 
country to call such a conference. Even the United States calling such a conference was an 
unlikely scenario. This was because the United States preferred to discuss the shape of the 
post-war Pacific in privacy with British, Russian and Chinese authorities, without the 
interference of small nations like Australia and New Zealand. 
Berendsen was surprised by the reactions of Britain and the United States to the 
Australia New Zealand Agreement. He said that he 'expected much greater 
repercussions,57 than what happened. He expected that publishing the Agreement would 
cause 'quite a large splash' but it seems 'that it has only made a ripple or two,.58 Strangely 
enough, McIntosh felt that the British and American reactions were quite strong and he 
seemed surprised at Berendsen's comments. He replied that 'if you (Berendsen) expected a 
reaction of greater intensity then I feel somewhat relieved at what actually did occur. ,59 
These comments were before Fraser visited Washington and became aware of the outrage 
that the United States felt about this agreement. 
On 15 February the British War Cabinet met and discussed the Australian-New 
Zealand agreement, where Cranborne revealed some fascinating insights into recent 
developments of trans-Tasman relations. Fraser had told Batterbee about the message that 
he and Curtin had received from Hull (through Prescot Childs) on 4 February about the 
United States response to the Canberra Pact. Fraser had replied to Hull that New Zealand 
would not call a conference before the Prime Ministers conference in London. Curtin said 
that he had wanted Australia and New Zealand to make identical replies to Hull. Fraser felt 
that this would be a mistake and felt that Britain should be informed about Hull's telegram. 
57 Berendsen to McIntosh, 21 February 1944, McGibbon, Undiplomatic Dialogue, p 65. 
58 Ibid. 
59 McIntosh to Berendsen, 25 February 1944, Ibid, P 67. 
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This was because it related to calling an international conference to which Britain would be 
invited. This comment shows that the New Zealand government was still operating within 
an imperial system, and felt that it ought to inform Britain of any new developments. While 
Curtin admitted that he had no intention of informing Britain he said that Fraser could do so 
if he so wished. Berendsen then told Curtin that Fraser had shown to Batterbee both the 
notes from Hull (via Childs) and the New Zealand reply. He said that Fraser thought that 
Curtin should inform Cross as the New Zealand government had informed Batterbee. 
Cranborne then revealed some confidential impressions that Batterbee had gained from 
Fraser about consultation with Australia. 'Speaking confidentially the Prime Minister 
[Fraser] said that he was rather glad that the incident had occurred as "it brought matters 
into the open"'. This incident was the difference of opinions over whether to inform Britain 
about what was happening. Batterbee continued saying that Fraser was 'secretly pleased 
that the Americans have immediately reacted, as he warned Curtin and Evatt that they 
would. He is also, I suspect, not entirely displeased that the practical difficulties of the 
provisions for consultation in the agreement are already being shown up. ,60 Batterbee also 
said that Fraser was pleased with Britain's reaction to the Australia-New Zealand 
Agreement. Batterbee wrote that 'To have shown any sign of soreness (and I think: he 
realises that there is some ground for such a feeling) would have been a great mistake. ' 
Did the Australian-New Zealand Agreement achieve its objectives? Its main 
objective was to ensure that Australia and New Zealand would be consulted in the 
formation of post-war Pacific policy. The governments of Australia and New Zealand failed 
to achieve this. Both countries had little input into the Dumbarton Oaks Conference where 
the draft United Nations Charter was drawn up. Neither country was consulted about the 
Yalta conference which also discussed Japan. More importantly, neither was consulted 
about the Potsdam Declaration, which defined the terms of Japan's surrender. Even 
ensuring that their signatures appeared on the surrender document that was signed on the 
battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 proved to be a struggle. 
An adverse consequence of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement was that it spelt 
the end of the Pacific War Council. Ironically, one of Australia's motivating forces for the 
60 Memo by Cranbome to War Cabinet~ 15 February 1944~ British Views. 
107 
agreement was its dissatisfaction with the Pacific War Council. Evatt was stung by Hull's 
criticisms of the agreement. He sent a note to Nelson Johnson, the United States Minister 
in Australia, to justify the actions of Australia and New Zealand.61 However, in doing so he 
breached the confidentiality of the Pacific War Council by citing three occasions when 
Roosevelt had mentioned the post-war Pacific. Roosevelt was outraged as the Pacific War 
Council kept no official minutes and its proceedings were unknown even by the State 
Department. Roosevelt used this incident as an excuse to dissolve the Council. 
A minor success of the Agreement was that it did encourage trans-Tasman 
consultation. The flow of information across the Tasman did increase as the Secretariats in 
Wellington and Canberra maintained consultation. This led to the Australian-New Zealand 
meetings that were held in Wellington in November 1944. However, the momentum of 
trans-Tasman co-operation was soon lost for some years. 
The greatest success of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement was the 
establishment of the South Pacific Commission in 1947. Even this was a watered down 
version of what Evatt had envisioned. It was an advisory body concerned with social and 
economic matters of the island peoples. It had no political or executive powers. This 
commission included members from Australia, New Zealand, Britain, the United States, 
France and the Netherlands. 
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement failed to achieve its objectives with the two 
minor exceptions of increased trans-Tasman consultation and the South Pacific 
Commission. The agreement did not have any significant influence on the United States. It 
did not discourage the United States from infiltrating into the Pacific. More importantly, 
Australia and New Zealand were not consulted about the post-war Pacific. It was however, 
important as a statement of Australian and New Zealand foreign policy, clearly showing that 
both nations were determined to playa significant role in the South and Southwest Pacific. 
Although not recognised as such at the time, the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement was a landmark in trans-Tasman relations. It was the first formal agreement 
61 See DAFP VII; Doc 56 for Evatt's breech of confidentiality. 
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signed between the two countries. Symbolically, it was important in recalling and 
cementing Anzac co-operation. Australians and New Zealanders had formed a close war-
time bond on the slopes of Gallipoli in 1915, that was forgotten in the inter-war years. In 
the Second World War they had fought side by side in Greece, Crete and in North Africa. 
The Agreement was symbolic of the shared war experiences and common threats faced by 
Australians and New Zealanders in war. It also symbolised~the unity that was achieved X 
both on the battlefields and politically when attempting to influence Britain and the United 
States. In the years to come when trans-Tasman relations were again reaching levels of 
indifference, Australia and New Zealand looked back to the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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The nature of trans-Tasman relations changed dramatically on a number of occasions 
throughout the course of the Second World War. The Australian and New Zealand 
governments were drawn together twice to meet two uncomfortable outside influences -
one a threatening invasion, and another affecting Australian freedom of action in the Pacific. 
Before the war trans-Tasman relations had been severely limited, operating within an 
imperial framework that was centred upon London. The situation was such that Lieutenant 
Colonel Stevens commented that Australian and New Zealand governments heard about 
each other's activities through Committee ofImperial Defence papers from London. 
The outbreak of war in September 1939 had little effect upon this situation, inspite 
of the attempt at co-ordination made in the Wellington defence conference in April 1939. 
Misunderstandings did result from the lack of consultation. This was demonstrated in 
November 1939 when the New Zealand government decided to send its expeditionary force 
overseas. Despite such misunderstandings the Australian and New Zealand governments 
independently followed similar policies without consultation. This was because they both 
adhered to and operated within the imperial framework. There was little desire within 
political or diplomatic circles on either side of the Tasman for closer trans-Tasman relations. 
The opening of the Pacific war in December 1941 brought dramatic change. The 
Australian and New Zealand governments were both threatened by advancing Japanese 
forces. This first uncomfortable outside influence caused them to work closely together. 
They decided to act together to increase their influence in Washington to persuade the 
United States to do more to stop Japanese advances in the Pacific. Although Australia and 
New Zealand were small powers, they did gain some minor successes. These included the 
establishment of the Anzac Naval Command and the Pacific War Council. The Australian 
and New Zealand government's efforts gained them some consultation, but no real 
influence. 
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In the wider arena, the Japanese threat was significant because it marked the 
declining power of the Empire-Commonwealth in relation to the rising power of the United 
States in the Pacific. The United States forces met the Japanese threat at the battles of the 
Coral Sea and Midway in May and June 1942. The Australian and New Zealand 
governments reacted in different ways to these developments. The Australian government's 
relations with the Empire-Commonwealth soured dramatically. Curtin's government 
appeared to move out of the imperial framework and sought close relations with the United 
States. The New Zealand government, in contrast, was more inclined to remain within the 
imperial framework and did not react dramatically to the decline of the Empire-
Commonwealth. 
The Australian and New Zealand government's different reactions to the decline of 
the Empire-Commonwealth and rise of the United States were accentuated by their differing 
approaches to external affairs, particularly their contrasting diplomatic styles. Both the 
Tasman neighbours wanted more influence in Washington. However, the Australian 
government's approach to external affairs was forceful, robust and demanding while the 
New Zealand government was deferential to Britain and tactful to the United States. This 
was because the Australian government realised that the Empire-Commonwealth was in 
decline and that the new world order would be centred upon the United States. This was 
not the case for the New Zealand government which on one level was aware that the future 
lay with the United States but was reluctant to change and its external affairs approach was 
largely unchanged. Australia and New Zealand were small powers and despite their efforts, 
they exerted only minimal influence upon the United States. It was clear, though, that the 
Australian government's persistent approach was more successful in drawing attention to 
their concerns than the New Zealand government's polite requests. 
When the threat of the Japanese had lessened, Australian-New Zealand relations 
became severely strained reaching crisis point in mid 1943. This crisis in relations 
highlighted the different understandings and approaches to relations with Britain and the 
United States that Australia and New Zealand had from 1942 onwards. The fundamental 
reason for the crisis in trans-Tasman relations was their differing policies regarding 
manpower and the location of their armed forces. While the Australian government bought 
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back its three divisions from the Middle East to fight in the Pacific theatre, New Zealand left 
its division to fight North Africa and then in Italy. 
The second uncomfortable outside influence that united the Australian and New 
Zealand governments ironically came from their new ally and protector in 1942; the United 
States. After the Japanese had been turned back, the Australian government felt decidedly 
uncomfortable by the United States intentions in the Pacific. Evatt feared that the United 
States might succeed the Empire-Commonwealth in the Pacific. He wanted Australia and 
New Zealand to be the two major powers in the South Pacific and consequently did not 
welcome the United States' interest in this area. From October 1943, the Australian and 
New Zealand governments again developed close political relations. This was exemplified 
by the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January 1944. Although not recognised as 
such at the time, the Australian-New Zealand Agreement was a landmark. Both countries 
were expressing their independent foreign policies in the Pacific. However, once the 
uncomfortable outside influence passed close trans-Tasman relations were lost for some 
years. The Australian-New Zealand Agreement was their first step towards the ANZUS 
Pact with the United States. 
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